

THE CROZER QUARTERLY

April, 1944

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THE CROZER QUARTERLY

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MAN'S ANSWER TO GOD'S WORK IN HISTORY

NELS F. S. FERRÉ

Andover Newton Theological School

OUR ATTITUDE toward present history and toward the future of humanity depends a great deal not only on our view of God but also on our view of man. It is, of course, true that in Christian theology our doctrine of man should ultimately be a corollary of our doctrine of God, and that, conversely, our idea of man should have definite implications regarding our idea of God. The history of theology, however, proves that this is far from the case. Theology has been greatly guilty of basic inconsistency. An important reason for this inconsistency is the fact that the main content of theology is necessarily historical. Theologians quite naturally have tried to include as much as possible of historical Christian faith. In so doing, traditional theology has been indiscriminating. It has included much historical material irreconcilable with the basic patterns of Christian truth. Christian thinkers today, therefore, need to work fearlessly from the Christian principles themselves to produce a Christian theology both adequate as to historical content and yet lacking in fundamental disharmony. The "tension of faith" is often made the scapegoat for the theologian's desire to include all historical assertions at the expense of consistency. Faith's credulity, however, is no reason for basic incongruities in theology. Modern irrationalism is a flight for refuge. Faith's tension is, rather, due to the disparity between the ideal and the actual. Legitimate faith harbors no inconsistency in its ultimate principles of interpretation. Its basic patterns are throughout harmonious. Above faith's tension between the ideal and the actual, moreover, is its calm conviction that the ideal is ultimately more real than the actual and that it can transform it. This is the heart of Christian religion. The tension of faith is the tension of time.

Christian theology is confident, furthermore, that the facts of history can best be understood in the light of faith. It believes that no hypothesis can better fit all the facts of our historic process than its own principles of explanation. Christianity has no need to appeal to irrationalism or to the closed mind. Convinced of its truth, it dares to face the facts.

Our present study, therefore, tries to understand man in the light of Christian principles of interpretation. For us this means that man is

made for a God-centred freedom and faithfulness in fellowship based on the kind of love first fully revealed and made effective as light and life in Jesus Christ. This formula, we believe, explains the facts of experience when they are adequately understood. When someone said to Hegel that his theories did not square with the facts, he is supposed to have replied, "So much the worse for the facts." This reply contains real insight. Sometimes men have thought so long in terms of other presuppositions, or worked so consistently with inadequate methods and standards, that they cannot have *their* facts fit a true theory. Nevertheless, unless we are to resort to some sort of agnosticism in the realm of material truth, we must hold that applicability to facts is one necessary test of theory. The application, however, must be to the facts themselves, not to current opinions based upon distorting presuppositions or methods. The Christian interpretation of man's answer to God's work in history, therefore, must as far as possible meet two standards: in the first place, it must be Christian; but in the second place, it must also adequately explain man's experience as a whole. However inadequate the individual interpreter may feel himself to be, if he is to give a Christian interpretation, he cannot escape the responsibility of these two claims upon his thinking.

A general but primary fact is that man is an organic whole functioning through different aspects of his being. The aspects are organic, essential expressions of man as a whole. Nevertheless, they often conflict. Through unity in and above conflicting functions of his being, normal man grows. Man is also a self-determining organism even though his choices are throughout conditioned by his inheritance, his training, and his experience. The primary fact of both personal and social experience is thus that normal man as a whole is a responsible being, albeit that responsibility is limited to as much of his life as he can understand and control. Deterministic psychologies do not explain the central facts of experience, but merely explain away the primary data in terms of subhuman categories. Spencer, for instance, tried to explain man's primary experience of willing by saying that what man really felt was the hesitancy of nature in him as it adjusted itself to a new situation. Much of modern psychology, to use another illustration, denies entirely the validity of introspective evidence, and confines its method to objective tests affording exact measurement and public verifiability. With an inadequate and inappropriate method this psychology works on the periphery of the meaning of man, and consequently obtains mostly negative irrelevancies. The pitiful part is, of course, that many modern thinkers consider such conclusions the gospel of fact and refuse to accept more adequate inquiries lest they be deceived by wishful thinking. Even Christian scholars have become intellectually, if not spiritually, emaciated through the reducing process of an irrelevant

scientific method. The full truth about man is not less, in any case, than that he is a responsible, organic whole functioning through aspects of him which often conflict.

Man as an organic whole, moreover, receives from beyond himself most of the stuff of life. What he actually inherits is, of course, a highly disputed matter. The complete immutability of the genes, however, seems not altogether tenable. Lamarckianism in ever new forms presses the fact that acquired characteristics may be inherited. Particularly important for the understanding of man is, of course, the theory of microevolution as the result of the accumulation of gene mutations. No theory, however, whether concerned with gene or chromosome, can readily deny the primary fact that the transmission of physical energy from one generation to another is somehow structuralized. This basic fact cuts much deeper than the shifting opinion about many other theories, for instance, about the nature and even presence of instincts. Whatever be the shifts in opinion regarding physical inheritance, it seems, nevertheless, safe to say that it is not a neutral affair. It is not a case of the transmission of *materia prima*. The inherited tendency to pathological conditions, for instance, is taken very seriously by investigators in the field. It makes little difference for our purposes whether the genes are open to direct modification, or whether much inheritance is effected in a different manner, or even comes at a different stage, say, through some process in prenatal development. Man's original physical endowment, in any case, contains structure. Certain recent studies of inheritance on the human level, in the case of identical twins, make inheritance assume preponderant importance over environmental factors. Mendel's laws and the history of the subsequent investigations as to dominant and recessive characteristics, even on the human level, also indicate that physical inheritance is by no means haphazard.

The stuff of life also consists of a mental endowment. Man is born a man and not a monkey. Even though the extent of mental endowment is not, to our knowledge, completely predetermined, intelligence in general is an inherited characteristic. Some depth psychologists also claim inherited mental content, even the subconscious retention of specific ideas. The thesis of Freud's *Moses and Monotheism*, for instance, stands or falls with this contention. The future may reveal our present environmental theories to be misleading and crippling. They may be extremely onesided and thus superficial. It may even be that moral and spiritual powers are partly inherited. They may perhaps be thought of as original endowments, partly transmitted through the generations which have to some extent modified them, and partly given directly by God to each new individual. Just as we have not equal physical and mental endowments, so the image

of God in us may also vary in its original intensity. In this way God would deal both with the generations and with private persons. Seeberg's theory that Jesus differed from man in general by an original endowment of God in him, by a special "given," may express a much wider truth. God may speak through the original depths of our being. The unconscious may, of course, be defined as our environment rather than as part of ourselves. This is done in the interest of strict rationality and of moral responsibility. In that case we have a neat little, consciously moral man who is largely a self-made affair. It seems truer to the facts of experience as a whole, however, to include the subconscious within our very selves. James' theory of the subliminal or marginal consciousness and Whitehead's reach for the deeper man beyond "the crown of consciousness" express vital and much needed truth. From one point of view, Groddeck is surely to a great extent right when he says that we do not live our lives; our lives live us. There is much unknown stuff of life which is part of us. It doubtless goes much deeper and is more far-reaching than we have any idea. Whether or not theories like Jung's unconscious racial self have much truth in them, there is a deeper self that we never fully understand. *The self-determination of the human organism can never be apart from this deeper stuff of life.* Man operates in and through it. He is continually conditioned by it. For that reason even our own choices are seen, not only sometimes as rationalizations, but also as decisions mysterious and only partially understood.

Man's responsible decisions are thus not entirely clear and free but always in and through his conditioning stuff. Besides this, there is his conditioning content of ideas. Leaving aside claims to direct inheritance of ideas whether, for instance, by Plato of old or by Freud of recent times, we find that our ideas come from two sources: social training and personal experience. Most of what we know we receive from others whether by formal or informal instruction. Extremely important at this point is Durkheim's theory of imitation. The content of man's mind, both as to ideas and as to attitudes, is due mostly to imitation. Knowledge as a whole is a social act to which individuals contribute only meagerly. Social inheritance, moreover, can be externally transmitted without direct testing in individual experience. There are cases where personal experiment is entirely inconsistent with further human experience, like the taking of strychnine. Or a person, for example, who has been taught that dancing or cardplaying is wrong may feel very strongly about it without any personal experience on the subject. Within the individual, however, there is also the recapitulation on a much reduced scale of the winnowed wisdom of the race. This aspect of knowledge is of utmost importance. For its highest efficacy imitation must, of course, be based on living instruc-

tion. Even formal training becomes vital only when it produces, whether actually or in sympathetic imagination, vital imitation.

Imitation alone, however, does not explain knowledge. It can explain, to a limited extent, the survival of knowledge. Even then, if fresh knowledge were not constantly produced, there would be a fatal and swift leak in human ideas. Books, records, and all similar channels for preserving knowledge are unable to guarantee its survival. Besides, imitation in no way provides for the arrival of new knowledge. Tarde called the new which the individual contributed "invention." This term, of course, seems inadequate, and in any case fails to express the cosmic depths behind all lasting ideas, whether they be true or distorted; but personal experience is at least the channel and part producer of the content of ideas. Ideas are never fully living, however emotionally compelling, until they become part of personal experience. Each mind must clothe with its own life and understanding the abstract symbols which convey truth. Some minds, whether by emergence or by revelation, invent or discover new truth. They very likely turn potentiality into actuality rather than pure possibility into reality—in any case, they add to man's content of mind. At this point, therefore, we have responsible individuals operating through a given stuff of life and through a content of mind due to social inheritance and to personal experience. So far, however, we have described only the background of selfhood, not man himself in his search for a full and free fellowship.

Each self, we have said, is an *organic whole* functioning through aspects which often conflict. Even though the old facultative psychology was woefully insufficient, it yet contained this much truth. These aspects are the will, the feelings, the reason, and the conscience. Each individual is a will. We agree with the modern psychology which describes will as the self in action. Without will there is no personal individuality. Will, moreover, is more than an organ of decision. It is, first of all, self-affirmation. It is naturally true, nevertheless, that self-affirmation in a world of process can never be apart from a never-ending series of decisions. Behind all these concrete decisions, however, lies the will itself. Schopenhauer was right in his idea that "the will to live" is the basic drive of the will behind all its specific acts;¹ but he was right only as far as its form is concerned. Nietzsche was right, too, in claiming that man has a natural will to power. The will to power is a natural part of every man. Alfred Adler also observed man correctly when he asserted man's deepest drive to be the desire for superiority. The will to live is the form of the will itself. The will to power or to social superiority is the original content of

¹ We recognize, of course, the difference of our interpretation from Schopenhauer's theory of the will, especially in its cosmic dimensions.

human will,² except possibly insofar as the form itself, or the will to live, can be considered content. The understanding of the undesirability of this original content of the human will is the truth of Buddhism. It is also the truth of Hinduism with its desire to escape from self-centred illusion into objective reality (*saccidananda*). This is at inmost the truth of Christianity's "ye must be born again." This is the truth of Kant's "radical evil" in man. This is the truth of all those modern thinkers who see man as naturally evil. It is not so much that man is by nature deliberately evil as that he is driven by a desire to live, the original content of which forms selfishly around a social instinct which means that life is measured in terms of others. Man naturally wants self-security and self-satisfaction. These he cannot understand how to find except by invidious comparison. Life is a struggle where everyone seeks to amount to something, to be something. Man's social instinct makes him measure himself by other people. He tends, therefore, to belittle their position in order to enhance his own, to depreciate their achievements in order to appreciate his own or have it appreciated, to develop personal and social dislikes and hatreds in order to feel sure that he and those who agree with him have something worth while.

Though all this is true, it is, nevertheless, only a partial truth. Man is naturally self-centred. His likes are naturally limited. Man has not naturally, to be sure, hatred in his soul; but his fear, his distrust, and his strong desire to get ahead may make for hatred of the people who stand in his way or who fail to appreciate him. Perhaps the original content of the will may suggestively be called the will to social recognition. Self-centredness and self-concern, however, are not the primary form of the will itself. The form is the will to live. In a world of struggle, of competing wills, self-affirmation, however, quite naturally takes on self-concern and self-centredness as the original content or material of the will.

It is dangerous to speak of the will apart from the stuff of life and the content of mind. The will reaches out to meet a world which, in turn, acts constantly on it. The relation of the self as will and of the world is one of constant, dynamic interaction. The self learns gradually to understand itself and its world by means of ideas. The self, its world, and the ideas that the self has of it constantly interact. These ideas are never without feelings. Feelings are the way the self reacts to itself and its world. Feeling may be only the slight awareness of the boredom accompanying the dismissal of the irrelevant. Or the feeling which arises as the self reacts to the significant may fill it with overpowering emotions. Feelings are the self's registering its attitude toward its world. The experience of the self is always in terms of both ideas and feelings, however vague one or

² Sadism, the will to die, and similar phenomena are readily explainable in these terms.

the other may be. There are no ideas without feelings and no feelings without ideas. If the necessary connection between idea and feeling were kept in mind, much unrealistic theory would be avoided.

The feelings are neutral in the sense that they are uncolored until they have been colored either by teaching or by direct experience. They have, however, one drive of their own: they seek expression. The inner drive of the emotions as an aspect of the self is self-affirmation. Otherwise they are neutral. There is no intellectual or moral judgment in the feelings *per se*. The feelings received their color from social training or personal experience. Feelings depend upon the ideas of the self, based mostly on its past as it is appropriately recalled through memory.

Reason is also neutral or uncolored in the sense that it has no specific inherited content. It, too, becomes colored through training and experience. Through memory the reason continually stores up its reactions to the world. The content of mind is, therefore, a reservoir of ideas surrounded with emotions, or *vice versa*, of emotions containing nuclei of ideas. Reason in itself is neither good nor bad. Consistency is not itself a good—not, at least, unless it be consistency with an absolute ideal. This ideal, however, does not come ready-made. A person can be consistent even in sin. Reason can be used both to reason for the truth or to rationalize.³ It can be used in the service both of the good and of the bad will. Reason, like all the functions of the self, however, wants self-expression. In man there is an innate drive both to know and to be consistent. For this reason stubbornness is not only emotional or willful “cussedness.” Some of its drive it derives from the reason’s inner demand for self-consistency.

Our analysis so far has prepared for our explanation of man’s answer to God’s work in history. We must now make clear how moral judgments arise and how Christianity best answers man’s quest for the true good. Reason, as we have seen, through memory, can tell whether an object or course of action is pleasant or unpleasant. Some thinkers, like Ralph Barton Perry, build a whole theory of ethics on this basis. Whatever is an object of interest is value; if of positive interest, it is good; if of negative interest, it is bad. The history of value judgments reveals what men most inclusively want. This is a democratic, naturalistic approach to ethics which begs no questions. Unfortunately, the matter goes much deeper than that. The good is not only the pleasant. It is also the right. And right is more than obligation in the sense of the authority of the total self over the partial self. The right, moreover, cannot be explained merely in terms of socially produced standards which have been imposed on or induced in the individual so that after a while they form part of his own value judgments. Right is more, again, than a

³ This is one aspect of the truth that underlies Anselm’s *credo ut intelligam*.

matter of social welfare gradually arrived at by social experience. The notion of right and its power over people would not arise unless it was somehow constitutive of man's nature rather than merely conventional. The sense of rightness is as natural a part of man as hunger. It can be dulled, desperately confused, and weakened by ignorance and indifference. The Buddhists with much insight call dullness man's worst evil, because while he is dull he does not even know enough to wish to escape the evils of life. However covered up, some sense of right, nevertheless, is part of every man. Christian theology knows this fact of experience to be due to God's image in man. Only if the form of right be innate, can the content be organically acquired. This is the truth of Kant's categorical imperative. Every man, unless he be morally diseased, has some urge to do the right and some standard of it, however vague and perverted. Every man, that is, responds in some measure to the image of God in him. Man is thus an organism functioning as a whole but through aspects which may often conflict. These aspects we have found to be will, reason, emotions, and the image of God.

The conflict in man must now be explained. The image of God like all the other aspects is neutral in the sense that it, too, has no specific content. Its general urge for self-affirmation, for the right, is, however, social in nature. Philosophers, and especially modern thinkers, are much impressed by man's sense for society. They know that man is naturally a social being. Man's urge for the right is for fellowship as part of his very being. The neutrality of God's image in man is due to its lack of definite empirical content. The image of God does not by itself say what is right. According to Christian theology, man is made for God and for fellowship in the spirit of Christ; and life proves, as we shall see, that he will have an unsatisfied urge unless and until this need be filled. The way it is to be filled, nevertheless, is explained only by a long process of actual experience. *The empirical content of the image of God is man's conscience.* It is rightly called conscience (social knowledge) since even religious and moral knowledge are social acts. They depend on the ages.

Man's conscience is filled concretely by social training, by individual experience, and by individual reasoning upon both of these. This explains why two people who are both devoutly religious can have consciences diametrically opposed on the same issue. Men have been taught differently. The respective innate urges for right have been filled with ideas, associated with emotions, which are inconsistent. Men have received different attitudes toward the same things. Thus, for instance, numberless people in the history of religion have danced unto God, while others, if they danced at all, would feel God's condemnation over them. An individual, moreover, by a vivid personal experience or by the groping of his mind

can have come to conclusions beyond those of the group. He feels God to be speaking through him and is willing to die, if need be, for the right. Both the group and the individual may feel that they represent God's will. Both act by the urge of God's image in them. The inquisitors and the martyrs both praised God. Saul and the early Christians whom he persecuted were both fervently religious. Calvin and Servetus both acted with religious sincerity in their pitiful relations. The image of God is the source of all these actions, but the contents of the image of God, the individual consciences, differ because of different social backgrounds, different personal experiences, and different ways of thinking.

This view of the conscience as the empirical content of the image of God explains, furthermore, why the conscience is both God's speaking in man and yet fallible. It is a dreadful thing to act against one's conscience, and yet the verdict of the conscience is not absolute. It also explains why there may be divisions in one man's conscience. The conscience is not of one cloth. Naturally, there are difficulties of conscience when man is confronted by seemingly irreconcilable loyalties. The case of Sophocles' Antigone is sufficiently illustrative. She was under holy obligation both to serve the king and to bury her brother. When the king had forbidden her to bury her brother, how could she possibly fulfill both her duties? But there are other instances of a divided conscience. A conflict may come between what we have learned from others and what we have ourselves experienced or thought. Or it may come between our early and our later training. Sometimes the conscience stays confused. Sometimes new light has convinced the mind, while the heart is still alien to the new truth. As a matter of fact, the mind tends to be radical in its drive for truth. It seeks for self-affirmation, to know. The feelings, on the other hand, are the conservative part of our nature. They crave immediate expression in accustomed channels. A balance is always needed between the two.

The conscience, of course, is more than mental. Its content is made up of ideas clustered around with emotions. The deepest emotions, furthermore, are often the ones received in early life. Our childhood attitudes tend to come back constantly. Freud was right when he talked about a *superego*. The superego in us is mostly parental, too; but behind the parental, which is often the most vivid content of conscience, lies the form itself, the image of God in us. New truth, therefore, is not welcome to the conservative feelings, except as it satisfies some previous emotional drive. These truths, however, when sufficiently convincing, evoke feelings of their own. They form a new complex of idea-emotions in the conscience. After a while, consequently, a tense conflict may arise between inconsistent old and new feelings. This conflict becomes acute when the

self as will must act. Then it must decide between them. The old content may be more right than the new idea. The truth of the old heart may be more right than the truth of the new head. Conscience, if it be strong and vital, demands careful examination of both sets of idea-feelings. The self thereupon either accepts or rejects the new idea, or must stand confused between them. The healthy soul keeps struggling until a definite decision takes place. He does not put off the conflict and thus gradually quench the spirit. He may be forced by the light of new truth to act against the stronger feelings in his conscience. That is, the true course of action, as he sees it, may have to break with the deep feelings associated with old ideas. *The conflicts of conscience are due to the fact that the image of God has no specific content.* It only urges to the right in a general manner. The empirical content of the image of God, or man's conscience, depends upon its social sources, and upon its personal experience. Conflicts arise because the social sources disagree and because experience provides new light. Is conscience, then, unreliable as a whole? Up to now we have considered only the diversity of conscience. In what sense can Christianity provide a standard for it which best fulfills its nature and needs?

We have found that man becomes naturally self-centred by the very urge to live. The original form of life we described as self-affirmation. The content that first fills the will to live we called an urge for social recognition. The needed or ideal content of man's life, however, is fellowship with God and man on the basis of Christian love. For this he is made. He cannot be satisfied before he finds it. This is man's destiny. There thus arises what Tillich calls a conflict between man's essential and existential self. Luther rooted this struggle in his distinction between true Christian freedom and man's natural *incurvatus se*. If we keep in mind our description of reason and of feelings, this conflict becomes partially understandable. The feelings want immediate gratification, demand their self-expression. The reason may point out that such immediate gratification involves the sacrifice of the larger good, usually the larger future good. The reason is, as Whitehead calls it, "the enlightenment of purpose." It can be used by the self either in the service of the natural drive of the feelings toward present satisfaction, or in the service of the self as will seeking the larger good made clear to it through training or reasoned experience.

So far we have, nevertheless, only a Platonic struggle between the reason and the passions. The "spirited part" of man must pull with one or the other. This is true as far as it goes. But there is another truth of utmost importance. The image of God has acquired an empirical content which is man's conscience. This declares that the yielding to the craving for immediate emotional satisfaction is where inexpedient much more than that: it is wrong. When this wrong is treated by a conscience

informed by religious training, it is declared to be sinful. The self as will must then choose between right and wrong, between God's will and sin. The image of God in accordance with its intensity in each man makes actions qualitatively different from all hedonisms or utilitarianisms. It invests them with an absolute quality. It anchors all teleological considerations in the ultimate form of religious responsibility and decision. Man may then rationalize his action and find good reason for doing what is sinful. Reason is the servant of purpose. Man's fundamental problem, therefore, is always with the deeper direction of his self as will. Since the original form of the will to self-affirmation naturally makes man self-centred and basically selfish, no religious living in the deeper sense is possible without religious conversion. *Conversion is the quickening and strengthening of man's image of God in its influence on the will.* God's image craves society. Self-centredness effects isolation. Man's dissatisfaction grows. Man is thus driven by two urges. The self as will, unless it be "born again," wants self-centred satisfaction. Its desire for social recognition is based on invidious comparison. The essential content for which man is made, however, fellowship on the basis of love, also drives him on. Man needs a social centre. Only as he becomes God-centred, moreover, can he find an adequate social centre. God-centredness, when genuine, is also deeply concerned with human fellowship. Personal piety may, of course, be the subtlest form of self-centredness. The "love of brethren," therefore, must always be the test of a man's having an adequate social centre.

Man's conscience must find this God-centredness and this love for others before it is mature and able to meet life as it is with desired efficacy. But it cannot get away from itself by itself. Man, in accordance with the intensity of his spiritual life, is continually torn between the self desiring social recognition by invidious comparison and the best content of conscience. Only worship, by making available God's grace, can quicken the self to will that for which it was made. Only worship can make man free from himself for himself through his unselfish concern for others in Christian fellowship. Preaching or spiritual instruction, formal or informal, must, of course, give the content to the conscience which makes the will desire to be regenerated. Fortunately, Christian faith finds that revelation discloses both God's nature and man's. Revelation makes clear not only what God wants with man but also what man potentially is. Man's own feelings of suffering, isolation, and frustration, on the other hand, "preach" from his personal experience his need of God's way for him. Reason receives all this instruction and illumines both the actual and the ideal. In this light the self must face the decision between its original self-centredness and God. Conversion becomes the only thorough solution.

Whatever emotional crisis may sporadically occur, conversion itself is a long process. *Conversion is God's total work in man's history and his continual answer in life.* It takes a long time for man to see his essential nature. Some never do in this life. And even though one may make a basic decision, life's choices ever after constantly demand decisions. The power of the self as will, to live up to its essential content, is then due to its depth of worship (including sincerity of work according to "the principle of alternation"), its receiving daily from God the strength of his grace to choose the right rather than the wrong, God's will rather than sin.

There is an objective necessity, moreover, why Christian ethics is final for man: in Christianity alone the good and the right are reconciled. The good we define as dispositional; the right as social.⁴ The good is a matter of the individual attitude; the right, a matter of the social situation. Right has to do with the social consequences which would ensue from a certain course of action. A person can mean well and still cause ill. He can mean ill and do a good thing. The true good is the highest possible synthesis of the good and the right. How do the good and the right necessarily fall together in Christianity? Why is Christianity necessarily the true good?

In Christianity the good and the right by their very nature aid each other's growth. The good according to Christianity is the kind of love that is unreservedly interested in others. Christian love is self-giving, creative of fellowship. Since it is by its very nature concerned with the welfare of others, the Christian disposition necessarily demands the right. It is a subjective attitude which is unstintingly objective in reference. Christian love demands that it be also right. It is not only goodness of heart. Love requires the intellectual understanding of the objective social situation that it may work its most good. Christian love grows more and more "in discernment and in all knowledge." But the right also demands the Christian good. There can be no solution of social problems apart from Christian love. Benevolent coöperation alone can bring in a new world. Good will alone can maintain it. *Since the objective situation is always social in nature, being moral and spiritual, the right cannot be realized until the good is also realized.* Thus the subjective and objective needs of man are fully met in Christianity. The right and the good condition each other. Christianity is thus the true good. When Christianity is understood and actually *lived*, social man is redeemed; and individual man, being a social creature, also finds salvation in such fellowship.

⁴ This definition is in line with the important works of Sir W. David Ross: *The Right and the Good*, and *Foundations of Ethics*. Cf. the latter, p. 139: [Right or] "obligatoriness attaches to acts independently of their motives, and moral goodness to them in consequence of their motives."

The Christian disposition of love is thus the standard for the only social experience that can adequately satisfy man. It is the essential content of his nature. Right has thus a divine rooting in the good. Man's true good is God's will for man as revealed in Christianity. The content of right is, culturally speaking, indefinite; its creative possibilities are unknown, but the standard of right remains. It is a God-centred freedom and faithfulness in fellowship based on the kind of love first fully revealed and made effective as light and life in Jesus Christ. This standard is also made gradually clearer through history. Human history is God's patient training of man through his total experience. Even man's social experience has developed and is developing a conscience. The conscience of humanity is slowly acquiring content. History, of course, is long, and we must remember Felix Adler's warning of "the slow tempo inexorably prescribed by the facts of mass psychology."⁵ Before God sent Christ, he trained man through prophets and seers in many lands. In Christ, however, we see the good in matchless fullness, the good which alone can realize the right. Since the time of Jesus, his truths have begun to penetrate the conscience of man. It is a long process and depends mostly on subconscious incubation. But the germination, once started, must continue.

Today Christ confronts the social order. The fury of the world today is to a great extent the fury of an uneasy conscience. For the first time in the history of man, war, for instance, is becoming a matter for apology. The conscience of mankind instead of glorying in it is uneasy about it. The statesman deplores its necessity. The poets who used to sing its glory after every victory have for twenty years sung its utter uselessness. The profit motive as the source of evil, to use another illustration, is openly challenged. Even the media of man's fellowship must be ministerial to morality. The march is to fellowship as God through history works through the pull of his purpose and the push of his progress. When man refuses to accept God's will, the demand of the right for the good, lest society perish, makes him return to it. Man is made for the remaking of society according to Christian principles. To be true to itself, man's nature must slowly find the right in cosmically aided social good will. The social confusion and despair of unaided man demands his surrender to the right which finds its standard in God's will. The work of God in history confronts man. He may say his conscience nay. He may rationalize. But he cannot escape that work. He must answer. If he answers no, gradually his social life is filled with evil and despair. He meets war, confusion, and increasing defeat. To live fruitfully and satisfactorily he must turn to God. His will alone is right, and man cannot do without it.

⁵ Felix Adler, *The Reconstruction of the Spiritual Ideal*, p. 20.

THE GODDESS IN CANAANITE FOLK RELIGION

JAMES B. PRITCHARD

Crozer Theological Seminary

THE CONTRIBUTION of the people of Canaan to the world through Judaism and Christianity is obviously not to be found in the goddess who was worshiped there. It was a god, Yahweh, which subsequent generations have called significant. Yet it is naïve indeed to assume that the idea, which was in a later time appreciated and made popular, was by a former generation similarly cherished. The student of religion in its historical aspects must be careful to distinguish between the popular folk religion of a period and the feeble voice which, although it may have appeared along with the folk religion, did not come to be appreciated until later. Such a popular movement, widely spread but never gaining official status for any considerable length of time, was the folk religion of Canaan from about 2000 to 600 B.C. centring about the lady, the mother of the gods.

The assumption, which I can only briefly outline here, that the official religion portrayed in the Old Testament was different from the popular cult of the masses of Israelites has been widely discussed and rather well substantiated. Indeed, the insight of the prophets is valuable for our day; but it does not follow that these men have always been so esteemed, nor that they represented the common practice of religion in the day to which they belonged.¹ Some years ago Julian Morgenstern ventured to estimate that only about five per cent of the material of the Old Testament comes from the northern kingdom, an area which contained at least seventy-five per cent of the population of the Israelite kingdoms.² Furthermore, the remaining ninety-five per cent of the material, which represents the southern kingdom with but twenty-five per cent of the total population, gives a very one-sided picture of daily life, beliefs, and practices of that kingdom. It is intensely subjective, having been composed and edited from national, prophetic, priestly, and scribal points of view. While one may question Morgenstern's figures, he will wish to agree when he says: "A literal study of the Old Testament unfolds a picture of that ideal national and individual life which the prophets proclaimed and which the later priests and scribes sought to legislate and moralize into being, rather than that practical existence which the people actually lived day by day."³ If the edited material of the Old Testament is not a faithful witness to

¹ For a picture of the cult as practiced in Jerusalem during the first part of the seventh century one has but to read II Kings 23.

² "The Historical Reconstruction of Hebrew Religion and Archaeology" in *Journal of Religion*, I (1921), p. 237.

³ *Ibid.*

the popular religion of Israel, where does the historian find reliable evidence for the cult as it was popularly practiced?

Israel's dependence upon her neighbors for the basic material of her religion is now freely admitted and widely published. What is unique in her contribution is not that which she freely borrowed, but the new combination of these given elements in forms which have proven historically to be useful to society. Such well-known books as Breasted's *Development of Religion and Thought in Ancient Egypt*, Rogers' *Cuneiform Parallels to the Old Testament*, Barton's *Archæology and the Bible* (now in the 7th edition), and Gressmann's *Altorientalische Texte und Bilder zum alten Testament* have served to diffuse the mass of information about the syncretistic character of the religion of the Old Testament.

We who study the Old Testament today stand in a privileged position. The recent exploration of parts of the Near East, the results of excavation in Egypt, Mesopotamia, Palestine, and Syria, the wealth of linguistic material have combined to give us a clearer picture of the part of the past to which Israel belonged than man had ever had.⁴ If the statement of Lord Acton, quoted by Breasted a few years ago, that "next to the discovery of the New World, the recovery of the ancient world is a second landmark that divides us from the Middle Ages and marks the transition to modern life"⁵—if this were true then, how much more true is it now! I shall give but one illustration of the "new past" which is coming into being. On April 25, 1928, a peasant while ploughing his field in North Syria chanced to find remains of an ancient building. Soon the French were excavating at that site, Ras esh-Shamra. Among the many important finds were literary texts which had remained untouched since about 1500 B.C. They were in an unknown script. Within a period of months they were deciphered and found to be religious and mythological texts which give a firsthand account of the religion and the names of the gods and goddesses of that particular period in Canaan. So, while our earliest Hebrew manuscripts of the Bible date from about A.D. 900, we have here a picture of religious belief in a document actually written 2,400 years before the earliest manuscript of the Old Testament. The results of this find alone are epoch-making in the writing of the religious history of Canaan.⁶

As this picture of the beliefs and practices current in Canaan becomes

⁴ Some of the more recent books which give reliable information upon this often-misrepresented subject are: Albright, *From the Stone Age to Christianity* (1940); Burrows, *What Mean These Stones?* (1941); Albright, *Archæology and the Religion of Israel* (1942); McCown, *The Ladder of Progress in Palestine* (1943).

⁵ Charles Breasted, *Pioneer to the Past*, p. 316.

⁶ Popular discussions in English of these finds may be found in J. W. Jack, *The Ras Shamra Tablets and Their Bearing on the Old Testament* (1935); C. F. A. Schaeffer, *The Cuneiform Texts of Ras Shamra-Ugarit* (1939); and in the books mentioned in footnote 4.

clearer, elements found in the Old Testament take on new meaning. Some of these are: sacred prostitution, borrowed myths in Genesis 1-11, art symbols, the mystic cult of the neighboring fertility deities, and the fact that many Israelites worshiped other gods at the same time as Yahweh.⁷ Monotheism does not appear to have been widely accepted in Israel until the time of the Second Isaiah in the sixth century.⁸ When this conception of monotheism arose and became the popular doctrine of Israel, it was read back into the religious history of Israel, so that to us the picture is foreshortened, and to the uncritical reader the evolutionary product of the centuries, which came to full bloom in the sixth century, is carefully concealed in material which purports to describe a much earlier period. T. J. Meek has recently concluded a summary of the evidence for this point of view thus:

But there is no evidence that such a demonstration [of the nonreality of all gods but one] occurred for the Hebrew people before the time of Deutero-Isaiah; hence monotheism cannot be taken for granted earlier than his time and later monotheistic interpretations must not be read into the past. . . .⁹

With this conclusion I see no good reason to disagree.

From the Old Testament itself it is clear that Ahab worshiped the Tyrian gods along with Yahweh and that the majority of Israelites probably saw nothing inconsistent with this liberal practice. Until the time of Josiah's reform other gods were worshiped in Yahweh's temple in Jerusalem. Idols were not objected to before this time, as Pfeiffer has convincingly shown.¹⁰ The reform of Josiah, when it came, sprang from priestly tradition which wished the centralization of worship in Jerusalem and not from the prophetic line. The ban on image making was a useful means of outlawing the provincial centres of worship which were always a liability to the governing priesthood in Jerusalem.

From the results of archæology and of textual criticism of the documents we have come to see the real religion of Israel as an understandable part of a much larger picture which is becoming increasingly clear, a picture of the religious pattern of the ancient Near East. Into this picture the religion of Israel fits like a piece of jigsaw puzzle into the pieces around about it. The picture is fairly stated by Pfeiffer:

⁷ See Beatrice L. Goff, "Syncretism in the Religion of Israel" in *Journal of Biblical Literature*, LVIII (1939), pp. 151-161.

⁸ For a presentation of this point of view see Pfeiffer, *Introduction to the Old Testament* (1941), p. 474, and T. J. Meek, "Monotheism and the Religion of Israel" in *Journal of Biblical Literature*, LXI (1942), pp. 21-43. W. F. Albright held a different view in his presidential address before the Society of Biblical Literature, Dec. 27, 1939; his address is published in *Journal of Biblical Literature*, LIX (1940), pp. 85-112. He modified his position slightly in *Archæology and the Religion of Israel* (1942), pp. 176-178.

⁹ Meek, *op. cit.*, pp. 38 f.

¹⁰ "The Polemic Against Idolatry in the Old Testament" in *Journal of Biblical Literature*, XLIII (1924), pp. 229-240.

The religion of Israel was not, until the reformation of Josiah in 621 B.C., substantially different from the religions of the nations whose territory adjoined the land of Canaan. The conception of Jehovah held by David and Ahab was so strikingly similar to the conception of Chemosh held by Mesha, king of Moab, that Julius Wellhausen could wonder why Jehovah, and not Chemosh, eventually came to be regarded as the sole God of heaven and earth.¹¹

Let us turn to the question of Israel's goddess. We now know the pantheons of Israel's neighbors and of her ancestors. In the pantheons of Sumer, of Babylonia, of north Syria, of Assyria, of Arabia, of Egypt, of the Hittites, of the Hurrians, of the Phœnicians, female deities played a conspicuous and important part. With such a picture of the deities of these many peoples who inhabited the Near East, peoples to some of whom Israel was heavily indebted on other counts, it would be strange indeed to find the early Israelites thinking of their deities solely in masculine terms. So, when one approaches the problem of seeking for the goddesses of the Israelites, he has, before he begins, a rather firm basis for assuming that there may be some evidence of this common phenomenon.

Almost every important site of ancient settlement in Palestine which has been systematically excavated has yielded small clay figurines of a nude female figure. I have published a catalogue of 294 examples of these figurines and have attempted to trace their origins.¹² While the problem of their use is not yet solved, it is rather certain that they had some religious significance. Whatever that significance may have been, it is likely that the Israelites prized these representations as expressive of the functions of a female deity. While I do not see any clear evidence for calling them representations of a goddess, as have many Palestinian archæologists, I would accept them as rather tangible evidence for the thought pattern in Palestine, that of thinking of deity in terms of the female. This fact, like the *a priori* argument from the existence of goddesses in all the surrounding pantheons, is an indication of the possibility of finding in the religion practiced among the masses of Israelites a considerable cult of the mother goddess.

A search for a goddess in the Old Testament itself is not immediately rewarding. An uncritical reading of the material results in a picture of deity in masculine terms. One may look through a concordance and not find the word "goddess." The Hebrew language did not have a word for the idea of a female god. Some years ago, in the description of the foreign cults introduced by Solomon, C. H. Cornill pointed out that "we find written: 'Astarte, the *god* of the Phœnicians.' Not even the *word*

¹¹ "Wisdom and Vision in the Old Testament" in *Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft*, LII (1934), p. 93.

¹² *Palestinian Figurines in Relation to Certain Goddesses Known through Literature*, American Oriental Series, XXIV, pp. 5-31.

'goddess' is conceivable to the Israelites, much less the thing itself."¹³ Let us see.

There is a word *asherah* which appears in the Old Testament eighteen times in the singular and twenty-two times in plurals. It has been translated in the Septuagint as ἄσος "post" or "grove."¹⁴ An examination of the context of the references makes it clear that this object was sometimes planted, it was of wood, it was often carved, it could be cut down. So it would seem that an *asherah* was a wooden stump or pole set up beside an altar as a religious symbol. However, there are some references in the Old Testament in which *asherah* may refer to a goddess.¹⁵ For some time scholars denied that the Hebrews knew a goddess by this name. With this position were connected such names as W. R. Smith, Stade, E. Meyer, and others. However, since 1929, the mythological texts from Ras Shamra have revealed a goddess Athirat, the exact philological equivalent to Asherah, as the chief goddess of the pantheon at about 1500 B.C. She is merely mentioned in earlier Akkadian texts; a rather complete picture of her comes from the poems of Ras Shamra. There she is "lady Athirat-of-the-sea." She is a mother goddess, called "creatress of the gods." She is connected definitely with the towns of Tyre and Sidon. She is the consort of the highest of the gods, El, a term also used for deity in the Old Testament. She has seventy sons, one of whom is Athtar. She acts as an intermediary between El and his petitioners. She drinks wine, has servants, and is known by the epithet "the perfect bride." Such is the picture of the mother goddess, the consort of the chief god, known from north Syria during the second millennium.

To the south of Canaan, in the South Arabic inscriptions, Athirat appears as a solar deity, the consort of Wadd, and sometimes of 'Amm, two names for the South Arabian moon-god. Little is known of her here except that in the Qatabanian pantheon she held an important place. D. Nielsen, in an article "Die altsemitische Muttergöttin,"¹⁶ has shown that Athirat was originally a sun-goddess in South Arabia, and became later a consort of the moon-god and then a mother goddess. She appears once in a North Arabic inscription of about the fifth century; there she is mentioned in a text along with Shingala. Only once does the name appear in the later Phœnician inscriptions. While the date of the South Arabic material is debated, it is generally conceded to reflect an early stage of Semitic development. From this evidence we may conclude that Asherah

¹³ *The Prophets of Israel* (5th English edition, 1901), p. 23.

¹⁴ I have collected the literary material bearing on the three Canaanite goddesses, Asherah, Ashtar, and Anat mentioned in this paper, in my *Palestinian Figurines*, pp. 59-82. For the references for the many details given briefly in the following paragraphs, one may see that volume.

¹⁵ I Kings 18:19; II Kings 21:7; and possibly I Kings 15:13.

¹⁶ *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft*, XCII, pp. 504-551.

was a prominent goddess, consort of the chief god, among some of the Semitic peoples of the second millennium B.C. By the first millennium her name was confused with her symbol, for her function as the great mother had been taken over by another. Who was this rival?

The most obvious goddess of the Old Testament was known by the name of Ashtoreth, rendered in the translations as Ashtoreth, Ashtart, and Astarte. She left her name as a place name in Palestine, Ashtaroth (plural of Ashtoreth), probably an ancient centre of worship of this lady.¹⁷ In three places the singular form of the name of the goddess is used, each time in connection with the town of Sidon.¹⁸ Saul's armor was put by the Philistines in the house of Ashtaroth. The Ashtaroth were mentioned along with the Baalim. There is only one hint of the nature of this goddess; it is the appearance of a common noun *ashtaroth* four times in Deuteronomy,¹⁹ with the apparent meaning of "offspring of the flock," a meaning which might associate the goddess with the idea of fecundity. By the time of the Greek translation, Ashtoreth was given certain complimentary epithets. This is the meagre information we have of this goddess from the Old Testament. Fortunately we can learn much from other sources.

She was known at Ras Shamra and received offerings of birds; she was associated in some way with Baal; she was capable of rage and cried "shame" to her consort, Baal, for killing Yamm, whom she evidently loved. In Egypt, Ashtart appears in a description of Thothmes IV (1420-1411), where this king is described as "standing on a chariot like Ashtart." From this and other inscriptions we know her in Egypt as goddess of war. A cylinder seal from Bethel, Palestine, has a representation of a goddess and the name Ashtart in Egyptian characters. Memphis was a seat of the cult of Ashtart. This is reflected in a reference of Herodotus to a temple there to the "stranger Aphrodite."²⁰ Undoubtedly she was foreign to Egypt, but was worshiped there as the patroness of war.

References to Ashtart in Phœnician inscriptions are numerous. She appears as early as the seventh century. There was a temple to her at Sidon according to Phœnician inscriptions; this confirms the evidence we have already noted from the Old Testament. Lucian described the Aphrodite cult at Byblos. There are many references to the "Lady of Byblos" from the Amarna letters and from a Phœnician inscription. A bilingual inscription from Athens has a proper name compounded with Ashtart; the name belongs to a man from Askalon. Herodotus men-

¹⁷ Josh. 13: 31 etc.

¹⁸ I Kings 11: 5, 33; II Kings 23: 13.

¹⁹ Deut. 7: 13; 28: 4, 18, 51.

²⁰ *Hist.* ii, 112.

tioned a temple of Aphrodite in this Palestinian town.²¹ From Phœnician inscriptions we know that Ashtart was well known in Cyprus as well as in the Phœnician colonies of the Mediterranean region. Little is known of the cult from Phœnician inscriptions except that the goddess had priests and temples and that children were often given names containing this theophorous element.

The most revealing picture of Ashtart may be had from the material concerning this goddess under the name of Ishtar, as she was widely known in Mesopotamia.²² Ishtar of Nineveh is well known from inscriptions and from the famous myth of the "Descent of Ishtar into the Nether World," a myth in which Ishtar descends in search of her dead lover, Tammuz. In this myth she is the goddess of productivity. This is obvious from the fact that when she descends to the lower world all sexual desire ceases in both man and beast. "From the time when Ishtar descended to the land without return, with the cow the bull has not united, nor the ass approached the she-ass, the maid does not approach the gentleman in the street."

As the goddess of productivity it is not unnatural that she appears as the "mother of the great gods." Besides, she is the lady of Nineveh, wife of Ashur, "perfect in bravery." Recently, S. N. Kramer has been able to piece together and translate the Sumerian prototype of this ancient myth.²³ In the Sumerian version Inanna takes the place of Ishtar. She, like Ishtar, is characterized as the Venus goddess and the goddess of war. In Arbela, Ishtar holds a different place in the pantheon. In this locality she is said to be the daughter of Ashur and the sister of Marduk; she was not married; and thus, as a virgin, she could well foster the cult of unmarried love.²⁴ To a similar tradition belongs the Ishtar of Erech, who is known largely from the Gilgamesh epic. Here is described a goddess who changed her husbands rather easily and cohabited promiscuously. The fact that her husbands were animals—the lion, the eagle, the horse—would point to a primitive source for this tradition. In the epic, as the mother of the human race, Ishtar mourns when mankind is destroyed by the deluge. Ishtar is known from two other cities, Babylon and Agade. It is from the former that we have a vivid description of her cult by Herodotus.²⁵

Before leaving the evidence for Ishtar it should be stated that in South

²¹ *Hist.* i, 105.

²² See G. A. Barton, "The Semitic Ishtar Cult" in *Hebraica*, IX, pp. 131-165; X, pp. 1-74. In the following summary of material about Ishtar use has been made of that given in great detail by Barton.

²³ "Sumerian Literature; A Preliminary Survey of the Oldest Literature in the World" in *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, LXXXV, pp. 293-323.

²⁴ Here she is associated especially with dreams.

²⁵ *Hist.* i, 199.

Arabia in all four dialects there appears a god, Athtar, a name which is philologically equivalent to Ishtar. The name is always masculine and is associated with such symbols as the spear point, the crescent with a small disc lying in it, the gate, the symbol of the hand, the bucranium, the antelope, and others. The South Arabic inscriptions contribute no mythological material concerning Athtar. We may conclude that this goddess was known from the middle of the third millennium with a twofold function as goddess of war and of love, appeared inconspicuously at Ras Shamra at about 1500 B.C., was known in Egypt as patroness of war, and was extremely popular in Phoenicia and in Canaan during the first millennium.

Yet another important goddess of the ancient Near East appears in the pages of the Old Testament. Her name is preserved in two place names, Anathoth and Beth-Anoth, and in the name of one of the judges, Shamgar ben-Anath.²⁶ In a poorly preserved text of Hosea 14:8, some scholars reconstruct it so as to read, "I am his Anath."²⁷ If this emendation is accepted, this reference would present Hosea as claiming for Yahweh the benefits of the cult of the goddess.²⁸ While little is known of her from the Bible, there is a wealth of material from other sources. In the Ras Shamra texts Anat appears as the consort-sister of the young god, Aleyan Baal. She is the furious avenger of his death; the disposition she made of the body of her enemy, Mot, may indicate something of the nature of the ritual by which she was honored. The text from Ras Shamra reads: "She seized Mot, son of the gods, with the sword she split him in half, with the winnowing sieve she winnowed him, in the fire she burned him, in the mill she ground him, in the field she sowed his flesh, that the birds might eat." In Egypt Anat is known from the time of the Hyksos invasion and is often represented, along with Ashtart, as goddess of war. Here these two goddesses are described as "the two great goddesses who were pregnant but did not bear." Anat is raped by Seth and later becomes his wife. She is not prominent in Phoenician texts. In the second millennium she seems to have enjoyed great popularity; in the first millennium she is relatively unknown. It may be that her function was taken over by Ashtart.

It would seem that despite the paucity of material in the Old Testament about these three goddesses, whose names were not completely expurgated from the carefully edited documents of Hebrew literature, the Israelites knew these ladies who played such an important place in the

²⁶ Judg. 3:31.

²⁷ J. M. P. Smith in *The Complete Bible: An American Translation* and O. Procksch in Kittel, *Biblia Hebraica* (3rd ed.).

²⁸ See H. G. May, "The Fertility Cult in Hosea" in the *American Journal of Semitic Languages and Literatures*, XLVIII (1932), pp. 73-98.

pantheons and in the ritual of the neighboring peoples. Their importance in the surrounding area would argue for a greater place in the religious practice of the early Israelites than the later editors, through whose hands passed the Hebrew literature, were willing to admit. Besides these three goddesses there were probably others in the Old Testament. Eve, according to E. A. Speiser, may be seen in the Hurrian name *Ĥebat*.²⁹ In the Old Testament there appears a word *hokmah* "wisdom."³⁰ This may be not a late word, as many have taken it, but a name of the old Semitic mother goddess which is preserved in the South Arabic *hwkm*.³¹

Thus far we have been concerned with tracing the names of the goddess or goddesses; we shall now ask the question: What do we know of the myth and ritual by which the lady was honored? The pattern of ritual in the Near East contained such elements as the dramatic representation of the death and resurrection of the god and the enactment of the sacred marriage. In Egypt Osiris and Isis figure in the resurrection myths; the pattern is followed in Sumerian mythology with the principals, Dumuzi and Inanna; in Akkadian, Tammuz and Ishtar; at Ras Shamra, Aleyan Baal and Anat; in Phœnicia, Adonis and Ashtart. When we turn to the Old Testament, however, we find the pattern very obscure, probably because of the hostility of the editors, through whose hands the documents passed, to the implications of this far-reaching ritual pattern of the Near East.³²

Yet, despite this meagreness, some things are evident. The prohibition against *qedeshim* and *qedeshoth* in Deuteronomy³³ is evidence of the survival until relatively late times of the institution of the sacred marriage. Recently, Beatrice A. Brooks has made a study of the fertility-cult functionaries in the Old Testament.³⁴ The pattern of thought into which these functionaries fitted was this. It was believed that the union of the god and the goddess effected the annual revival of nature in the spring of the year and was responsible for the increase of animal and human life. When a god went in to his consort, the act of union made fertile the land and the goddess effected the annual revival of nature in the spring of the gods was aided by a similar action on the part of humans. This belief in the power of sympathetic magic made necessary the maintenance of sacred prostitutes in the temple. Brooks has well said: "By magical

²⁹ E. A. Speiser, *Introduction to Hurrian*, Annual of the American Schools of Oriental Research, XX, p. 41, n. 91.

³⁰ "Wisdom" is personified in Proverbs 8 and 9.

³¹ D. Nielsen, *Die altsemitische Muttergöttin*, in *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft*, XCII, pp. 550 f.

³² See S. H. Hooke, *Myth and Ritual* (1933), pp. 68 f.

³³ Deut. 23: 18.

³⁴ *Journal of Biblical Literature*, LX (1941), pp. 227-253.

rites which often included actual intercourse with a sacred votary, it was believed possible to insure fertility of crops, to secure offspring with divine sanction, or to feel one's self assimilated to the deity."³⁵ In the Old Testament these temple functionaries were known as *nethinim* "temple servants," *qedeshim* "sodomites" or "male devotees of the fertility cult," *zonoth* "harlots," and other terms. The persistence of this cult of sacred marriage is seen in the description of the reform of Josiah pictured in such detail in II Kings 23. The popularity of such practices in the folk religion is reflected especially in the symbolism of the book of Hosea; this appropriation of a foreign symbolism was an attempt to appropriate to the cult of Yahweh some of the popular notions—the less objectionable ones to be sure—of the folk cult.³⁶ There is such invective as "They sacrifice upon the tops of the mountains, and offer upon the hills, under oaks and poplars and terebinths, because the shadow thereof is good; therefore your daughters commit harlotry and your daughters-in-law commit adultery."³⁷ The prophets stripped Yahweh of his former consort and gave to him the consort of Israel—an idea which is reflected in the later divine pair, Christ and his church. It should be pointed out here that certain Jews living in exile in Elephantine worshiped Yahweh along with his consort, Anat. This custom among Jews living outside the main stream of Jewish life probably reflects the practice of folk religion at a time earlier than the Deuteronomic reform.

We who are the cultural inheritors of the angular morality of the Hebrew prophets are apt to look with revulsion upon this practice of sacred prostitution as a means of keeping friendly the forces responsible for the life-giving processes. Two descriptions from Greek sources will serve to give in objective, if not sympathetic, language the nature of the ritual. The first is from Herodotus, a Greek historian of the fifth century B.C.

The foulest Babylonian custom is that which compels every woman of the land once in her life to sit in the temple of Aphrodite and have intercourse with some stranger. Many women, who are rich and proud and disdain to consort with the rest, drive to the temple in covered carriage drawn by teams, and there stand with a great retinue of attendants. But most sit down in the sacred plot of Aphrodite, with crowns of cord on their heads; there is a great multitude of women coming and going; passages marked by line run every way through the crowd, by which the stranger men pass and make their choice. When a woman has once taken her place there, she goes not away to her home before some stranger has cast money into her lap and had intercourse with her outside the temple; but while he cast the money, he must say, "I demand thee in the name of Mylitta" (that is the Assyrian name for

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 230.

³⁶ Article by H. G. May listed in footnote 28.

³⁷ Hosea 4:13.

Aphrodite). It matters not what be the sum of the money; the woman will never refuse, for that were a sin, the money being by this act made sacred. So she follows the first man who casts it and rejects none. After their intercourse she has made herself holy in the goddess's sight and goes away to her home; and thereafter there is no bribe however great that will get her. So then the women that are fair and tall are soon free to depart, but the uncomely have long to wait because they cannot fulfill the law; for some of them remain for three years, or four. There is a custom like to this in some parts of Cyprus.³⁸

Lucian, a Greek writer of the second century A.D., tells of the rites connected with the worship of the goddess of Byblos in *The Syrian Goddess*:

But I also saw in Byblos a great temple of Aphrodite of Byblos, in which also the rites to Adonis are performed. I also made inquiry concerning the rites; for they tell the deed which is done to Adonis by a boar in their own country, and in memory of his suffering they beat their breasts each year, and wail, and celebrate these rites, and institute great lamentation throughout the country. But when they have bewailed and lamented, first they perform funeral rites to Adonis as if he were dead, but afterward upon another day they say he lives, and they cast [dust] into the air and shave their heads as the Egyptians do when Apis dies. But women such as do not wish to be shaven pay the following penalty: On a certain day they stand for prostitution at the proper time; and the market is open to strangers only, and the pay goes as a sacrifice to Aphrodite.³⁹

From these two pictures one can more readily understand the prohibition of Deuteronomy:⁴⁰ "There shall be no harlot of the daughters of Israel, neither shall there be a sodomite of the sons of Israel. Thou shalt not bring the hire of a harlot, or the price of a dog, into the house of the Lord thy God for any vow; for even both these are an abomination unto the Lord thy God."

Why was this orgy of celebration held? Certainly it was a deeply religious and serious performance. It did not show a primitive promiscuity, for society had long since developed values in chastity and regularity in marital unions. Sir James Frazer has given a sympathetic estimate of such practice:

The gods stood as much in need of their worshippers as the worshippers in need of them. The benefits conferred were mutual. If the gods made the earth to bring forth abundantly, the flocks and herds to teem, and the human race to multiply, they expected that a portion of their bounty should be returned to them in the shape of tithe or tribute. On this tithe, indeed, they subsisted, and without it they would starve. Their divine bellies had to be filled, and their divine reproductive energies to be recruited; hence men had to give of their meat and drink to them, and to sacrifice for their benefit what is most manly in man and womanly in woman. Sacri-

³⁸ *Hist.* i, 199.

³⁹ *De Dea Syria*, 6 ff.

⁴⁰ Deut. 23: 18 f.

fices of the latter kind have too often been overlooked or misunderstood by the historians of religion.⁴¹

Such are the general lines of the picture of ritual practice in the region around Israel, and undoubtedly in Canaan itself. Had the practice not been found there, the frequent prohibitions in the Old Testament against such practices would have been meaningless. The Israelites must have shared the superstitions and the general view of the world of their neighbors from whom they borrowed so much of their culture. I believe that from the evidence of the figurines, from the personal names of goddesses found in the Old Testament and the knowledge which we now have of their cults from literature outside of the Old Testament, from the frequent reference to temple functionaries, that worship of the goddess must have played an important rôle among the folk cults of Palestine from early times down until the Exile. It would illustrate the extreme vitality in religion of the most important event in the life of every human—the event of being born of a woman.

⁴¹ *The Golden Bough: The Magic Art*, 3rd ed., Vol. I, p. 31.

THE ULTIMATE DEPENDENCE

WINSTON L. KING

Chaplain, Army of the United States

RELIGION is incurably personalistic in outlook and instinct. Of the fact itself there can be no doubt. From the crudest stages of demonic reverence to the systematic theologies of its matured life, religion speaks of its objects of worship as personal in some sort and of the duties of the religious life as personal obligations. Where a deliberate attempt is made to avoid the use of personal categories in the description of the divine reality, as in Buddhism and generally in mysticism, either the faith backslides from its original theoretical purity into a frankly personalistic worship of its founder or else, where that is impossible, overcompensates for the impersonality of the object of its worship by a complete engrossment in the self and its subjective states.

In common with other religions, and even more especially than some of them, Christianity and its Hebrew parent have always spoken of God in definitely personalistic terms. Their fundamental conviction in this respect could be expressed as a paraphrase of a familiar New Testament passage: "God is a (personal) spirit, and they that worship him must worship as (personal) spirit." For them God has been at the very least an active, personal will with whom conscious fellowship is possible for the devout.

But this is not at present anything to glory in. The personalistic conception of God is suspect, both from within and without, as belonging to the untutored religious childhood of the race. The pressure upon religion to abandon such categories is tremendous. For some the use of *any* specific name like God is so fraught with personalistic connotations as to be objectionable; others, like Dewey and Wieman, use it only in a rhetorically unitive sense after scrupulously emasculating it of any personalistic attributes. From a scientific viewpoint the statement of Albert Einstein some two or three years ago before a joint conference of scientists, philosophers, and theologians is characteristic. He was quoted to the effect that he could not believe in a personal God in any sense because such a being would constitute an incalculable and hence disruptive factor in the natural order. And the friendliness of A. N. Whitehead for God and things religious does not extend to any truly personalistic conception. While the "appetition" which is the *eros* of the world process is semi-psychological in nature, and though the primordial God of whom he speaks is somewhat more than a system of energy or values, there is still more of functional harmony than purposeful activity in the creative process and

man's salvation will come through escape from thinking and feeling in terms of narrow personal categories.

A respectable proportion of the religious world also is concerned with this immature religious fallacy. It would shame religion away from its primitive personalistic bias in the name of modern enlightenment. "Personality producing factors" is a more noble term for the same thing than "God"; ideal social values are a better-than substitute for him. We have been made supersensitive to the centuries-old reproach that men make their gods in their own image. The classic term for showing one's scorn for his neighbor's idea of God is to call it "anthropomorphic." Better to have no God at all than the personal one of the uncritical masses! And still further it would be a gain could we elevate theology into a truly scientific discipline, and a sign of religious maturity to learn to think that the love of God is dependable, like the coming of summer or the constancy of the ratio to each other of the angles of a triangle.

My concern here is not so much to elaborate a complete argument for a personal God as to object to the unacknowledged assumption which rules the above viewpoints, and to its implications. This assumption may be put into a brief sentence: *Regularity of mechanical sequence is always and everywhere more dependable and intelligible than conscious personal purpose.*

The origin of this persuasion is fairly obvious. It springs from the mood engendered by the success of the physical sciences in dealing with the human environment. Its immense popular influence is due to the aura of achievement which encircles the heads of "science," "scientists," and "scientific method," rather than to a carefully reasoned principle of interpretation. One has only to attach the adjective "scientific" to any set of claims to be accorded almost unlimited confidence—or such, at least, is a prevalent supposition.

The success of the sciences is a solid fact. Considered in terms of techniques and products, their accomplishments are stupendous. These visible achievements have fundamentally altered the quality of our cultural life and deeply affected our conception of moral and spiritual values by the increased perspectives given to human knowledge and power. There is here no quarrel with the reality or importance of the success of the sciences; there is only the insistence that its limited nature and specific quality be kept always in mind and its perversion and uncriticized adoration be resisted.

The scientific coloring of modern culture and the mathematical texture of its philosophy have resulted in an almost total disregard and depreciation of personalistic categories in all departments. The fact that we possess a mechanical precision which can deal in a routine manner with

atomic weights, subatomic electrical energy, and mass-produce in terms of tolerances of ten-thousandths of an inch; that interstellar distances and events can be accurately computed and predicted; that fundamental structural changes in matter are being achieved through chemistry; that many areas of the organic world, including its most "spiritual" aspects, are being increasingly subjected to analysis and measurement; and the additional fact that this has been achieved by a laboratory technique which studiously eliminates the human equation in the interests of a thoroughly impersonal and objective procedure—all this leads to impatience with the disturbing emotions, the vague intuitions, and the subconscious crosscurrents of personality in its other than purely rationalizing moments and to an outright rejection of all personalistic categories in any field of knowledge or endeavor. Such categories are regarded only as once-upon-a-time useful fictions or as mere figures of speech.

The significance of this for human relationships should be self-evident. When such a bias becomes a full-blown philosophy of attitude and procedure, personality, as such, becomes theoretically nonexistent or is disintegrated into a congeries of associated drives and assorted repressions focalized in one physical body. Trust in personal character is an outmoded superstition; conscious personal integrity is a species of social hypocrisy; direct appeals to moral sense are meaningless or only herd-conventions. Confidence in "scientific method" and "detached, objective viewpoint" replaces moral conviction and is in turn accorded a pseudo-religious reverence. The practical maxim of the age is: If you wish to be sure of results, set a machine or a method to achieve them. The hope of the world is in improved physical and psychological techniques, and the road to its perdition is paved with fatuous trust in human purposes and character.

Another facet of the influence which stems from the success of the sciences in persuading us to discard personalistic conceptions—and one of especial importance to religion—is an increased awareness of the hugely impersonal character of our cosmic environment. Physical sciences have imposed upon us the almost exclusive use of impersonal and mechanical thought-forms with regard to it. We are increasingly conscious that while many features of the cosmic order escape our exact knowledge at present, there can be no reasonable doubt but that it is a relatively rigid order of basic uniformities and physical relationships, which have endured and will endure in substantially identical forms for millenniums, and that the organic and mental are integral parts of that order. There are indeed no major exceptions to this order, not excluding the human mind and God, around which science does not believe itself able finally to cast the net of an equation or to transfix with telescope and microscope.

Human destiny is not ruled by a Most High who "comprehends heaven with a span, weighs the mountains in scales, the hills in a balance, and holds the seas in the hollow of his hand"—and uses them for intelligible purposes—but by the inexorable progression of the molecular whirl and the infallible operation of the second law of thermodynamics. If "God" is to be thought at all, it must be in terms of a "mathematical thinker" or in terms of a functional energetic order, not as a conscious designer. He would be better understood and served in terms of mathematical formulæ than through belief and loyalty to the character and teachings of Jesus Christ.

Such a reading of the facts of our experience is a superficial and narrow one, however. The control and illumination of the impersonal by the personal, and not the converse, is the way of salvation. The key to the riddle is not, indeed, the rejection of the impersonal and mechanical factors in existence by a superstitious personalism, but their subordination and proper limitation in the perspective of conscious purposiveness. We must understand that our primary dependence is not upon a mechanical order of reality and its attendant techniques, but upon a moral and personal order of being. Consciously chosen goals, purposively pursued through many obstacles and by alternative methods, in harmony with a pervasive spiritual order, this, rather than reliance upon the efficacy of tools and methods themselves, represents our fundamental faith and appropriate philosophy of action.

This is preëminently true in the realm of humanly manipulated mechanics. Within a certain range mechanical instrumentality is irreplaceable. A human intention cannot be substituted for the chain of physical events initiated by the closing of an electrical circuit; telepathy cannot replace telegraphy. A milling machine set to a given measurement will, without deviation and for a practically unlimited succession of operations, hew to the fractional part of a hairline. Where the human eye cannot see, the movement of nerve or muscle is too coarse and uneven, where fatigue would undermine uniformity of result, and disturbing emotion and changing attitude turn aside from the original pattern, the machine performs with absolute precision. In a looser but equally factual manner the standardized method or system corrects and prevents social and psychological inaccuracies.

All this is true, but it is not the complete truth. If we contrast this type of dependability unfavorably with what may be expected from personal intention or moral trustworthiness or the power of the human individual himself, at least two observations must be made. One is that the reliability and irreplaceability of a machine, technique, or method is of a narrower and inferior sort. It is that of a tool, not that of the master

purpose which uses and shapes the tool. One machine versus one man or mind, both placed in a mechanical context, furnishes no adequate basis of comparison. The machine itself was called into being by conscious purpose working with uniformities discovered by that purpose. Its efficiency is the result of intelligent adaptation of means to end. Its whole course and life history are predetermined for it. In a word, the spiritual order of the conscious personal purpose includes and comprehends the mechanical order of the mechanism in a way that no mechanical system can include the spiritual or mental. The mechanical may crush the spiritual, perform tasks that it cannot directly encompass, may in its development and discovery alter mental life, outlast it when individual is compared to individual, but it cannot employ mind as instrumental and cast it aside in favor of a better means.

In elaboration of this it should be said that our dependence upon the machine or process *as such* is limited to its iron uniformity of procedure. Just that and no more. But our basic faith is in the purposive adaptation of a process to the desired end. The undeviating uniformity characteristic of the machine or logical method is a necessary foundation upon which to build and an indispensable factor in the actual accomplishment of the end, but only that. Our fundamental reliance is always upon the intelligible character of the purpose which created or uses the process, upon the interpenetration and subordination of the mechanical by the spiritual. This reliance is to be understood in no narrow sense as confidence in the integrity of a given trade name but in the broader sense of reliance upon a designing intelligence whose purposes I can comprehend and share in. We might in this connection paraphrase the famous Kantian dictum about percepts and concepts thus: Purpose without appropriate mechanics or method is futile and empty; method or mechanics without pervasive purpose is blind and meaningless!

The second observation has to do with the degree of trust which one can place in mechanics as contrasted with purpose. "Love never faileth," wrote Paul, contrasting it with other things which do. Along with tongues and prophecies we might include machines and methods. The individual machine may outlast the human being. (Or shall we put it, atoms and stars outlast the human race?) It will pound and grind on until its parts are worn and broken in faithful performance of the same task and in blind repetition of the same process, long after its maker has gone. But broken, useless, or run amok, it has no power of reconstitution or of the achievement of the same end under differing circumstances. It is the love and intelligent purpose, either of the individual who was originally moved by them, or the continuing purpose of his spiritual heirs and intellectual assigns, which does not fail. That purpose

may be weakened, rendered powerless for a time, frustrated in its intention, but it will rise up to make a new and better tool. It outlasts and outreaches uniform and indestructible mechanical process. It guarantees and supports its tool, binding its evanescent existence into a system of lasting purpose passed on from generation to generation.

This means, I think, that a civilization does not depend basically upon the scale of technical skill achieved by it, nor can it be guaranteed to perpetuity by the perfection of its scientific and social techniques. That these techniques may do much to mold the character of a people by specification of the material goals which are thereby put within their power, and that they may create an entirely new quality of spiritual and cultural perspective, cannot be gainsaid. One has only to compare highly industrialized societies—for better or worse—with the unindustrialized to realize it. But it is even more true that the governing moral conceptions of the society by which the techniques have been created and are utilized, the cultural web of coördinating purposes into which they are fitted, and the spiritual fibre of that society are basically more determinative of its destiny than its scientific skills. These are no doubt truisms; yet we have not known how to draw out their implications for practical action, with the result that our civilization falters in its forward progress. We have placed our ultimate reliance in the wrong area. Moral discipline and effort have been discounted; moral scruple and religious belief have been considered unimportant; a mechanically perfect order of society was to save us from our waywardness of disposition. An economy of abundance, the final easing of the primitive roughness of the struggle for existence, and the thorough mastery of new scientific techniques would solve every problem. But the ramparts which we have erected crash about us, and the golden city of man's future happiness dissolves into an ugly gray fog of confusion because we have neglected or not known how to build the invisible stuff of spiritual values into our edifices. Our abundance of technology has been embarrassing because we have had no transcendent ends to achieve. We had not realized, apparently, that techniques, prodigally produced and unbelievably productive, did not automatically bring their guiding ends with them. We still fail to find any way to control science for socially desirable ends. We must be reconvinced that the character of the men who use the scientific method and the social network of purposes into which scientific achievement is woven are more important than technical perfection.

What bearing has our discussion on the more specifically religious question of man's relation to his total environment? Can it be affirmed with the same confidence that conscious purpose is and must be regnant on a cosmic scale, in, for example, the realm of human social and technical

relationships? Evidently not. There is no such complete certainty of the permeation of the cosmic order by intelligible purpose, no nice adaptation of mechanical means to spiritual ends so apparent therein; nor can we spring by the use of analogy as evidence from the human social context directly to a universal principle. There are many who sincerely believe that man has overlaid the impersonal and mechanical order of nature with moral and intellectual creations of his own spirit which have no natural rootage.

Without attempting a theodicy we can make some relevant observations, however, at least negatively permissive and perhaps positively confirmatory of the religious conviction of a pervasive spiritual order of cosmic scope. We can say on the basis of our human experience that there seems to be no antecedent reason why a pervasive order of spiritual purpose should be utterly incompatible with the observed mechanics of the natural order. There would seem to be no *a priori* necessity why these latter should be considered the ultimate or exclusive elements of the universe or why purpose might not here, as well as on the human level, use the physical order for its own ends without an irresolvable conflict between two opposed principles or without reducing either pole of the effective union to terms of the other. It seems fully within the bounds of possibility that here also conscious purpose may include and be creative of the mechanical sphere in a nonreversible relation.

Auxiliary to this probability are two other considerations of important weight. One is that the continued systematic analysis of the natural physical order has led to a result increasingly removed in nature from the quality of physical perception and increasingly approximating the quality of a mental construct. Some years ago Einstein suggested that the mind must pierce ahead of actual laboratory procedure to a pioneering sort of preunderstanding of physical structure based on its own "free inventions." "It seems," he writes, "that the human mind has first to construct forms independently before we can find them in things. . . . The structure of the system is the work of reason; the empirical contents and their mutual relations must find their representation in the conclusions of the theory."¹ Scientific theory must keep its feet firmly anchored to the perceptible mechanical order by physical experimentation, always testing its theory by value for practice. Yet the fact that the reality with which theoretical physics deals is prediscovers by constructs of the mind gained from its own sense of order, and that the resulting structural formulæ can be correlated to the physically perceptible entity of laboratory technique only by an increasingly complex mathematical formula, is surely significant. The ultimate nature of matter is apparently far removed from

¹ *The World As I See It*, pp. 46, 33.

the sensible qualities of sight, sound, and weight, and is peculiarly amenable to intellectual understanding.

The other consideration is that the cosmic process, however mechanistically interpreted, has evoked and sustained the power of conscious spirit. Mind and spirit have evolved historically from the mechanics of natural process. They are able to interact with their environment in a significant manner. There has been that, and apparently still is, within that process which has sustained and developed the spiritual order evidenced in human consciousness. Some would say that we have here only a fortuitous emergence of small consequence; others would reduce mental activity to a shadowy appendage of the physical with no independent power, and moral responsibility to a delusion; still others would find at best for mind only an adaptive dexterity to a mechanical and irresponsive natural order. None of these alternatives seems to do justice to the observable interaction of ideal ends and mechanical means in human life or to the originating and closely sustaining rôle of man's environment in his spiritual and moral life.

Religion has its own interpretation of this connection which, while it may go beyond scientifically apprehensible facts, is not contradictory of them. The man-to-universe relation it conceives as a mutual responsiveness of like to like. It should be willing to grant the immense practical value and necessity of dealing with the mechanical features of the natural environment on a purely physical plane, as represented by the sciences; it should be willing to acknowledge the absolute necessity of the foundation and tool which physical fact gives to spiritual purpose; it should be willing to recognize the close coöperative unity of the spiritual and physical poles of existence; and it should accept the mature disciplining of its spiritual life by a stratum of unyielding, inexorable natural process, in which rain falls on the just and the unjust alike—but it should not abandon its conviction that spiritual man does find spiritual response in the universe and that his personal life and values are the creation of a deeper, environing personal life. Religion is right to maintain that the eternal sameness of physical ratios does not represent in itself a spiritual proportion or a moral trustworthiness. It is right to hold that there must be something fundamentally more trustworthy than the rising of the sun or the stars in their courses—a conscious benevolent purpose which works unceasingly even while worlds are born and die again, of whose goals it has some inkling and in which it can share—or else the universe is at bottom a spiritual quicksand. "God is a spirit, and they that worship him must worship him in spirit and truth."

ULTIMATES: ETERNAL OR TEMPORAL

M. C. OTTO

University of Wisconsin

ONE OF the frequently quoted passages of New Testament scripture is John 8: 32. "And ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free." Its practical application falls considerably short of the quoting. This may be partly due to the text itself, since the meaning of it is not obvious or even unambiguous. In that respect it resembles other great sayings perpetuated in literature and daily speech. There is first of all the question whether the truth which is to make us free is some one particular truth, the truth then and there declared, *this* truth, *my* truth. There is the further question whether truth is to be regarded as transcending time, place, and circumstance; whether it is THE TRUTH, self-contained, absolute, and abstract, or a general name for many truths, each of which is relevant to a specific context in which it is the condition of a freedom there to be won or lost. Finally (the word *finally* means only that various other problems of definition are omitted), how or in what sense are we to understand truth to be preliminary to freedom? For there are senses in which the possession of truth leaves a man anything but free. An ignorant man can believe and say things, even do things, which an informed man cannot.

Now whatever the correct answer may be, if there is one, to these and similar queries, this much permits of no doubt. The scriptural admonition makes truth seeking a basic obligation, and on the ground that it is the very condition of man's highest good. The time in which the Gospel of John was composed has with good reason been compared with our own. Long-established economic and political institutions were going under, resulting in unusual intellectual and moral confusion and in widespread loss of faith in the possibility of making anything worthy of life. It was in the face of this condition of affairs that the idealist we know as St. John urged his fellow men to seek truth as the gateway to freedom. One would therefore suppose that the men and women who in our time represent the religious movement for which he spoke and labored, and who are aware of the critical danger to which human freedom is today exposed, would show peculiar devotion to the truth ideal.

Is this what we find to be the case? Scarcely. Truth seeking appears to play a minor rôle in contemporary Christianity. That is why Winston L. King's article, "The Ultimate Dependence," gave me uncommon satisfaction. It has been my fate to read a good deal on the problem that is central to his present theme—the existence of divine "personality" ordering and guiding the whole of events somewhat as men try to organize and direct their personal lives—and the impression made upon me by much of

the output on that subject in recent years has been twofold: bland intellectual irresponsibility and shameless presumption of intimacy with the Most High. In some of the more flagrant examples published in the periodicals, the author quite frankly announces, though in more formal, professional language: "Here's the low down on what God is now up to; take it from me." If this sounds cheap or irreverent in my description, it sounded worse, at any rate to me, in the original deliverances. The better types were of course less shoddy, but as a rule they offered nothing more substantial as proof than the writer's say so.

Well, this article by Mr. King is of a different sort. Although he has faith in "the disturbing emotions, the vague intuitions, and the subconscious crosscurrents of personality in its other than purely rationalizing moments," he does not rely upon these emotions, intuitions, and crosscurrents to make his case for him. He consistently speaks to the reader's mind, not to his feelings. Never, if I am a judge, does he try to win his point by making an ally of the reader's prejudice against his judgment. He states the facts which he regards as good evidence for his position and expects them to do the convincing. Consequently the whole problem is illuminated, the reader's wits are sharpened and his critical powers are stimulated, so that he is likely to end the reading, not as happens too often, with a deepened conviction for or against, accompanied by a more confused comprehension of what the crucial issues are, but with broadened and clarified insight, whether convinced one way or the other, or perhaps unable to come to a decision at all.

The problem that is central to Mr. King's subject, I was just suggesting, is the validity of the theistic interpretation of the cosmos. Stating it in his own words, it is the question whether religion "is right to hold that there must be something fundamentally more trustworthy than the rising of the sun or the stars in their courses—a conscious benevolent purpose which works unceasingly even while worlds are born and die again, of whose goals it has some inkling and in which it can share—or else the universe is at bottom a spiritual quicksand." It is therefore quite natural to understand the title of the article, "The Ultimate Dependence," as referring to this Divine Person, and to read the article in line with this understanding. The author's discussion, however, takes in more territory than this. It seems quite as much concerned with the *human* person. Indeed the evidence for the reality and value of the personal quality of human beings is appraised by the author as logically more conclusive than any available evidence for cosmic personal quality.

A thorough critique would have to go into the relation of these two phases of Mr. King's contention. Much no doubt depends upon getting his position correctly at this point, much more than can be brought out in a

brief examination of a paper which raises numerous interesting and important questions, each entitled to careful examination. Such a comprehensive criticism is here out of the question. It must suffice to say that the aim is to defend both the cosmic and the human person against the materialistic, mechanistic interpretation of the experienced world, according to which neither the one nor the other has any logical respectability. Perhaps we do not go far wrong in concluding that basically the position is something like this: the Divine Person is the ultimate dependence in the absolute sense, the ultimate among ultimates, so to speak; the human person is the ultimate dependence relative to the things and contrivances of man's environment. "Consciously chosen goals," we are told for example, "purposively pursued through many obstacles and by alternative methods, in harmony with a pervasive spiritual order, this rather than reliance upon the efficacy of tools and methods themselves, represents our fundamental faith and appropriate philosophy of action."

It would be possible to dismiss Mr. King's article with the remark that he merely repeats a criticism which, in one form or another, has been made again and again since natural science and especially industrial inventions have become dominant in modern life. It would be possible to do this, but it would not be fair; for although we have been told before that our civilization has become overmechanized, this does not prove that we have acted on what we are told to any such extent that its retelling is unimportant. And if we have read or heard before that we believe and act as though civilization itself depended "upon the scale of technical the skill achieved by it," while as a matter of fact "the cultural web . . . and the spiritual fibre of that society are basically more determinative of its destiny than its scientific skills," it does not follow that we have appreciated or heeded the warning. As he himself says: "These are no doubt truisms; yet we have not known how to draw out their implications for practical action, with the result that our civilization falters in its forward progress." Moreover, absolute originality is extremely rare, if indeed there is such a thing. His is another kind of originality. A man who thinks his way for himself to his position and states his conviction freshly in his own words, as Mr. King has done, should be credited with doing a genuinely original job, even though some other person or persons preceded him in being troubled by essentially the same problem.

It is therefore not because the argument moves along more or less familiar lines that I am dissatisfied with it, seriously dissatisfied; it is rather because the author fails to go far enough in the examination of his problem, indeed is content merely to dispute the tacit assumption which, according to him, rules the mechanistic view and let it go at that. This

assumption he states in a sentence: "Regularity of mechanical sequence is always and everywhere more dependable and intelligible than conscious personal purpose."

But suppose this assumption to be rejected, or even refuted, then what? Well, then we are aware of the error of making it, but are still in the dark as to what can be done in a positive way to overcome the evil effects of the error. Does this do anything for the practice of life? Does it do more than leave us where we were? We learn what is wrong; we do not learn how to go about setting it right. It is of course a good thing to find out that you are going in the wrong direction, if that is what you are doing, but this discovery does not provide you with the right direction to go. You may be more lost than ever.

It is perhaps for this reason that I had the strange impression while reading Mr. King's words that I was listening to an orthodox discourse on philosophy. He is not a professor of philosophy but a chaplain now serving at the front. Nevertheless, like so many of us he stops just where the hard work begins, stops, that is to say, after having pointed out that the current conventional outlook on the world will not do if man is to reach the highest good of which he is capable. He leaves it to be discovered what steps would take us forward from where we are and should not be to where we might better be and are not.

He stops where the hard work begins, I say, since the readers of the *CROZER QUARTERLY* and others who care about such matters or are likely to care about them, are already cognizant of the fateful discrepancy which has grown up between the acquisition of power and its moral use. They do not, as Mr. King believes, need to "be reconvinced that the character of the men who use the scientific method and the social network of purposes into which scientific achievement is woven are more important than technical perfection." This fact has been widely publicized, and daily events are constantly underlining its truth. What they do need (and that is where the hard work comes in) is a conception of personal character designed with direct reference to the scientific machine age in which it must function, a type of personal character and of moral idealism authenticated by the best knowledge, no less than by the best aspiration, of that age.

Mr. King seems unaware of this task. He deliberately tries to perpetuate the dualism between the material and the spiritual which has become one of the chief obstacles to progress in the human undertaking. "The control and illumination of the impersonal by the personal," he declares, "and not the converse, is the way of salvation." True enough, stated in these general, not to say abstract, terms. But if we view the task realistically, specifically, and concretely, it is evident that the only feasible

"way of salvation" is a plan of campaign in which neither the "impersonal" nor the "personal" is assigned the command, but in which control and illumination are expected to be mutual and reciprocal.

Possibly this point should have a little more elaboration. My criticism is this. The error that has to be remedied is not so much a prevailing maxim "that trust in personal character is an outmoded superstition," or that "conscious personal integrity is a species of social hypocrisy," or that "direct appeals to moral sense are meaningless or only herd-conventions." In all probability relatively few people would subscribe to such notions. Nor is it true that we are ruled by a general belief that a better world depends alone on "improved physical and psychological techniques." For although considerable cynicism as regards mankind is a fact, and uncritical trust in scientific technology is a fact, and although they are factors in producing present spiritual backwardness, our trouble goes deeper. We are attempting to get along with an all but unchanged moral and religious philosophy of life in a world order which has been radically changed by theoretical and applied science. Mr. King quite rightly objects to the scientific overcoloring of modern culture and to the attempted reduction of experience to a mathematical pattern. And yet unless truth, right, justice, beauty are timeless and placeless values, affecting, but never affected by, the world of affairs—which is often asserted but never shown—they must be expressive of the time and place in which they are meant to be relevant. Only in that way can they be vital ideas and ideals.

Let us concede that the present age tempts men to rely upon tools rather than persons, upon mechanisms rather than purposes, upon the material rather than the spiritual, and let us grant in addition that yielding to this temptation blocks off the most promising paths of moral progress. But what we mean by *person*, *purpose*, *spiritual*, may be something ontological, metaphysical, set apart as distinctive kinds of "being" from the natural world, from human bodies, and from economic and social institutions; or we may conceive them to be not things at all but functions, special kinds of commitment and conduct in which the desires, the needs, and the aspirations of men are interactive with each other and with humanly contrived instrumentalities, social processes, and selected resources of nature. It is my conviction that only the latter kind of person, purpose, spiritual attainment is harmonious with present-day knowledge. My chief objection to Mr. King's challenging paper is that he urges us to put ultimate dependence upon attitudes which can no longer count on the support of the best we know about the life we have to live. If this is true, his appeal is futile, and more than that, is positively harmful. It pushes people apart

who should be working together, and puts it up to those whose careers must be realized in the practical world to evolve ends of their own, without the coöperation of the men and women who have chosen to devote themselves primarily to the things of the spirit.

The issue just touched upon is the dualism to which I referred earlier in this reply. We meet it here as the conventional separation between the study of fact and of value. Natural science is in charge of the one and religion in charge of the other. The assumption of this dualistic foundation accounts perhaps for Mr. King's silence on two matters where we need to speak plainly, not to say loudly, to each other. One of these is closely related to the subject matter of the preceding paragraph, and so had better be considered first, although it is not so basic in nature as the second of the silences.

It is disturbing that a paper which has so much to say about the theoretical materialism of our age and the necessity of counteracting its influence in our civilization, should neglect the practical materialism which does incomparably greater damage to the higher life, day in and day out, than the theoretical kind. In academic and theological circles a materialistic theory of the universe may cause some embarrassment because it collides with other academic interpretations; but in the world at large, where the millions are engaged in keeping their bodies alive and such souls in them as they can, it is the actuality of a dollar-and-cents materialism which has to be overcome in the human interest. And it is safe to say that for every individual whose youthful idealism falls victim to the scientific portrayal of our world as a ruthless mechanism, there are thousands upon thousands whose faith in moral, æsthetic, and religious values seeps away as they participate in the struggle for approved material success. The former may, it is true, make personality "theoretically nonexistent," but the latter makes it nonexistent actually, which is a far different thing. It is this everyday life that conditions us and educates us to be materialists. I wish that instead of attempting to show up the shortcomings of materialistic science, Mr. King had been aroused to attack the social materialism which is so largely responsible for preventable human misery and for the bloody tragedy in which we are now caught up.

Possibly, however, this is a superficial criticism. It may be contended that the scientific bias has become "a full-bloom philosophy of attitude and procedure," that this causes the universe to be looked upon as a ruthless mechanism, in conformity with which we have constructed our political and economic order, national and international. We cannot at the moment enter into that question with any fullness. But if the analysis is sound, as Mr. King evidently thinks it is, then considerably more is called for

than is set forth in his paper. This is the second silence which I wish he had broken.

What does he do? He acknowledges the finality of the scientific picture of the whole round of things and then declares that the idea of a universe ruled by a divine Being is not incompatible with it. I regret my inability to see this as true. If, as he admits in referring to the order of the universe, "there can be no reasonable doubt but that it is a relatively rigid order of basic uniformities and physical relationships, which have endured and will endure in substantially identical forms for millenniums, and that the organic and mental are integral parts of that order"—if this is what we must believe, then I confess it would not occur to me to say as he does: "Our primary dependence is not upon a mechanical order of reality and its attendant techniques, but upon a moral and personal order of being." No; what we must have is a new conception of reality, not a makeshift compromise to which we are forced by the pressure of scientific thinking and religious aspiration.

This new view has been set forth by a succession of scientific humanists. Their particular attempts at elucidation may not be all they should be; their intellectual and moral programs may not be the best that can be achieved; but they have at least faced the problem which has to be solved. They have not run away from it and have refused to be put off with patchwork. They have woven cloth of new stuff and in a new design. They are still busy weaving, though certain writers who think with their wishes have declared them dead. I am glad they are still alive, and that some of them are young, for it is their philosophy, I believe, which heralds a spiritual renaissance in our scientific age.

Mr. King writes as an individual, but he writes for many others and he writes for religion. His advocacy of theism is open to the same objections as those made against the parts of his paper which I have critically examined. Let the theist or the atheist be right: it is still the pattern of our common daily life, not a scientific mechanistic theory of the universe, which is the contemporary "spiritual quicksand." And until religious-minded men and women are outraged by this fact, and dare, as individuals and as organized churches, to work against the injustices, the lies, the indecencies, the brutalities so brazenly present in contemporary society, I, for one, shall remain unimpressed by any published "conviction that spiritual man does find spiritual response in the universe and that his personal life and values are the creation of a deeper, envionring personal life." I remain unconvinced even when that conviction is honestly and ably declared as it is in the present instance. I would still say as I did twenty years ago, though now with deepened conviction and a greater sense of urgency:

Only let it be taken to heart that soul is not the name of a thing, but of a life; that the soul's salvation is not a commodity or gift to be bought or begged, but a development to be attained; that to save one's soul is not an instantaneous deed, but a lifelong adventure; not the rescue of an indefinable entity in preparation for a life to come, but the creation of a type of personality through loyalty to concrete values as these are at issue in everyday experience. It is an inner richness and ripeness, a sensitiveness to truth, to beauty, to the dignity of life.

THE PROFITS OF EDUCATION

SHIRLEY JACKSON CASE

Florida School of Religion

WHAT shall it profit a man if he acquire every degree in the academic calendar but is denied the opportunity to earn a good livelihood? If it were not supposed to insure one a more lucrative living, education would be in imminent danger of losing caste in the popular way of thinking that prevails in present-day America. Today graduation from our institutions of learning tends to be measured by its prospective commercial value.

Once upon a time scholars were men who aspired to learning for its own sake. The privilege of living with books was the supreme reward, while food and clothing and shelter were minor considerations. Scanty provender was accepted as a matter of course; shrunken stomachs left more room for the expansion of the mind. The body was sufficiently protected and adorned by a hair shirt, one rough cloak, and the shelter of a monastic cell. Housed within the cold walls of the cloister the chilled skeleton warmed its bones around the fires of wisdom that burned within the soul. No enfeebling physical comforts hampered the life of the spirit, and an emaciated frame seemed the fittest tabernacle for healthy minds. A prematurely aging body was the natural concomitant of a flowering intellect. Jerome, the great Christian scholar of the late fourth and early fifth century, remarked with evident satisfaction that while he was still in his forties his hair was gray, his brow wrinkled, and the loose skin hung under his chin "like the dewlaps of an ox." The blood stream flowed cold around his heart. But his abused physique sustained for more than another quarter-century his life of strenuous mental activity.

Since those ancient days educational ideals have radically changed. In the year 1919 several of our university centres were visited by an unusual lecturer. He was a sergeant in the United States Army, recently returned from service in the First World War. As a Kentucky mountaineer, accustomed from his youth to hunt for food with gun and trap, he had acquired marvelous speed and accuracy on the trigger. Once when hiding alone in a shell hole in France he so quickly shot each one of the approaching enemy who came within range that the rest of the attacking band, supposing that they had been ambushed by a superior force, unconditionally surrendered. Thus singlehanded he took some twoscore prisoners, marching them ahead of him into camp. On his return to America he was hailed as a national hero. It was rumored that he might be persuaded to run for Congress, or even for President. But, relinquishing the opportunity to continue the practice of his marksmanship

in the happy hunting ground of the national capital, he undertook to campaign the country on behalf of his neglected fellow Kentuckians. He affirmed with vigor—indeed, he amply exemplified in his own speech—their lack of educational advantages, and he made a strong plea for support of more and better schools for his kinsmen. The climax of his appeal to the sympathies of his university audience was especially revealing. He said, in effect: Educate the Kentucky mountaineers so that henceforth they too will be able to live without work!

Saul of Tarsus once declared that if one is unwilling to work, then he is not entitled to eat. This is a hard saying, and many persons have displayed considerable zeal in the effort to prove it false. But this, I take it, is not the universal ambition of modern youth. One who looks upon education as the open sesame to a life of indolence is, in these strenuous times, hardly worthy of serious consideration. Yet it is commonly assumed that education added to industry will insure for everyone greater material prosperity. The more one knows the more one will earn; education is always convertible into cash. Perhaps this assumption is partially correct, but I doubt whether a doctoral dissertation on the history of plutocracy would establish it as a universal fact.

It is very true that conditions in America during a century or more have been giving to our educational activities a strong set in the direction of profit taking. Our vast agricultural acreage and seemingly inexhaustible natural resources have invited exploitation, while opportunities for commerce and industry have virtually forced themselves upon men of vision and energy. Under these circumstances America inevitably became money-minded, and our educators kept step with the procession. Pedagogy and prosperity became boon companions. All over the country there sprang up like mushrooms in the night a crop of institutions calling themselves seats of learning, where it sometimes happened that more stress was laid on the seats than on the learning. Interest revolved about two foci, the physical equipment of the plant and the preparation of the students for remunerative jobs. The term "seat of learning" was hardly appropriate to that type of institution. It might better have been called an educational factory—the cynic very likely would term it just an educational racket.

Whether our educational program is called a racket or a legitimate business, at least one trend seems apparent in the present outlook. The prospect for large monetary returns on a high school, college, university, or professional course of study is not nearly so promising today as it was a few years ago. Therefore, one may ask, ought not the schools to be closed or their number reduced in order to bring the output of the factory into closer accord with the economic law of supply and demand? Also, other reasons for retrenchment can be urged. It is sometimes charged

that the schools have not been furnishing the kind of education most needed for practical purposes. Or, again, paying jobs are no longer to be had, and it is folly to flood an already glutted market with useless goods.

If our interest in the educational enterprise is at heart money-motivated, if we are chiefly in pursuit of the golden mirage that a passing era of unprecedented financial prosperity dangled before the eyes of American youth, then I suspect that we are courting disillusionment. I lay no claim to esoteric wisdom about events that are yet to happen, and my skill at reading the signs of the times may be quite imperfect, but at the present moment certainly the outlook is not bright for the future of lavishly financed institutions of learning aiming to deliver annually to society a fresh brood of money-minded alumni.

There is, however, another possibility. May it not be that in the coming century the educational mind of America will shift its centre of gravity from the quest for pecuniary amplitude to some new norm for estimating values? In that event it may not prove an irreparable calamity to find that education has been forced off the gold standard. In the meantime it may be possible to discover a more adequate means of estimating its worth.

More than three centuries ago Francis Bacon made some remarks that are very comforting to those of us who have been destined to carry thin purses. "I cannot call riches," he wrote, "better than the baggage of virtue. The Roman word is better, *impedimenta*, for as the baggage is to an army, so is riches to virtue. It cannot be spared nor left behind, but it hindereth the march; yes, and the care of it sometimes loseth or disturbeth the victory. Of great riches there is no real use, except it be the distribution; the rest is but conceit." I venture to propose that we measure the profits of education in terms of the virtue rather than of the wealth that may accrue therefrom.

Let me hasten to add that I employ the word virtue, not in the degenerate sense of a pallid moralism, but in its true classical meaning of integrity, strength, and efficiency in action. Furthermore, my meaning will be misapprehended if it is assumed that I am proposing to fall back upon the innocent aphorism about virtue being its own reward. I am still sufficiently orthodox to believe that the laborer is worthy of his hire, even though he be only a humble schoolteacher or country parson. Moreover, I insist that learning is entitled to its rewards in terms of standard currencies and on the plane of everyday existence. Its goal is not a quantum of ethereal satisfactions to be realized in a life of voluntary asceticism. Cloistered scholarship has had its day and has served well its generation, but that day has waned. The present age needs educated people in action throughout the entire range of society's concerns. For, rest assured, if the

troubled world's affairs are not directed by brain trusters they will be dictated by brawn trusters. It would be difficult to imagine anything more shortsighted and pernicious than the disposition, evident in certain quarters today, to treat education as one of the first of society's activities to be dispensed with in troublesome times.

I am assuming that education is capable of displaying virtues. One may ask what they are. Edmund Burke, the well-known eighteenth-century English statesman, once said to his constituents, "Your representative owes you not his industry only but his judgment." What rank heresy for a politician to advocate! If he would be regular, orthodox, then he must be only the puppet of the people's will, voting on government issues and policies in accordance with the latest utterances of radiobroadcasters and telegram senders. He is but a weather vane to register the shifting currents of popular emotion; it is not assumed that he may be depended upon to entertain valid convictions rooted in studious investigation and intelligent interpretation of matters with which he ought to be most competent to deal. Everyone knows that politicians in the past have not always been chosen for their ability to exercise independent judgments, and those who adopt Burke's ideal may often discover, as did he, that they are not traveling the broad highway to popularity.

This notion of irresponsible subservience represents a commonly accepted understanding of the proper relation between employer and employee. The applicant sells his industry for a stated price, thus turning into cash his educational equipment for the performance of a routine task. His responsibility for exercising good judgment, for cultivating creative thinking, for improving upon existing conditions, for devising more effective procedures, or for making any constructive contribution to the task in hand, is not thought to be involved in the financial transaction. And if he ventures to cherish any of these supererogatory virtues, as the theologians have called them, his efforts may pass unappreciated, if indeed they do not bring down upon his head sharp criticism for meddlesomeness and dastardly innovations. In the sphere of religion he is thought to be a fiendish menace to orthodoxy.

Our highly developed institutional organizations, not excluding even those that we call educational, have all participated more or less zealously in the exercise of a benevolent protectorate over the *status quo*. Even the intellectually trained man is not immune from the temptation to seek organic safeties at the cost of pioneering and venturesome conquests. This fact could easily be demonstrated from the history of fraternities of lawyers, physicians, college professors, and clerics, not to mention labor unions, manufacturers' associations, political parties, patriotic societies, and innumerable similar groups. Education for participation in their activities means

acquiring a mastery of the traditional techniques, the sacredly guarded tools of the trade, like the clergyman's mummeries, the lawyer's redundant vocabularies, or the physician's awkward Latin prescriptions.

The highly praiseworthy ambition of these organizations to protect the interests of their respective members necessarily results in an unfortunate by-product detrimental to the quest for higher efficiency. In the nature of the case a unionized profession cannot avoid becoming an asylum for mediocrity. Once he has acquired the right to wear the cloth, the clergyman cannot be unfrocked for mere inefficiency, just as an incompetent janitor will continue to hold his job under the beneficent protection of a union card. College professors, doctors, dentists, lawyers, and members of various trades share similar privileges. Thus the professional ethics of the group tends to represent proprieties rather than aggressive attainments, and mediocrity enjoys equal dignity with the highest excellence. Education cannot be measured in terms of virtue if it aspires only to respectable mediocrity in a profession or guild. Certainly it would be absurd to disparage the importance of training in professional techniques; skill of hand is a primary qualification for any competent workman. But this equipment is not enough. Unless one has the mental ability to pass judgment on the efficiency of traditional procedures and performances, one lacks an adequate education.

Are we doomed, then, to live forever in a state of unrest? We often crave repose for our troubled spirits, unconscious of the fact that a permanent state of mental relaxation spells intellectual death. Nevertheless, over the total range of life's contacts we yearn for freedom and interpret freedom as release from effort. Of late we have heard much about "four freedoms" the attainment of which will bring peace to the troubled world. Their realization is greatly to be desired, but the price that will have to be paid for their maintenance may be larger than we are wont to appreciate. A freedom of speech that is not seasoned by a rational self-discipline would be a doubtful benefit to mankind. Freedom from want enjoyed by persons unwilling to bear the responsibility of self-support would soon degenerate into bondage to a stultifying charity. Freedom from fear can furnish only a fool's paradise to people who must continue to live in a world where all men must still grow strong to avert ever imminent dangers. Even freedom of worship would be a questionable blessing to those who share that sacred privilege in a state of mental and moral lethargy. Healthful activity of mind rather than soporific indolence of body is the goal at which a worthy education aims.

The laborer, we have said, is worthy of his hire. But unless he is content to remain a mere hireling, he will always be worth more than he is paid, just as the hireling will usually be worth less than he receives. The

old Roman philosopher, Seneca, seems to have had this subtle notion in mind when in one of his paragraphs he wrote:

We give something additional even to those who teach the meanest trades, if their efforts appear to be extraordinary. We bestow a gratuity upon pilots, upon workmen who deal with the commonest materials and hire themselves out by the day. In the noblest arts, however, those which either preserve or enlarge our lives, a man would be ungrateful who thinks he owes the artist no more than he bargained to pay. Besides this, the teaching of such learning blends mind with mind. Now when this takes place, both in the case of the physician and the teacher, the price of his work is paid but that of his mind remains owing.

The educated mind, functioning back of the trained hand and eye and tongue, is the benefactor to whom we owe the irredeemable debt of gratitude. Herein we recognize the priceless virtues that are the fitting rewards of education. One who has caught this vision will not be among those parasites of learning, too often to be found in shop and school and pulpit, who think of our institutions as conveniences for their personal benefit. They would have the institution carry them, while they shirk responsibility for its effective maintenance. One is not really educated who is just one more automatic device, a replica of thousands already available, for use in one or another of the standard occupations in which graduates have customarily found employment. The acquisition of technical skills and acquaintance with current opinions are certainly necessary, but if education halts at this point, the result may be the actual suppression of intelligence. It may smother rather than agitate the creative mind.

In my rôle as clergyman I sometimes preach a sermon entitled "The Piety of Unbelief." Don't be alarmed; I am not going to repeat the sermon on this occasion. But just as no religion can be vigorously healthful while it remains placidly content with any set of traditional rites and dogmas, so no form of educational endeavor can be supremely significant for mental vitality if it deals only in parrotlike reproductions of given practices and opinions. Indoctrination is not education at its highest level. Educational growth does not actually start until the student becomes aware of a disquieting restlessness engendered by the ferment of his own mind. Nor will he thereafter shrink from the necessity of innovations which, in the nature of things, are unavoidable. To quote Francis Bacon again: "Time is the greatest innovator; and if time of course alter things to the worse, and wisdom and counsel shall not alter them to the better, what shall be the end?" Without hesitation we answer, "disaster." To supply the world with workers strong in wisdom and counsel is the goal of our educational effort. As students pass out of our halls of learning, we would have them intellectually healthy, strong, capable, resourceful, and aggressive.

What, then, is the supreme value of education? Above all else, it is

the attainment of the disposition to cultivate intellectual initiative in connection with any task to which one may turn one's hand; to make one a capable exponent, to repeat Bacon's phrase, "of wisdom and counsel." This equipment is always needed and especially in times of adversity. One who cultivates an aptitude for this type of service will not, I believe, long find himself out of employment or lacking in suitable rewards for his endeavors. But the capacity for perpetuating this vision is the ultimate reward of the intellectual quest.

THE CHURCH AND THE WILL OF GOD

THOMAS SAUNDERS

Chaplain, Canadian Army

It is the theme of this paper that there is some positive relationship between the church and the will of God, and the object of the ensuing pages is to discover and establish, in approximate terms at least, what that relationship is. In theory, the will of God is the guiding principle of the Christian church, though to what extent the church adheres to this principle and reveals God's will is a moot question. The issue is beclouded by many minor issues that unfortunately assume major proportions.

At one time it was assumed that the church was the only agency for revealing and preserving God's will on earth. The church, it was held, was the custodian of Christian truth and the heir of the promises of Christ. When Christ should return in the manner described in the apocalyptic passages in the gospels, the church's task would be fulfilled and the final reign of God would have begun. This was the theory of Christian leaders in the early church. It was a theory that admitted of a society beyond the church, but did not admit of that society having anything to do with the revelation and preservation of God's will in any positive sense. The first Christians, of course, regarded the revelation as reaching back into the scriptures of the Old Testament, which had found their fulfillment in the Christ who had come, suffered, died, and risen again; but the church was the interpreter and true custodian of the scriptures and consequently soon became regarded as itself the source of revelation.

As Christian hopes of the Second Coming dimmed, however, a new interpretation of the function of the church was found necessary, and was finally given articulate expression in Augustine's *City of God*. The church was still held to be the custodian of Christian truth and the heir of the promises of Christ, but its character in relation to the coming kingdom of God was radically changed. The problem of a society beyond the church was here met by the simple process of predestined elimination, the church of the elect ultimately becoming the *city of God* on earth.

The task of rationalizing the actual position of the church in the present world was left to a later theologian, Thomas Aquinas. Thomism, with its practical Christian totalitarianism, was perhaps the greatest practical theological asset of the mediæval church. It justified and held together a society in which corruption and saintliness were each acknowledged to have a place; and it had the further advantage that it left no room for a society beyond the church. It made the church coextensive with the

world—or at least with that part of the world of which the church took any account. It made the problem of the relationship of the church to the will of God relatively easy as, while the church might not be the perfect reflection of God's will, nevertheless, because of its catholicity and scope, there could be no doubt of its being the only reflection. The will of God could be preserved through no other channel, for the simple reason that, under all-inclusive Thomism, there was no other channel. Undoubtedly there were unbelievers and infidels, along with a certain number of heretics, who might be considered as *outside* the church; but they were not *beyond* the church, as they invariably found out to their cost.

Until the Reformation, Thomism was thus an effective practical justification for the church as the preserver and revealer of the divine will; and, along with the theory of the infallibility of the church, it provided a stout foundation for the Catholic edifice. With the advent of Protestantism, however, the fine scheme of Thomism fell apart. Protestantism meant that, from a Catholic standpoint, there was now a world beyond the church which could neither be assimilated nor ignored. From a Protestant standpoint it raised the question, What and where is the church? and what is its function in relation to the will of God? If the Protestant bodies could be the agencies of God's will on earth, it followed that the traditional church was no longer the sole agency for preserving and revealing that will. Also, if the Reformers were right and theirs was the true church, God's will had been traveling under false colors for a long time, and still continued, to a large extent, so to do.

Under Protestantism, the revelation of God's will was transferred from the church to the Bible. This was the inevitable corollary of Protestantism's coming into being, as the Bible was not only the basis of the new religion, but, having ruled out the church, it was the only possible channel of revelation. What the Reformation did, therefore, was to becloud the issue as to where and in what manner the revelation of the will of God was preserved: in the Bible or in the church? and, if in the latter, in what sense?

True, one Protestant writer recently has declared that "Protestantism, by withdrawing the Christian revelation from the historical community which is the body of Christ and establishing it in the Bible . . . has taken Christ out of history as effectually as the Gnostics would have done had they succeeded in persuading the church to accept their theory of revelation and salvation."¹ It is perhaps needless to add that, so far as most Protestants are concerned, this theory is pretty much in the nature of "a voice crying in the wilderness." The reaction of the average Protestant has been that, by making the community rather than Christ the supreme

¹ C. C. Morrison, *What Is Christianity?* p. 220.

revelation, Dr. Morrison rather than Protestantism is the one who has "taken Christ out of history." Yet there is no denying that the birth of Protestantism with its biblical emphasis constitutes the chief difficulty in resolving the problem of the relationship of the church to the will of God.

The problem in our time has been amplified by the numerous progeny of the Reformation which, like the old woman who lived in the shoe, has now so many children it doesn't know what to do with them. Among these progeny is one which has turned its back, not only on its progenitor, but upon Christianity itself. This recalcitrant specimen is the modern freethinker and agnostic. As long as the church was one, this individual could be handled. But once Protestantism is given the right to separate existence, with its roots in the Bible and its dictum that every man is his own priest, the way is open not only for every man to be his own priest but, if he so desires, to have his own church. If some men decide to have no church, there is nothing to stop them. Their interpretation of the scriptures has not led to belief but to unbelief; and that is their privilege.

The immediate effect of the Reformation on the question of the church and the will of God thus was that Christian people were presented with an either-or alternative: either the revelation was in the historic church or it was in the Bible. Subsequent events have added to this original alternative until today a large part of the Protestant world not only denies the infallibility of the church (which is the foundation stone of Catholicism), but (in its original sense, at least) the infallibility of the scriptures, on which their own faith has been built. Certainly, if the controversies in modern scholarship prove anything, there is no acknowledged infallibility in the interpretation of scriptures; and the problems of biblical and textual criticism, which have received their greatest impetus from Protestant scholars, have only served—superficially, at least—to undermine the foundations of Protestantism itself.

It is the supreme irony of Christian history that Catholicism, basing its claim on its own infallibility, has become a conservative influence on the scriptures, while Protestantism, basing its claim on the infallibility of the scriptures, has spent much of its time literally in tearing the scriptures apart. Actually, however, it is not difficult to see why this should be; nor is the situation as ludicrous as, on the surface, it may appear.

To begin with, Catholicism, its own position being established, has traditionally been a conservative influence in Christian history. It has been consistently anxious to preserve and conserve its own position and prestige and, long before Protestantism thrust its way into the picture, had successfully dealt with similar attempts by other "sects" or "heresies" to flout its authority. Its tendency has ever been to be suspicious of change,

since change was more likely to be to its detriment than to its advantage. For this reason it has persistently discouraged undue critical interest in the scriptures, preferring to keep the key to Holy Writ in its own hands. It has never looked favorably on a wide dissemination or investigation of the scriptures, not because it is primarily concerned with their infallibility, but because it is very much concerned with its own infallibility.

Protestantism, on the other hand, has represented the progressive element in Christian history. Institutionally, the various denominations of Protestantism may be in many respects conservative, but the genius of the Reformation has been revolutionary rather than reactionary. Thus, denying all authority except the scriptures, Protestant scholars have become possessed of an absorbing interest in the scriptures. This interest, wedded to a penchant for scientific accuracy in modern Protestant scholarship, has been responsible for much of the "tearing apart" already mentioned.

It should be noted, however, that Protestantism's investigation of the scriptures has not been for the purpose of "tearing apart." Rather, it has been for the purpose of ascertaining more surely what the scriptures say. In this connection it should be noted that the former idea of scriptural infallibility as an unquestioned belief in the Bible, word for word, by a large proportion of Protestant people is no longer held. The scriptures are no longer "infallible" in that sense. However, if the scriptures are not infallible, there at least seems to be more reason for relying on their authority, as a means of ascertaining the will of God, than on the authority of a self-authorized church.

The case for the scriptures as over against the Catholic church as the source of revelation seems so obvious that, from a Protestant standpoint, it is almost needless to make it. The scriptures, being prior in time to Catholicism² and a product of the early church, seem vested with an authority that a later institution could scarcely match; and, if we think of the revelation of God's will as being supremely evident in the person of Jesus, the case for the scriptural record as the source of revelation seems only that much more sure. Finally, if the revelation of the will of God is only in and through the Catholic church, it leaves all Protestantism out of the picture; and that is a state of affairs that no good Protestant will allow.

By basing our knowledge of God's will on the record of scripture, however, we eliminate no branch of the Christian family, because, while there are "scriptures" other than those in our recognized canon, they constitute no problem such as a church other than the Catholic church constitutes on the other theory. As a matter of record, "scriptures" beyond

² Institutional Catholicism. The Catholic would claim that his church goes back to Christ, but so does the champion of every other communion.

the canon have proven an aid in interpreting the canon. Thus, by accepting the scriptures as the source of revelation, we not only appear to be resting our case on a more reliable authority, but eliminate at least one insurmountable obstacle that would beset us if we regarded the revelation as in the church.

The apparent paradox presented by the spectacle of Protestant scholars "tearing apart" the scriptures which the Reformers held to be infallible is, on adequate investigation, really no paradox at all. The scriptures are vital to the Protestant faith; and the task of their investigation and interpretation is one of no small importance. For lovers of literature and for the beauty of pulpit reading it is undoubtedly well that we should preserve the authorized version of the Bible; but in the interests of accuracy of interpretation it is well that we should also be acquainted with some of the modern versions, and that our scholars should continue to investigate texts, which are far more numerous than most people suppose. To the fundamental criticism of texts it is to our advantage that there should be added such helps as source criticism, literary criticism, historical criticism, and the most recent of all methods, form criticism; for, if the will of God is to be ascertained through the scriptures, it behoves us to understand the scriptures as fully as we may. Thus, while Protestantism denies that the source of revelation is in the church and maintains that it is in the scriptures, it has insisted that a critical study of the scriptures is essential to our faith. At least this is true of contemporary Protestantism in the main.

But where does this leave us with regard to our original proposition, *i.e.*, the relationship of the church to the will of God? Our theory so far implies that there is no direct relationship between the church and the will of God, but only an indirect relationship through the scriptures. The scriptures contain our best record of the teaching and Passion of Jesus, who is the loftiest revelation of God's will; and thus we may look on the scriptures as the intermediary between God's will and the church. This does not, of course, settle the question of a world beyond the church or the location of the true church; but it provides an aid in establishing these points. The location of the true church, it tells us, is anywhere that there is a realization of God's will through the revelation contained in the scriptures; while the world beyond the church is anywhere that there is no realization of God's will as revealed in the same source. Thus, if we accept the scriptures as the source of revelation, no church as an institution has a monopoly on God's will, nor has it a guarantee that it is the most adequate reflection of that will. Every man may be his own priest and every man may have his own church; but, in the task of making that

man or that church the best possible reflection of the will of God, the aid of critical biblical scholarship is of inestimable value.

The function of the investigation and interpretation of the scriptures is thus to ascertain more clearly the will of God. A few modern sects or denominations in Protestantism might not subscribe to this, but the majority would. The church that exists wherever an individual has some realization of God's will through the revelation contained in the scriptures will become a better church, and consequently a better reflector of God's will, as it knows more surely what the scriptures have to say.

If we take the long view of the matter, we shall see that the wide variety of interpretation offered today is not necessarily a detrimental factor in our understanding of God's will, but that, as a matter of fact, it ought to help us ultimately to become more certain of the nature of that will. As well-trained minds are brought to bear on the many problems that the scriptures present, we may have no guarantee of unanimity of opinion, but there is no doubt that gradually various facets and aspects of the Christian revelation become more clear. To ignore these problems and treat them as if they did not exist is to betray the responsibility that we have voluntarily assumed as Protestant people. If the Christian revelation is preëminently in the person of Jesus as portrayed in the scriptures, it behoves us to be not only the custodians but the critical interpreters of the scriptures.

The first step in the process is, of course, a unanimity of opinion as to the technical apparatus to be used in the task of interpretation. If there is no common ground of scholarship, there can be no common ground of appraisal or belief. This does not mean that different "schools" of criticism may not have different methods, or that they may not approach their subject from different viewpoints. It is as important that one "school" should be interested in the milieu of Jesus, for example, as it is that another should be interested in his person; and, in the same manner, it is as important that one "school" should support the thesis of an Aramaic prototype of the gospels, if the evidence warrants such a hypothesis, as it is that another should stand by the Greek. But the methods employed in all cases should have the stamp of scholarly approval or the result will be chaos.

Unfortunately there are some sects or denominations whose tenets, based on no common denominator of accepted scholarship, are breaking Protestantism apart. Their faith, based on personal experience and a subjective, atomistic exegesis, has no rational foundation, and is a prey to the idiosyncracies of the individual emotion or mind. They not only make for differences of opinion in the interpretation of scripture and of God's will, but they leave no common ground for discussion by which

such differences may be overcome. This is at once the danger and the tragedy of the Protestant stand; and it is because of this flaw in the Protestant armor that many contemporary intellectuals, seeking some source of religious authority, have turned their backs on Protestantism and sought refuge in the artificial authority of the infallible church.

For the majority of Protestants, however, this is no satisfactory way out. The presence of the sects and denominations mentioned is an embarrassment to us, but we will not flee our ground for all that. There is a way open to us that is neither the extreme of totalitarian authority vested in an institution nor of indiscriminate liberty vested in our own persons. That way is through a recognition of authority vested in the scriptures, subject to the additional authority of the approved laws of critical scholarship. This third way makes for no easy unanimity of opinion, but it does make for a common basis of discussion through which at least relative unanimity may be reached.

In this way the church which Protestantism holds to be the true church—the church that exists wherever there is a realization of God's will through the revelation contained in the scriptures—may learn more surely what the will of God is, through a slow, difficult, but constantly unfolding process; and for this reason Protestantism will continue to produce biblical scholars of ability and devotion, without whom we would be bereft of the guardians and guides of our faith. So, with their help, we may relate the church to the will of God.

COMMUNICATION

THE EDITOR :

I deem it my duty to reply to Dr. Ralph Marcus' review of my book, *Religious and Secular Leadership*, published in the last issue of your *Quarterly*, in order to dispel a popular illusion that a Jewish professor or rabbi is necessarily a rabbinic scholar any more than a Christian cleric or college professor is necessarily a New Testament scholar or expert in patristic literature.

As my book is based primarily on the Talmud and rabbinic literature, it was hardly to be expected that Dr. Ralph Marcus, otherwise a talented scholar, but with no pretension to rabbinic scholarship whatsoever, should undertake a critical analysis of its contents. Indeed, the reader of the "review" will look in vain for any evaluation, critical or otherwise, of any major thesis advanced in my book which, as indicated above, is constructed of talmudic and rabbinic source material. In lieu of a studied critique, the reader is treated to a series of ill-digested comments based on a hurried perusal of the book, showing Dr. Marcus' failure to understand simple passages of an elementary nature.

Thus Dr. Marcus cites a passage in which I state: "The authority of the High Priest did not extend beyond the limits of the Temple. The Sanhedrin, however, had religious authority not only over Judea but over the entire Jewry all over the world." He contrasts this statement with another passage which reads: "The High Priest, by virtue of being the head of the Temple, which was the center of the entire Jewish life, exercised great influence over the people." Therefore, comments Dr. Marcus: "Not only is one left in doubt whether Dr. Zeitlin thinks the high priest had more or less influence than the Sanhedrin, but also wonders what reason Dr. Zeitlin has for assuming that in the first century A.D., the members of the Sanhedrin were secular rather than religious leaders."

Obviously, Dr. Marcus failed to understand the difference between authority and influence. Perhaps for his benefit I should have italicized or drawn a diagram around these words. Certainly the Sanhedrin, as the interpreter of the religious law, enjoyed authority such as the high priest (beginning with the establishment of the Commonwealth) did not, outside the boundaries of the temple. Nevertheless, by virtue of being the head of the temple, which was sacred to all Jews, he indubitably wielded influence. As to the allegation that I asserted or implied that the members of the Sanhedrin were secular rather than religious leaders, nothing could reveal more clearly Dr. Marcus' failure to grasp the meaning of the struggle which I depicted between the religious force, embodied in the scholars of the Sanhedrin, and that of the temple hierarchy.

Stranger still is his comment on my statement that the high priest, Onias II, allied himself with Seleucus against Ptolemy III because he feared that a union of Palestine with Egypt under the flag of the Ptolemies

would result in the loss of revenue to the temple in Jerusalem, since the Babylonian Jews would find it difficult to continue their pilgrimages to the Holy City or to send gifts and sacrifices to the temple. Whereupon, Dr. Marcus opines: "This is very interesting if true. But the fact is that Palestine was united with Egypt in the time of Ptolemy III." One wonders whether Dr. Marcus has lost contact with the world to such a degree as never to have heard of Quisling and the repetitive historic phenomenon represented in his type. Of course Judea, for the time being, was under the control of Egypt. But that did not eliminate political differences among the Jews in Palestine, some favoring a pro-Egyptian orientation and others favoring an alliance with the Seleucids, so that when war broke out between Seleucus and Ptolemy III and the tide turned against Ptolemy, Onias, the high priest, readily allied himself with Seleucus.

Totally uncomprehending is Dr. Marcus' sequel: "In the second place, there is not the slightest evidence that Ptolemy III, or any of the Ptolemies who ruled Palestine, objected to the Babylonian Jews' sending of gifts to the temple in Jerusalem." Of course not. Why should the Ptolemies have objected to a flow of wealth from Babylon to Palestine, which was under their dominion? One wonders what led Dr. Marcus to misconstrue the clear meaning of the text that it was the Syrian-Babylonian authorities who would interfere with the export of wealth from Babylonia to Palestine, if the latter were under foreign domination (cf. also Josephus, *Antt.* xvi, 6).

Dr. Marcus displays the same art of misconstruction in his unhappy references to other periods treated in my book. Thus, pointing to my statement that the Jews "never converted any people by the sword or by the spirit," he suggests gently, "If he includes the period of the Second Commonwealth, as he seems to, he is simply making a statement that every well-informed person knows to be untrue." But from the context in which the advent of the Jews in Europe is contrasted with that of the Christians, any tyro would realize that there can not possibly be any allusion to the period of the Second Commonwealth. Nor is Dr. Marcus better informed in the later Spanish period of Jewish history. He is totally unaware that the so-called "chief rabbis," appointed by the Castilian monarchs, were not rabbis in the religious sense of the word; they were physicians, financiers, diplomats, and generally royal favorites. That some of these so-called "rabbis" were unable to read Hebrew is attested to by no less an authority than Ilm Adret. Did not Dr. Marcus read the Hebrew quotation to be found in my book, p. 57, n. 151? But this brings us back to the opening statement. *It was ever so*. Not all who bear the proud title of rabbi are versed in rabbinic literature; and not all who venture to review books based on rabbinic sources bring to the task the requisite competence of knowledge or insight.

Where Ignorance Is Bliss, 'Tis Folly

AMERICANS, by and large, are folk of a single language. If people expect us to talk with them, they can learn our language. With the increasing prospect of English becoming *a* if not *the* world language, there is a growing disinclination on our part to bother about the painful task of acquiring proficiency in foreign tongues. To this some may protest that German and Japanese are now being taught at forced draught, the better to enable the students efficiently to knock off Germans and Japanese. With this only seeming exception, the general rule would still seem to hold. Since there are no foes to be slaughtered who converse in Hebrew or ancient Greek, it would seem useless to clutter one's head with them. To be sure, our Scriptures were, unfortunately, composed in those tongues, but with the many admirable translations available how foolish it is for prospective ministers, interpreters of the Scriptures though they are to be, to waste their time on work already better done. (Laziness can at times be humble.) John Graham, the self-made merchant immortalized by George Horace Lorimer in *Old Gorgon Graham*, speaks for many an American. He has received a letter from his son Pierrepont, in which a French sentence was quoted. The old man is both pained and puzzled by it:

... You learn men and what men should do, and then if you happen to have any foreigners working for you, you can hire a fellow at fifteen per to translate hustle to 'em into their own fool language. It's always been my opinion that everybody spoke American while the tower of Babel was building, and that the Lord let the good people keep right on speaking it. So when you've got anything to say to me, I want you to say in language that will grade regular on the Chicago Board of Trade. Perhaps even this is not an utter exaggeration. There are people who claim to have heard modern translations derided: "If the St. James version was good enough for the apostle Paul, it's good enough for me." (People who talk that way usually *do* call it the "St. James version.") With such it probably is the point of wisdom to follow the example of the priest and Levite and—pass by on the other side.

To others it may be remarked: "If real translations were possible, perhaps the minister destitute of Greek and Hebrew would not be in so desperate a plight." But the long and short of it is, they are not possible. Words and phrases are curious things. They are part and parcel of their own languages, and frequently they just will not let themselves be torn loose from their surroundings. Years ago, as a very young boy just starting to learn Latin, I was pained to find that my rendering of a few lines of Vergil did not sound like poetry—it didn't even rhyme! My uncle, a minister learned in the classics, to whom I chanced to express my perplexity: "My translation is right. Why isn't it poetry?" answered me in words which I have never forgotten, "To make your translation poetry you have to be a poet." Exactly.

In my Greek classes I have occasionally illustrated the extreme difficulty of making an adequate translation by drawing a rectangle on the blackboard and then superimposing another rectangle upon it. The ideal translation would demand that the second exactly fit the first: exactly

the same size and exactly superimposed. But how rare is that the case. So frequently the best one can do is to get them into some sort of contact. Part of the first is not included by the second; part of the second extends beyond the first.

That is the nub of the difficulty. So frequently a part—often a very significant part—of the original is not brought over by the so-called translation; and even worse, so frequently the word or phrase we use injects into the rendering something peculiar to itself that was not in the original text. Thus the reader of the translation, unacquainted with the original, may very easily be led totally astray through being struck by the overplus of the translation and in consequence utterly mistake the meaning of the passage he is attempting to construe.

A particularly good example of this is the Pauline phrase, "tutor unto Christ." That, Paul seems to say in Galatians, is what the law is. To the modern reader *tutor* suggests *teacher*, especially the one hired by a wealthy and indulgent parent to urge the youngster along the path to knowledge, teaching him a few hours a day, making the tasks pleasanter and easier, playing tennis with him and going for tramps and swims. Thus the function of the law was somewhat similar: it taught men their ABC's, carried them through grammar school, so to speak, fitting them for the more advanced instruction they were to receive.

Of course, this is utterly the reverse of what Paul meant, although it is safe to say that many a sermon has suggested it. The point of the matter is that *tutor* is an utterly inadequate rendering of the Greek *paidagōgos*. The King James' rendering *schoolmaster* is still worse. Even Goodspeed's *attendant* is far from ideal. Nor is the seemingly more literal *pedagogue* any better. All convey a meaning, but it is not the right meaning. They read back into the Greek what these words connote in English, and fail utterly to suggest what Paul is implying. When he calls the law a *paidagōgos*, he is not complimenting it, nor thinking of its educative function. Rather, it is a harsh menial, a slave, whose function is to hedge and confine the immature child who is thus kept under surveillance, not free to express himself. It has no educative value, is no "shepherd of tender youth." It guards him—but not from evil; it guards him as a jailor. So long as he is under its constraint, he is a prisoner, and an unwilling prisoner; a slave, though he is properly a son and heir.

Space in this editorial does not permit a discussion of Paul's whole view of the law, as he had come to have it; how he had come to see it as functioning to force men to make a dash for freedom, convincing them of their hopeless bondage, and thus forcing them (though quite unintentionally!) the more eagerly to welcome the one means of escape provided in God's gift to man of his own son. Nonetheless it provides an example—and there are literally hundreds more in both Testaments—of the many pitfalls that lie in the path of the unwary and the ignorant. Perhaps in subsequent editorials attention may be called to a few of them, for example, "I know that my redeemer liveth," "In my father's house are many mansions," or even, God save the mark, the Mizpah benediction.

From Off the Campus and On

PROFESSOR Ferré represents a distinct trend in contemporary theological thought. His paper will be read with interest even though some may opine that he is a bit overmodest in feeling that it "will be criticized as far too liberal in content." Dr. Ferré was born in Sweden but was educated in America, graduating in turn from Boston University, Andover Newton, and Harvard. Since 1939 he has held the Abbot professorship of Christian theology at Andover Newton. He is the author of several books and a member of the American Theological Society.

During his two years on the faculty of Crozer, Professor Pritchard has become well and favorably known both off the campus and on. His pointed and able book reviews, together with an article, "The Minister as Interpreter" (July, 1943), have introduced him to our readers as a competent scholar and facile writer. His present article, in the field of his specialty, is a judicious and cautious study of a problem which should prove of interest to all concerned with the Old Testament and its background.

Chaplain King is no newcomer to our pages. His latest article in the CROZER QUARTERLY appeared in July, 1942, "The Significance of Adventism." A graduate of Asbury College, Andover Newton, and Harvard University, he was for several years minister of the First Congregational Church, Lebanon, New Hampshire. He is now serving overseas as an Army chaplain.

It is with particular pleasure that we are able to print Professor Otto's critique of Chaplain King's article. The latter appeared to the editor to raise questions of sufficient importance to merit fuller attention. No one could be more competent for this task than M. C. Otto, for many years one of the leading exponents of scientific humanism. Professor Otto holds the three orthodox academic degrees (A.B., A.M., and Ph.D.) from the University of Wisconsin, and since 1910 has been a member of its department of philosophy. He is no newcomer to our pages. If editorial persuasion continues to be of avail, this pleasant relationship will continue.

Shirley Jackson Case is too well known to require any lengthy introduction to readers of the CROZER QUARTERLY. During his many years in the Divinity School of the University of Chicago, where he served with distinction as a professor and dean, his books and articles were many and influential. Upon retiring from Chicago in 1938, he took up residence in Florida. Within a year he was back in the harness, dean of the Florida School of Religion and editor of *Religion in the Making*. For a long time pressure has been upon him for an article for the QUARTERLY. One characteristically laconic sentence from the note which accompanied this article may be quoted:

You will easily perceive that the enclosed document was prepared as a popular address to students, and if it seems quite too thin—as well it may—for your stately pages, then throw it in the wastepaper basket and we can both forget it,

if only to show that even a skilled critic may occasionally fail to appraise the proper worth of a document. The editor, with no feeling of immodesty, is sure that his is the better judgment upon this occasion.

Chaplain Saunders will be remembered by our readers for his frequent articles in these pages. A native of Scotland, he has long been a resident of Canada, as a student and subsequently as a pastor. At present he is a chaplain (with the rank of captain) in the army of his adopted land.

Solomon Zeitlin, one of the world's great talmudic scholars, was born in Russia. He studied in Russia, Paris, and the United States, and holds earned doctorates from the Jewish Seminary in Paris and from Dropsie College, Philadelphia, where he has been professor of rabbinical literature since 1925. He has long been a student of the Second Commonwealth and of Christian beginnings. That he was not entirely satisfied with the review which his most recent volume received in our pages will perhaps be evident without further editorial comment. Some students of the yester-years may remember the little affair anent "English Bards and Scotch Reviewers." It is not suggested that the two cases are identical; yet there is a superficial resemblance after all.

Once again we are happy to present a list of distinguished reviewers from off the campus. Professor Abrams is a member of the department of sociology of the University of Pennsylvania. Professor Beare has been for years on the faculty of the Presbyterian College, formerly in Montreal, now in Toronto. Professor Bertocci is a member of the department of philosophy in Bates College. Professor Branton holds the chair of New Testament at Colgate-Rochester. Professor Brightman, of Boston University, has been introduced in this column so often that it is utterly impossible to say anything new about him. Dr. Bronk, formerly of the American Baptist Publication Society, is another constant and faithful reviewer. Dr. Cherry holds a master's degree from Crozer and a doctor's degree from the Philadelphia Divinity School (both in New Testament). He is minister of the Sharon Hill (Pa.) Methodist Church. H. Lamar Crosby is professor of Greek at the University of Pennsylvania and a former dean of its Graduate School. Dr. Dauerty is minister of the First Presbyterian Church, Moorestown, N. J. Robert M. Grey, minister of the historic First Congregational Church of Woburn, Mass., will be remembered for his brilliant article, "But What about the Layman?" (January, 1943). Mr. Keighton, of Narberth, one of our regular reviewers, is again serving Crozer as instructor in public speaking. Professor Moehlman, of Colgate-Rochester's department of church history, is an ever-welcome contributor of reviews and stimulating articles. Dr. Orlinsky, visiting lecturer in Bible at the Jewish Institute of Religion, is a distinguished expert in the Septuagint. Professor Parsons is professor *emeritus* of New Testament at Colgate-Rochester where he headed that department for many distinguished years.

BOOK REVIEWS

Theology in Transition, by Walter Marshall Horton, New York, Harper, 1943, pp. xxix, 186, xxxiv (actually ii), 196 (and index), \$2.50.

Theology in Transition is a reprint of Horton's earlier works, *A Psychological Approach to Theology* (1931)—minus Chapters V-VII—and *Realistic Theology* (1934), with a two-page preface and a reprint of the author's *Christian Century* article on "How My Mind Has Changed in the Last Ten Years," under the title, "Between Liberalism and the New Orthodoxy." Since the volume contains only two new pages, and familiarity with its contents may be presupposed among theological readers, the present review may serve as an occasion to evaluate Horton's transition from a "liberal" to a "realistic" view.

Walter Marshall Horton is a man of personal distinction, rich experience, theological scholarship, and Christian character; he has made fruitful and stimulating contributions; yet his formulations of Christian thought have seldom satisfied the present reviewer. A reading of *Theology in Transition* has heightened this dissatisfaction, and has disclosed the chief reason for it, namely, Horton's lack of exact and thorough definition of terms. Definition is not the sole merit of a writer. Poets and prophets rarely define; scientists are often more concerned about facts than about the meaning of concepts. Nevertheless, definition is a merit. It was the chief concern of Socrates, and ought to be a major concern of every theologian.

Horton had made clear in *Theism and the Modern Mood* (1929) that we must either hold to the logic of pure science and lose faith in God or else renew faith through a richer logic. Then he learned (from Barth and Brunner) that liberalism should be purged of "idealistic illusions" and become "realistic." It is at this point that confusion sets in, on account of the lack of definition. First of all, it is clear that the words "idealistic" and "realistic," as Horton uses them, have nothing whatever to do with their use in philosophy. In philosophy, idealism is a system that makes mind the supreme or the only reality in the universe; realism, a system that either makes the nonmental supreme, or else assigns it a very large place. In this sense, all theism is idealistic in holding to the supremacy of God (although much theism, like the scholastic, is partly realistic, and so may be called dualistic). When a philosopher reads that realism has taken the place of idealistic illusions, he therefore naturally supposes that the writer: 1. rejects all idealism as illusory; 2. therefore rejects theism as one of the illusions; and 3. substitutes for belief in the supremacy of mind belief in the supremacy of something entirely nonmental—matter, nature, energy, or neutral entities. Now Horton, of course, does not mean anything remotely resembling what he (and many other recent theologians) suggest by their words to a philosophically trained reader.

What, then, is this "realism"? Horton tells us that it is the recognition of more truth in Augustine and Calvin, especially in such ideas as "the wrath of God," "original sin," "perdition and judgment." This implies that realism means for him something like what it means for the novelist: a confrontation of the harsh, hard, evil, cruel facts of experience. But Horton also identifies realism with "the transcendent element in Christian faith"—the biblical revelation. In this sense, realism is a recognition of "other mind," or what Brunner calls "the divine-human encounter" (both of which are standard idealistic-personalistic ideas), plus a peculiar access to truth through revelation (which is no more "realistic" than any other access to truth). As opposed to Wieman, Horton looks to "divine guidance rather than human

discovery." It is not clear how such a distinction can be carried out. How can one know that he is divinely guided until he discovers that he is; and why should God guide a man without allowing him to discover that he is guided? The whole concept of realism, as used by Horton, is confused and ill-defined.

Lack of clear definition is evident in the treatment of sin in *The Psychological Approach to Theology*. One of the most wholesome contributions of that work was its protest against "treating morally diseased people as if they were sinners" (p. 81). Horton follows Hadfield in identifying sin with the "willful, controllable, and therefore blameworthy" (p. 83). But he has an uneasy feeling that the religious concept of sin is different, and he finally calls sin "an objective cosmic maladjustment, a pathological relationship between man and the source of his well-being which subsists whether the sinner is conscious of it or not" (p. 84). Here the definition of sin is explicitly pathological. Sin is moral disease; although the treatment of moral disease as sin was sharply condemned a few pages back. There is sin. There is moral disease. There is cosmic maladjustment. But it is neither liberal nor realistic to identify them or mass them under one label.

Realistic Theology is an attempt to explain Horton's transition from liberalism to realism. The whole process of transition is confused by lack of exact definition of both *termini*—*a quo* and *ad quem*. What, exactly, is liberalism for Horton? It seems to be not a method (as most of us have taken it to be) but a set of dogmas. Horton mentions "the favorite liberal dogma of progress" (p. 4, n. 2). One would like to know what religion is left if one denies progress entirely; if there is no hope for man's conversion or salvation, and everything must grow worse and worse forever, what is the sense of talking about belief in God? Further, one may question whether there ever was a liberal dogma of progress. A liberal belief, based on experience and reason, cannot assume dogmatic form; and the belief in inevitable progress is closer to Calvinism than to liberalism. Again, liberalism is described as "hopeful, idealistic, easy-going, world-affirming" (pp. 7-8). Would Horton prefer the hopeless betrayal of all ideals? Sure not. The "easy-going, world-affirming" liberalism is no serious liberalism of thought; it is the moral laxity of what the layman calls "liberal"—the attitude of friendliness toward fashionable vices.

What, then, is this awful theological liberalism that must be rejected? Horton quotes John Bennett's definition: "Faith in man and his highest values as the clue to the nature of God" (p. 25). If "man" in this definition means "all of man's experience," the definition does not distinguish liberalism from any other approach to God. It simply states the only possible approach to God. The most supernatural of revelations can be a factor in man's faith only in so far as the revelation in some way enters or affects man's experience. But if "man" means the purely human apart from all divine influence, then it designates a theological abstraction that no believer in God could seriously entertain. On the other hand, if man's highest values, that is, man's experiences of love, of worship, of revelation, are not clues to the nature of God, how would any clue, or influence, or power divine ever penetrate man's isolation? The definition of liberalism thus reduces to the definition of the only possible conditions of religious experience or faith.

Until we have a clearer definition of liberalism, theological thought will continue in the chaos which now obtains. Horton insists that we must retain the idea of "continuity," which he finds is central to liberalism (p. 33). He also speaks of it as "immanentist." Truly, thought must recognize both continuity and discontinuity, both immanence and transcendence. But it must deal with these concepts as clear and well-defined ideas, not as slogans for passionate praise and blame. The current

stage of theology is too much an age of slogans (old and new) and too little an age of clear thought. We need light. Horton's work is provocative in revealing the needs of our time. It does not, however, go far toward meeting them.

EDGAR SHEFFIELD BRIGHTMAN

The Anti-Anthropomorphisms of the Greek Pentateuch, by Charles T. Fritsch, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1943, pp. 81, \$2.00.

Just over a century ago Zechariah Frankel (1801-75), at the time chief rabbi of Dresden and of all Saxony, later to become president of the Rabbinical Seminary in Breslau, began the systematic study of various phases of the Old Greek (Septuagint) translation of the Hebrew Bible. One phase to which Frankel devoted special study was that of the translators' methods of turning into Greek those expressions in the Hebrew which represented God as anything less than superhuman, *e.g.*, as having the bodily or mental characteristics of man (anthropomorphisms, anthropopathisms).¹

It is gratifying that Dr. Fritsch chose this phase as the subject for his doctoral dissertation, for, as he observes, "no one since Frankel has dealt with this subject by studying the examples themselves in a systematic and comprehensive way" (p. 4, n. 3). In successive order, our author discusses the nature of the problem (Introduction, pp. 3-8), "Anti-Anthropomorphisms" (Chap. I, pp. 9-16), "Anti-Anthropopathisms" (II, pp. 17-20), "The Name of God Changed or Omitted" (III, pp. 21-27), "Motion and Place Denied God" (IV, pp. 28-35), "Direct and Indirect Softening" (V, pp. 36-48), "Grammatical Changes" (VI, pp. 49-53), "Intermediary Elements" (VII, pp. 54-57), and "Miscellaneous Matters" (VIII, pp. 58-61). The monograph is brought to a close with the "Conclusions" (pp. 62-65), two appendices (Codex Alexandrinus vs. Codex Vaticanus in the matter of reproducing the Hebrew anthropomorphisms, anthropopathisms, etc. [pp. 67-70]; Anti-Anthropomorphisms in Aquila, Symmachus, and Theodotion [pp. 71-72]), an extensive and valuable bibliography (pp. 73-77),² and a useful index of biblical passages (pp. 79-81). The editorial board of the series *Princeton Oriental Texts* is to be congratulated on continuing its new policy to broaden its scope from purely Islamic character (Nos. 1-7 in the Series) to cover the Ancient Near East in general (Nos. 8-10).

The important task which our author set for himself was to assemble and classify all those instances in the Pentateuch where the Septuagint translators modified or suppressed altogether the anthropomorphisms, anthropopathisms, and the like, of their Hebrew *Vorlagen*. This task has been accomplished very adequately. Yet the reviewer cannot help feeling that Dr. Fritsch has allowed himself, quite without realizing it of course, to be misled by his predecessors into accepting as a premise what he should first have demonstrated to be a true proposition; namely, he should have proved that we are really dealing with anthropomorphisms, etc., before assembling, classifying, and discussing them as such. As a matter of fact, the reviewer is now convinced more than ever, as a result of Dr. Fritsch's collection of

¹ I have made special reference to Frankel in the hope that scholars will realize how much they are losing by not acquainting themselves directly with his work. I know of no important contribution to the study of the Greek-Hebrew of the Bible, with the possible exception of Schleusner's *Thesaurus*, which has been so neglected. An excellent sketch of the life and works of Frankel constitutes Chap. VIII in Prof. L. Ginzberg's *Students, Scholars and Saints* (Philadelphia, 1938; pp. 195-216.) Cf. my brief remarks on Frankel's work, *JBL*, LXI(1942), n. 1 on p. 88.

² Schleusner's *Thesaurus* (5 vols., Lipsiae, 1820) and Bickell's *De Indole ac Ratione Versionis Alexandrinae in Interpretando Libro Jobi* (Marburgi, 1862) are the more notable works which should have been included.

the data, that what have been regarded by virtually everyone as instances of an antianthropomorphic attitude on the part of the Septuagint translators are the result of nothing more tendencious than mere stylism, theology and philosophy playing no direct rôle whatever in the matter. I shall present here but a small fraction of my argument; a full analysis would require the space of the book under review.

In Chap. I ("Anti-Anthropomorphisms," p. 11) it is manifestly improper even *a priori* to designate as antianthropomorphic the use of the intensive pronoun "self" (αὐτοῦς) in the Septuagint for Hebrew *pānīm* (lit., "face") in such an expression as "... and he brought you forth with his face and with his great strength out of Egypt" (Deut. 4:37). A translation must make sense, and what sense would it make to reproduce the Hebrew literally ("... he brought you forth with his face...")? Moreover, it is far from certain that Heb. *pānīm* does mean here "face" as such; the recognized English versions are unanimous in reproducing the Hebrew by "... with his presence," and that masterly scholar, S. R. Driver, comments in this connection (ICC Deut., p. 77), "cf. Ex. 33^{4,15} *pānāi yeleku*, Is. 63¹ 'and the angel of his presence (*ʾmal'ak pānāʾe*) saved them'; also, for the general sense of *pānīm*, 2 S. 17¹¹ (of a human person)." Nor should there be overlooked in this very connection the semantic history of cognate *pānu* in the Canaanite of the Amarna tablets and *pn* in Ugaritic and in Phœnician generally. *A fortiori* the antianthropomorphic assumption of our author is precluded at once by the fact, as observed by him in a footnote (p. 10, n. 2) but the significance of which is not taken into account, "The Seventy have translated [face] literally eighteen times in the Pentateuch when referring to God."

Again, on pp. 10-11 (n. 6), in connection with the Septuagint rendering "... the Lord God" (... κυριου του θεου) for Heb. "... the Lord his God" (Ex 32:11), our author states, "The omission of the possessive pronoun 'his' in the phrase 'his God' in the LXX makes the relationship between Moses and God less intimate. . . . The tendency to separate God from that which is physical as well as from that which is unbecoming to his majesty may have led to the Greek translation in these instances." Altogether our author lists three other such instances in the Septuagint: Ex. 15:7 (Sept. "the enemy" for Heb. "thine . . ."), 23:27 (Sept. "fear" for Heb. "my fear"), and Deut. 32:10 ("of an eye" for Heb. "of his eye"). However, when all the other pertinent factors are brought to bear on the matter it becomes quite clear that there is involved neither antianthropomorphism nor a tendency. For one thing, as our author notes immediately, "Of course there are numerous passages in the LXX where the possessive suffix, referring to the deity, has been kept, viz., 'my hand,' Ex. 7:17, 6:8, Num. 14:30, etc." Secondly, it would be interesting, and necessary, to list and classify all those passages in the Greek Pentateuch where the possessive pronoun with a person or thing was not reproduced literally, and where anthropomorphism is not involved. From the reviewer's acquaintance with the material he is inclined to believe that the proportion is much the same whether the deity is or is not involved (cf. Frankel, *Vorstudien*, pp. 139-140, "Das possessive Pronomen . . . wird zuweilen ausgelassen. . ."). In fine, all that enters into our problem is the question of style, of literary effect; all talk of an antianthropomorphic tendency is quite without foundation.

On p. 12 we read, "The phrase *bē'ēnē YHWH* (in the eyes of Jehovah), or *bē'ēnāi* (in my eyes), where the pronominal element refers to Jehovah, is consistently translated into the Greek by words and phrases which avoid the mention of eyes." However, the matter is seen in its proper light, and any antianthropomorphic explanation is at once ruled out, when the following facts are taken into consideration:

1. Our author himself notes (p. 13, n. 10), "Three times in the LXX the word 'eye' is translated literally when referring to God"; 2. even when the Lord is not involved, the expression "in the eyes of" (*be'ēnē*) is so frequently rendered by "before" (e.g., *ἐναντίον*); or compare *ἀπέναντι* and *ἐνώπιον* for *liphnē* whether God is or is not involved (cf. Frankel, pp. 159-160). Note too the meanings of this word in Canaanite generally. What is clearly involved here is not the avoidance of the eyes or face of the Lord or of anyone else, but the correct understanding and translation of the Heb. expression "in the eyes of" or "to the face of," which long before the time of the translators came to be idiomatic for the concept "before."

Or again, if the translators rendered the Heb. word for "anger" (*'ap*) in connection with God by its correspondent in Greek (*οργή, θυμός*) rather than by the other meaning of the same word, "nostril," it was surely not for the purpose of "obscuring the physical association" (p. 13) but simply because the use of the term "nostril" would have been devoid not only of all intelligibility in the context but also of philological justification. After all, the Septuagint translators, as all translators since (except in Aquila!), were interested in reproducing the Hebrew words and phrases "as is," not the proto-Hebrew or proto-Semitic roots and meanings and associations. If a clinching argument for the thoroughly correct use of "anger" for Heb. *'ap* be needed, it may be found in the fact that, as stated by our author (*ibid.*), "This is true in its use with God as well as with man." In fine, the question of antianthropomorphism scarcely enters into the picture.

And so it goes through the rest of the chapter: "The word *peh* (mouth), when used of God, was carried over into the Greek without any change" (*ibid.*); "In most cases the word *yād* (hand), when used in connection with God, is translated literally into the Greek. . . . This is true whether the word is literally used in the Hebrew, or figuratively" (p. 14, and n. 15). It is a pity that our author has discounted this overwhelming data to give preference, and consequently credence, to the theory of antianthropomorphism, to but two passages where Hebrew "hand" was not reproduced literally.

The chapter on "Anti-Anthropopathies" follows the same pattern. Alleged anti-anthropopathies are treated as prime evidence, whereas the clear instances of anthropopathism, while quite commendably noted in their proper place, are not allowed the same significance. Thus the fact that the translators reproduced Hebrew "repent" by Greek "to reflect" or "to have compassion" does not mean that a tendency towards antianthropopathism was at work. Moreover it should be noted that while our author believes that "In all these cases the idea of repentance on the part of the deity has been avoided," he is nevertheless constrained to add immediately, "but the substitutions, with the exception of Num. 23:19, still retain anthropopathic color" (p. 18)—clear evidence then that the translators' avoidance of "repent" can have nothing to do with antianthropopathism.

On the basis of a single instance of the expression *hārāh* "to burn (of anger)" involving God (Gen. 18:30, || verse 32) our author asserts, "Then, too, the LXX attempts to avoid the ascription of anger to God. . . . There is a deliberate omission here of the verb . . . because of its use in connection with God" (pp. 18-19). But surely this assertion should not have been made in view of the fact that it is followed immediately by the statement, "but there are numerous examples where it [viz., *hārāh*] is retained under the same circumstances," with n. 5 (*ibid.*) citing six specific passages in point followed by an "etc." to indicate even more. The same is true of both the verb and noun of *qṣp* ("to be wroth, angry").

What has been said above of Chaps. I and II applies likewise to the other

chapters in the monograph. As for the conclusions of our author (pp. 62-65; cf. *JBL*, LX[1941], pp. vi-vii) this much must be said: All talk of an antianthropomorphic tendency among the Septuagint translators of the Pentateuch must be suspended, and together with it all attempts to prove that tendency to be of inner-Jewish or Hellenistic origin (pp. 3-4, 63-65) until it should be proved that there really existed such a tendency among the translators. From the evidence available it is clear that the burden of proof rests upon those who believe in the existence of such a tendency among the "Seventy." Certainly the opening sentence of the "Conclusion" (p. 62), "An anti-anthropomorphic tendency has long been observed in the Greek Old Testament; in this investigation its extent has been ascertained, the examples have been classified, and certain conclusions have been drawn," loses much of its significance in the light of the author's own data which are summarized immediately as follows, "Actual anthropomorphisms and anthropopathies are taken over into the Greek with comparatively few cases of alteration. . . . There are even some cases where the LXX is more anthropomorphic than the Hebrew." The only proper way to study the relatively few cases of antianthropomorphism, etc., where God is involved, is not alone in relation to those numerous cases where the expressions are carried over into the Greek literally, but also in the light of those many instances in the Pentateuch where the Lord is not involved and where such expressions as "hand," "foot," "wrath," etc., are or are not reproduced literally in the Greek, where the active is turned into the passive and vice versa (cf., e.g., Frankel, *Vorstudien*, pp. 144-145, "Der Activ wird häufig in den Passiv und umgekehrt umgewandelt"; *Einfluss*, §§ 3 and 24 *inter alia*), where the possessive pronoun in the Hebrew is for purely stylistic reasons omitted in the Greek, and similar translation phenomena. Moreover, such a study should be made for each of the books of the Pentateuch separately, since it is generally agreed that each book was translated by a different person. The reviewer will not be surprised if such a study leads to the conclusion that the "Seventy" Jewish translators of over two thousand years ago were faced by the same sort of problems that confronted the seven Jewish translators that formed the editorial board responsible for the Jewish Publication Society Translation of the Hebrew Bible over a quarter of a century ago, namely, ". . . a translator is not a transcriber of the text. His principal function is to make the Hebrew intelligible. Faithful though he must be to the Hebrew idiom, he will nevertheless be forced by the genius of the English language to use circumlocution, to add a word or two, to alter the sequence of words, and the like . . . as intelligibility was the principal aim, the Editors have felt justified in making their additions . . . as often as the occasion required" (Preface, p. x). What is involved is not theology, but stylism and intelligibility.

It may not be out of place here to point out that the "anthropomorphic" situation in the Greek Pentateuch appears to be paralleled perfectly in the Greek Job. There too it has long been popularly assumed that the translator was quite allergic to anthropomorphisms, anthropopathisms, direct charges against and offensive statements concerning God, and to such expressions as deriving from the assumption that there was no life after death apart from the eternal lifeless existence in Sheol. The reviewer dealt with this problem in the course of his doctoral dissertation on the Septuagint of Job (pp. 124-137; as yet unpublished),³ and after studying every case where the Lord was and was not involved he could but conclude that "whether our translator did or did not believe in resurrection or find anthropomorphisms offensive,

³ See in the meantime, *JQR*, XXV (1934-5), pp. 271-278 [on *Shaddai* in 5:8]; XXVIII (1937-8), pp. 63-64 and notes 26 f. [on the translator's treatment of those passages which deal with afterdeath].

he reproduced H [the Hebrew text] faithfully." As for the contrary belief held so widely, it was arrived at by the simple expedient of 1. interpreting quite arbitrarily a very few extremely difficult passages that still defy convincing explanation (*e.g.*, 19:25!), 2. ignoring completely the large number of instances where the translation is literal, and 3. not making a study of or taking into account the very many passages in which the Lord was in no way involved.⁴

It is good that the author has started on his scholarly career with a careful study of one phase of the Septuagint. At the seventy-ninth Meeting of the Society of Biblical Literature (December, 1943) he continued his work with a paper on "The Names of God in the LXX." It is the reviewer's hope that these are but the first of a long series of useful contributions toward the understanding of the text and versions of the Bible.

HARRY M. ORLINSKY

From Jesus to Paul, by Joseph Klausner (translated from the Hebrew by William F. Stinespring), New York, Macmillan, 1943, pp. xvi, 624, \$3.50.

Professor Klausner has produced a volume that is very hard to appraise fairly. That it contains a large amount of information, some of which is not easily accessible elsewhere, may be conceded without qualification; that it contains some very profound insights would be ungracious in the extreme to fail to acknowledge; that it has been superbly translated is a pleasure to record; that it also falls at times far short of being objective history, utterly failing to understand many of the problems it most confidently grapples with, in consequence of passionately held convictions which are like burning fire in his bones, it would be idle to deny. This is no dispassionate study of the beginnings of Christianity. In the last analysis—and this is only another way of saying "first and foremost"—it is an *apologia pro vita sua*: a justification of why Judaism has not accepted, and never can accept, Christianity, which was given its distinctive and unacceptable cast by the renegade Jew of the diaspora, Saul of Tarsus. To quote Klausner's own words—the thesis is repeated again and again:

Intensive research over many years has brought the writer of the present book to a deep conviction that there is nothing in the teaching of Paul—not even the most mystical elements in it—that did not come to him from authentic Judaism. . . . But it is a fact that most of the elements in his teaching which came from Judaism received unconsciously at his hands a *non-Jewish coloring* from the influence of the Hellenistic-Jewish and pagan atmosphere with which Paul of Tarsus was surrounded during nearly all his life, except for the few years which he spent in Jerusalem (p. 466).

Or crisper and more sententious:

The answer has been given in what has been said up to this point: In spite of the fact that the *foundations* of all the teachings of Paul are Jewish, his *own* teaching is both the *contradiction of the Jewish religion* and the *rejection of the Jewish nation* (p. 591).

Thus again and again we have short and poignant sentence paragraphs at the end of a chapter of exposition: "Could Judaism have exchanged this bright hope for the hope of Paul and his followers?—" I am not criticising this attitude, nor would I minimize the treasures of Judaism of which he is rightly proud; nonetheless it is only fair to point out, and in the strongest terms, that this pride of religion, this pride of race, does not tend to an unbiased appraisal of those who can scarcely fail to be regarded as having broken down ancient landmarks, or to use his repeated figure, diluted the pure wine. Thus I am inclined to say that while he has devoted

⁴ It need scarcely be pointed out that no account has been taken in this review of the character and relative frequency of the anthropomorphisms and antianthropomorphisms within the various parts of the Bible (on the Pentateuch, cf., *e.g.* Driver, *Introduction*,⁷ pp. 8-9, 120-121, 128-129, 140-141), the Targums, Midrashim, Philo, etc., since they do not concern the immediate problem within the Greek Pentateuch.

many pages to Paul, and has made many profound observations, he has nonetheless totally misunderstood and misrepresented the one he sought to appraise. And this is most unfortunate, for his readers—Jews and Christians—will be legion.

The whole question, so central to Paul, of faith—the new and radiant life in Christ—is a closed book to Dr. Klausner, as he sees Paul adding a “strange element” to the “Jewish element, in which there is much of mysticism,” “which changed the mysticism to delusion” (p. 537).

Ever does he see Paul attacking the ceremonial law—that great bulwark of the synagogue—primarily as an easy way of gaining converts: in fact, he was “forced to preach” the abolition of the Torah “in order to win *many* Gentiles to faith in the Jewish Messiah.” This relaxing of requirements was possible only for a diaspora Jew, for whom Judaism had become pretty dilute. Just as normative Judaism had refused to heed Philo—precisely because of the compromise he had made between Judaism and Hellenism—so “this Christianity which set aside the ceremonial laws, made the Messiah a deity, and removed from its teaching Jewish national separateness and all the territorial and nationalistic aspirations contained in the Jewish Messianic conception . . . does accept him” (p. 198). Thus again and again Klausner makes it very clear that whatever values Christianity has—and they are many—it received from Judaism, but has watered them down and lessened their value by this willingness to compromise.

In all of this Klausner appears to me to have failed to detect the tone of early Christianity: he can even say, as have many before him, “Of course, [Paul] intended to abrogate only the *ceremonial* part of the Law, and not the *ethical* part” (p. 594), failing strangely to see that for Paul all law was law; that when he broke with it, he broke with it as a whole; that the Christian was no longer under its constraint in any of its aspects, moral or ceremonial, and that this was the reason Paul so constantly emphasized that liberty was not license. It is especially surprising to see a Jew fall into this pseudoscientific distinction between ceremonial and moral law.

Or again, not only does he fail to understand what “faith” connoted for Paul; so also he quite misunderstands “love,” although indulging in gracious words of appreciation of the “beautiful and sublime” poem in I Corinthians 13. (It is to be remarked that like most interpreters, Christian as well as Jewish, he fails to see that this is not simply a pretty decoration of the epistle, but a terrific ethical rebuke to a part of the church addressed.) But Paul, though speaking “much of Christian love, which in truth is only Jewish love with a mystical coloring . . . forgot to emphasize *righteousness*, apart from which love may be a strong support for *individual life*, but not for *social and national life*” (p. 559). Blindness of this sort is strange in one who has devoted so many years to research.

Paul’s sane and sensible words regarding law and order in general and the government in particular arouse our Zionist friend to indignation: he finds it hard to “escape a feeling of resentment and protest against this recital of praise for the tyranny of Caligula and Nero, or of Gessius Florus. One is forced to see in it flattery of the rulers, on the one hand, and yielding to force, on the other hand—all in order that ‘the powers . . . ordained of God’ might not persecute the new sect” (pp. 565 f.). Since marriage is entered into “only to avoid licentiousness, why *should* Paul permit divorce? Will not any woman or any man serve the purpose of quieting the sex impulse?” (pp. 572 f.). Of course, Paul’s insistence that women veil their heads was a concession to public opinion—apparently a reprehensible concession to our author since “we have not found that Jewish women were required to cover their heads specifically in the synagogue . . .” (p. 570).

One final indication of his complete failure to come to grips with Paul may be cited. He has referred to the word in II Thessalonians (which he accepts as Pauline), "If any will not work, neither let them eat." These he concedes are "fine words" but they clearly suggest "that the Parousia is not very near; if it were very near, there would be no occasion to concern oneself with the world that is passing away, and those who idle their time away would be right, . . . They could say, 'We have not heard that Jesus demanded work; on the contrary, he taught that the flowers of the field did not work, yet they lack nothing . . .'" (pp. 578 f.). It would be difficult to find a passage bristling with more misconceptions. One who could so write is a poor guide.

If space permitted, it would be of point to challenge his whole thesis: Paul was a diaspora Jew, therefore— Well, therefore what? I know it is very common to dilate on the fact that Paul was a citizen of Tarsus—quite irrespective of the fact that this interesting detail is never hinted in his own letters. (That to Klausner is inconsequential apparently, for despite his critical examination of Acts and his admission that Paul's letters are more reliable, he uses it without reserve and cites words from the Pauline speeches or the Pauline letters with utter impartiality, not infrequently combining both in the same sentence with the common introduction, "According to his own testimony" [cf. p. 601].) But suppose he was. It is utterly unscientific to assume that every Jew of the dispersion was foot-loose and rootless. The mere fact of living in a pagan environment may very well have meant in many cases an even more rigorous shielding oneself and family from contamination, a greater devotion to the letter of the law than in the more disinfected security of Zion. Of course, Klausner is not the only one to fail to see this, but Klausner is an historian—and a Jewish historian—and might be expected to have used greater discretion than irresponsible Christian publicists and sociologists.

Actually I feel that this volume is a dangerous book. There is a popular and not unnatural tendency *crede experto*. This author is a Jew, a professor who lives in Palestine and speaks Hebrew; therefore when he writes on these matters, his words are double-distilled truth. But not every Jew is an authoritative guide in Judaism any more than every Christian is an expert in early Christianity or the Protestant Reformation. That Klausner is a specialist in Talmud and the other rabbinical writings I seriously question: his toying with the notion that Paul is referred to in the "Talmudic Haggadah" under the caption "that pupil" who scoffed at Rabban Gamaliel (pp. 311 ff.), and his later deduction that while Paul had surely "sat at the feet of Rabban Gamaliel . . . he had mocked at everything which Rabban Gamaliel had taught"—that is, that not only is this a picture of Paul but a true picture—give me serious qualms. That he is a distinct amateur in New Testament criticism, although he has read reasonably widely, will be evident to every expert who reads the volume—although unfortunately it will not be so clear to the layman. Erudition in many details, but a bland and uncritical weaving together of materials for his main outline—this gives me pause. As I read it, I felt it a more-or-less Renanlike idyll, smacking more of the *littérateur* than of the sound historian. His statement on p. 33 of the population of Palestine and of the size of Jewry in the Roman empire would in itself be enough to shake my confidence in him as a sober historian. Many statements like the words I have italicized in the following quotation from that page, "The Jews of Palestine were a decided majority not only in their own country (according to my opinion, *based on exact calculations the nature of which this is no place to explain*, there lived in Palestine three million Jews, besides a half-million Syro-Canaanites, Greeks, Arabs, and Romans) . . .," would incline me to the term charlatan.

Every indication of Jews and Christians coming to have an increasing interest in their common problems is to be gratefully welcomed. Each has distinct contributions to make to the other. Without Christian arrogance—and because there is plenty of that, I rather welcome this not unduly modest blast on the shophar: it is wholesome for us to realize that we are not the only ones who can look forward to winning the world in our generation; it is also wholesome to realize that our undisguised sense of mission may be offensive at times in non-Christian ears—it may be remarked that by and large Christian scholars are better informed about late Jewish history than are Jewish scholars. Nor is this surprising. Mormons are more concerned about the beginnings of the Christian church than are non-Mormons about the beginnings of the Mormon period. A handful of Jewish scholars are awaking to the problem. Among these may be mentioned the late C. G. Montefiore and the indefatigable Solomon Zeitlin. Those who are competent will be able to throw much light. But while I have no more desire to see Jews turn into Christians than Christians turn into Jews, I could wish that while each is concerning himself with a study of the other—at least while he is publishing his findings—he could keep his sense of mission and missionary ardor under lock and key. As Koheleth remarked, “for everything there is a season . . . there is a time to keep silence, and a time to speak.”

MORTON S. ENSLIN

The Beginning of Christianity, by Clarence Tucker Craig, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, 1943, pp. 366, \$2.75.

Professor Craig informs us in his preface that “This volume has been prepared to guide the serious student in a study of the beginning of Christianity,” and his subsequent remarks indicate that he looks upon his book as a new type of *Introduction to the New Testament*, which he hopes will “cultivate the interest of the student.” He attempts to combine brief sketches of the historical background of the early Christian writings, with short analyses of the contents of each book, and summary accounts of the developing theology. The result is an elementary textbook, ample in scope but frugal of serious discussion, presenting the student with a readily-assimilated digest of the conclusions of modern scholarship regarding most of the historical and literary problems which arise in connection with the first Christian century.

This reviewer is inclined to feel that the treatment is too superficial for the “serious student” to whom it is ostensibly addressed. To dispose of the problem of Revelation in three pages, and of the common faith of the second Christian generation in two, is scarcely to invite a student to be serious in his approach to biblical and historical studies. The chief virtue of the book—if it be a virtue—is in the order and system with which the material is presented, which will make it easy for the student to prepare himself for examination. It will by no means make him aware of the complexity and extreme difficulty of the problems involved, nor of the extent to which any historical reconstruction depends upon the coördination of a whole series of hypotheses, many of them fragile, to which we are driven by the deficiencies in our source materials for the period.

It seems fair to say, also, that no sufficient idea is given of the manifold life of the Roman empire in which the church is forging its way, nor of the circumstances, external and internal, which point toward the emergence of the close-knit structure of Catholicism, already present in all essentials by the end of the second century. In the treatment of Christianity as religion, nothing like justice is done to the singular pre-eminence of love, which is presented as merely one element in a

general ethic. The analysis of the various ideas of the Person of Christ covers most of the formal categories which emerge, but without conveying any clear notion of the tremendous impression of power, majesty, and ineffable glory which our Lord made upon the imaginations of his followers. Even an elementary history should attempt to convey some feeling of the awe and the splendor which surrounds these lowly communities, of the precariousness of their outward circumstances, which stands in such startling contrast with their assurance that the future belongs to them, and of the intense and turbulent and swift-moving internal activity of the nascent movement.

Such faults were perhaps unavoidable in a work which attempts to offer an answer to virtually all the numerous and complex problems of New Testament introduction and early church history within the compass of a single volume of moderate size. The book is disappointing mainly because one feels that the author, with his sound and thorough equipment of scholarship, is capable of something more enlightening and more stimulating. There is seldom occasion to find fault with specific views, except for a certain lack of sureness in the brief references to Roman paganism. In general, the atmosphere of the classroom is too much in evidence, and the historical imagination which would impart life and vigor to the total picture has not been made to play its proper part.

FRANK W. BEARE

Myth and Society in Attic Drama, by Alan M. G. Little, New York, Columbia University Press, 1942, pp. vii, 95, \$1.50.

The present study is an attempt at putting the two halves of a single picture together—the one half Attic drama, the other Attic society. It is the outcome of a question which probably many others beside [*sic*] myself have been both philistine and sensible enough to ask. Why do people continue to read these plays? As literature they breathe an old world air; they are remote in time, strange in plot, in form unlike the drama of today, and yet they do very definitely and inexplicably move the reader. On the other hand, if they can move us in times like these, must they not have stirred more effectively a contemporary audience?

In these words the author sets forth his problem. His effort to solve it, he tells us, involved reading all the extant plays in their chronological order. His imagination had previously been stimulated by visits to the ancient theatres at Athens and Delphi, and recourse was had also to the "countless vase paintings, . . . statuettes and figurines, which are still available in museums or in reproduction," which record ancient Greek impressions of their theatre.

Even so painstaking and conscientious an investigation, however, proved unsatisfying: "the plots, the dialogue, the curious ethical principles involved, continued to seem strange," and the author was led to wonder whether, after all, the solution of his problem might not be reached with the aid of psychology—possibly "these ancients did not think as we do." Eventually he came to see that the "drama was, like all art, a reflection of society; it was a sounding board on which were struck out discords only to be resolved . . . a solvent for social conflict." This discovery he proceeds to state in clearer terms: Attic drama "was the expression both of a society and of a psychology—of a society passing from tribal organization into political, from a tribal responsibility directed towards the group into individual equality before the law; of a psychology dependent upon this advance and fashioned by it, emerging from primitive methods of expression into the conscious use of abstract speech."

Here we find most of the notes which form the theme that runs through this study, a study which is announced as but the "prelude to a larger work, the social history of the ancient theater," namely, social conflict, tribal organization, group

interests, and primitive preconceptions and inarticulateness. Apparently the social conflict is a permanent feature, but the tribe gradually loses its importance, the group makes way for the individual, and the primitive Athenian becomes less and less naïve and inarticulate. One would scarcely deny that some such development took place in Athenian society, but doubts arise regarding the way in which Mr. Little deals with this development.

To begin with, we question the validity of the term primitive as applied (p. 11) to the Athenians who witnessed the plays of Æschylus. Can that term be used of a people who a century earlier had produced a Solon? And were the Athenians unaware of the poetry of Alcæus and Sappho and the speculations of Pythagoras and Xenophanes, or are all these also to be termed primitive? No doubt at the present time there are individuals who are primitive in their mental processes, but we should hardly apply that adjective to describe the age in which we live. If in the heyday of Æschylus Athens was truly primitive, the evidence is yet to be produced. Yet Little, having made that assumption, proceeds to draw conclusions from it. He has evidently been strongly influenced by anthropological and sociological studies, notably those of G. Thomson, whose *Æschylus and Athens*, published in 1941, harps upon the same notes of tribal society, its ritual practices and its taboos. As applied to fifth-century Athens, such speculation would seem to rest upon very slender support.

Little asks (p. 4), "What, then, of the original purpose of the ancient drama, and what was the social function of the Attic dramatist?" and replies without hesitation, "It was the projection of social conflict hidden and disguised from modern eyes beneath the mythological form of primitive thought." Here he seems not to be speaking of the germ out of which grew Greek drama as we know it, but rather of its first appearance in Attica, for he says (p. 9): "The Dionysia came to [was intended to?] unite the ten Attic tribes . . . in a harmless competition, a competition of words and thought rather than of action. It was a painless outlet, a sublimation for what we shall see to have been a serious disruptive factor, namely, the strife of economic and kindred groups." Not only that, but (p. 22) "it was the tyrant Peisistratus who produced tragedies first at the new City Dionysia, a festival founded by him to consolidate the union of the Attic folks under his rule. . . . It has been suggested [the suggestion is Thomson's] that in the prominence which he gave to the new worship Peisistratus sought a solvent for the old tribal cults which, here as at Sicyon, may have impeded the proper knitting together of the political *synoikismos* which was Athens."

These seem to be gratuitous assumptions. Granted that Peisistratus welcomed the drama with official recognition, need we seek for any motive other than that of enhancing the glory of Athens, a motive that presumably accounts for his institution of the Panathenæa and for the prominence accorded the recitation of Homer? Tyrants generally were patrons of art and letters, nor is it certain that such patronage was calculated solely as a means of appeasing and diverting an unruly populace. Furthermore, the worship of Dionysus, though new when compared with that of the Olympian deities as a whole, was vastly more ancient than the time of Peisistratus. Little himself remarks in passing that a temple had been erected for the god at Athens as early as 600 B.C. How much earlier his worshipers had honored Dionysus with song and dance in the Athenian agora is not definitely known. At all events Peisistratus does not deserve credit for having invented Attic drama, and it may be doubted that Thespis, when in 534 B.C. he became the first to produce drama with the state as sponsor, made radical adjust-

ments in his art to suit the tyrant's needs or consciously became a partner in a political undertaking. It seems equally fanciful to suggest that the ten tribes newly created by Cleisthenes with the purpose of breaking the power and the dangerous rivalry of the four tribes thus displaced needed the Dionysia as "a painless outlet." The tribe was to remain into Roman times as a feature of Athenian political machinery, but that Cleisthenes was able at one stroke to replace the ancient tribes with ten of his own manufacture would suggest that Athens was no longer primitive to the extent of treasuring tribal ritual and tribal taboos. Yet Little explains (p. 10) that the Dionysia was "an illusion of conflict, a re-enactment of an earlier struggle. Tribe against tribe, the Athenians competed at the festival on equal terms: from the tribesmen came the members of the rival choruses; to the victorious tribe went the credit of winning." If this means anything, it must surely mean that Cleisthenes was deliberately fostering a new tribal strife to replace the old.

Support for this theory of vicarious conflict—a social catharsis, if we may borrow the terminology of Aristotle—is sought in the extant dramas. Thus it is pointed out (p. 10) that "in the earliest play of Æschylus (presumably the *Suppliants*) and more obviously in comedy the strife of group with group dictates the course of the plot." To be sure, conflict has always been of the essence of drama insofar as drama is a portrayal of life, and Attic tragedy is no exception to the rule, but the conflict in tragedy is a conflict of ideas and ambitions as seen at work in individuals rather than a conflict between groups of whatever sort. In the comedy of Aristophanes we do find group conflict a prominent feature in the handling of the chorus, but it is to be noted that those comedies come precisely at the period when Little points to Euripides as illustrating the effect of the substitution of the individual for the tribe. Furthermore, whatever be the origin of the *agon* of comedy, though the chorus often divides into two warring camps in its advocacy of this or that formula, the conflict usually concerns primarily the individual and his ideas.

To the present reviewer the fundamental weakness in this book lies in the tendency to see ulterior motives where none may reasonably be found and to resort to allegorical interpretation where a natural interpretation is ready to hand. Thus (p. 30) in an analysis of the *Eumenides* we read: "This gathering is highly symbolic. To the Athenian audience Apollo represents visibly Enlightened Religious Conscience; Athene, Attic Law; the leader of the chorus is the spokesman for Attic Public Opinion, represented by the chorus itself; the prosecuting Furies are the Curse which descends on whoever infringes tribal law." It may be noted, parenthetically, that Little here is guilty of substituting for the real chorus (the Furies) the Athenian elders who have been called in to adjudicate the case on trial. In commenting upon the famous passage in that same play (lines 658-661) in which Apollo argues that the loyalty of the son was due the father rather than the mother, Little remarks: "But the argument has a peculiar emotional rationale, if we remember that Athene was herself a disguised form of the ancient pre-Greek mother goddess, who in Minoan and Mycenaean worship had been supreme, and had stood, perhaps, as symbol of matrilineal society." Are we to suppose that the audience was thinking of that, and was Æschylus attempting to substitute a new concept of sonship for an inherited belief that was still alive and operating in Athens? Apparently Little would have us think so, and therefore he is led to mistranslate line 734—which in the careful version of Smyth is rendered "My office it is now to give final judgment"—so as to read "For what remains mine is the right to judge," and he adds by way of interpretation of the passage: "The matrilineal principle, Athene, abdicates of her own free will before the patrilineal, for no valid reason that we can logically endorse,

but on grounds which had an emotional validity for the Athenian audience of the time."

Upon laying down this little book, the reviewer is moved to wonder whether, after all, the question posed in the preface—"Why do people continue to read these plays"—may not have a quite simple answer, namely, because they are readable, because, despite their remoteness in time and place, despite certain fairly obvious differences in social conditions and inherited beliefs and customs, they deal with human beings whom the poet has made very real and whose problems know no limit of time or space or speech but are eternal and universal.

H. LAMAR CROSBY

On Beginning from Within, by Douglas V. Steere, New York, Harper, 1943, pp. xvii, 149, \$1.50.

A professor of philosophy at Haverford College sounds out the call for inwardness in religion. Against the collectivist tendencies of our age, which minimize the significance of the individual and glorify the mass, Professor Steere contends that the Christian religion has individual roots and that it is concerned with the growth of inward life within man. Indeed, he states the central theme of his book in these words: "These essays will maintain throughout that the core of the Christian religion is to be found in this personal solicitation by God, made manifest in Jesus Christ; in this divine caring, not *en masse*, but for each individual that has ever entered the world, a caring that gives to each individual an infinite worth . . ." (p. xiv). Accepting this thesis, the significance of the individual and the desirability of inwardness in religion are both foregone conclusions.

The primary way of God's working upon men and society is through his saints. A saint is defined as "a Christian individual in full degree and nothing more" (p. 9). The saints are not only good; they are also devout. A good man is one who does good from compulsion, with no sense of gladness. A devout man is one who does good out of sheer joy. Such are the saints, and they are the constant renewers of the life of society, preserving it from putrefaction and disintegration. Caring for individual men and women, rather than for mankind as a vague and abstract mass, the saints are the great doers of good in life. They make themselves "responsible for other men's sins." Only because of such men is there hope that a better world will come into being.

Saints or apostles are not born, however. They are made. They are made as their lives are opened to the divine solicitude of God. To prepare their lives for this, many of the saints have employed a specific spiritual discipline. They have used aids to uncover their true selves until the ground of their being lies exposed to the saving and revitalizing action of God. Some of them have left records of their spiritual schooling, as has Ignatius Loyola in his *Spiritual Exercises*, based upon the disciplines which he employed upon himself while in retreat in a cave at Manresa in Spain. The purpose of these exercises was to train the soul in the way of Jesus that there might result a complete commitment of the life and will to God and his purposes. Professor Steere feels it to be imperative that some such set of spiritual exercises be found for the deepening of the life of modern Christians. Indeed, he suggests that an inestimable service would be rendered this generation by someone who would refashion Ignatius' *Spiritual Exercises*, changing them from the type of military obedience upon which they are based to "the type of obedience that becomes a son" or "a type of obedience that becomes a human friend of 'the friend behind phenomena'" (p. 64).

The last chapter, delivered as the Ingersoll lecture on immortality at Harvard

University in 1942, sounds a note seldom struck; namely, the wisdom of preparing for death. Just what death is and what it involves we cannot know. Behind each discovery in life there hangs another curtain, the final one of which is death. While Professor Steere offers no hope of lifting this last curtain of mystery, yet he does believe that there is possible a preparation for death while we live day by day. Indeed, his thesis in this chapter is that "death illuminates life" (p. 117). As I die little deaths through self-forgetfulness, the refusal to put pride before righteousness, the acceptance of the penalties of honesty rather than the fruits of dishonesty, and the walking of the sometimes hard and materially unprofitable ways of mercy and love, I discover that my "inner *Me*" instead of disintegrating becomes stronger. Through these little deaths I am released for fuller life and prepared for the greater death of the body. Concerning this, too, I gain assurance from life that though the *Me* seems to die, it can become alive to God as never before.

The volume as a whole is an appeal that we develop a fresh concern with Christian nurture to offset the mass shallowness of our collectivist age. As such, it is a challenging recognition of the importance of the individual and of his part in the renewal of all social and world life. For the minister the volume will be valuable not alone for its analysis of the ways of the spiritual life, but also, from a practical point of view, for its many specific disclosures of this quality of life functioning in individual saints and apostles.

GEORGE W. DAVIS

The Earliest Gospel, by Frederick C. Grant, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, 1943, pp. 270, \$2.50.

This is an able and important volume. The author, Frederick C. Grant, long known to critical circles, whose name, too, is destined to be perpetuated in the work of his son (see pp. 34 n., 53 n.), brings to the study of Mark and of the earliest gospel tradition a lifetime of scholarship. *The Earliest Gospel* is an advance on the relevant sections of *The Growth of the Gospels* (1933) chiefly with reference to the contributions of form criticism, whose German works Grant has mediated to English readers, and which he prefers to call *tradition criticism* (p. 41). To this universally controlling viewpoint, Grant adds the insights gained from the untranslated German studies, *Galilee and Jerusalem* (1937) by Ernst Lohmeyer, and *The Influence of Pauline Theology in the Gospel of Mark* (1923) by Martin Werner, whom Grant thus introduces to English readers for the first time. The book is really a collection of Markan studies semi-independent of each other.

After delineating the oral gospel as fact and interpretation from the very beginning—i.e., a theological (though not uniform, p. 23) understanding of the life of Jesus based on the *fact* of the resurrection and proclaiming the *message* of coming judgment with Christ as judge, the promise of salvation through repentance and trust, and the adducing of supporting evidence from Jesus' life and ministry (p. 19)—Dr. Grant finds Mark to be so much a reflection of the common tradition that almost any author besides Mark could have written the gospel (p. 38 n.). Mark was not the "young man" of Mark 14: 51, 52 (p. 44), nor the Mark of Acts (p. 52), nor an author as such (p. 54). Indulging his fancy, Grant pictures him as an unartistic but literate Roman Christian, perhaps "a clerk in a mercantile establishment" (p. 53), who did indeed have a connection with Peter as the Elder (*via* Papias) claimed and the gospel seems to bear out, especially in chapter 1 (p. 36). But Papias' words, rightly understood, make Mark simply the transmitter of the oral tradition, and, as Acts shows (e.g., 10: 37-43), this tradition already bore the stamp of a general outline of the life of Jesus. It is this which constitutes the "order" (of events, not of

arrangement of material for, say, didactic purposes, p. 52) of Mark. Of what items, then, did the evangelic tradition consist? First, the passion narrative, which in Chap. VIII Dr. Grant examines in detail, quite in the manner of the form critic, and reconstructs. The noteworthy eliminations as secondary are the agony in Gethsemane, the trial before the high priest, and the narrative of the empty tomb—"Mark had no resurrection narrative" (p. 179). He allows to stand the last supper and the youth in the garden, but brackets the prediction of the betrayer and Peter's denials as additional material inserted by Mark. The account ends, as the gospel begins, with the phrase, "Son of God." (In the discussion Grant does not carefully distinguish between "the old Roman passion narrative," p. 187, and the final form of it in the gospel.) All else is additional, some by Mark and some presumably by others, and Mark 14:28 and 16:7 "may be later even than the Gospel of Luke, though earlier than Matthew" (p. 59). Here again Grant is not as clear as he ought to be, for he has emphasized the homogeneity of Mark's style (p. 32). Another class of material is the thirteen, or fifteen, controversies, listed on p. 60, four Galilean, the rest Judean (p. 61). Into this material was inserted the Petrine element, accounting for Mark's "vividness" (p. 71); sayings on discipleship paralleling if not quoting Q; "the little apocalypse" of chapter 13; and some clearly legendary (in the technical sense of canonized saga) material. A special problem is posed by the fourteen "son of man" sayings, which reflect a pre-Markan theological point of view (p. 63), are separable from the gospel material, but are deliberately inserted by Mark himself. The Aramaic outcroppings suggest that the gospel tradition as a whole derived largely from Palestine and circulated as independent pericopes originally in that language, probably translated piecemeal "as anyone was able," to borrow Papias' phrase (p. 90); while the Latin words betray the Græco-Roman medium through which the tradition passed (p. 70). To the problem whether Mark was written originally in Aramaic, Grant devotes a whole chapter (V), and after a sympathetic discussion emerges with a negative answer. He does allow, however, for the influence of the Aramaic idiom on the Greek and finds appeal to the "underlying" Aramaic helpful in certain difficult cases, but always in the traditional material, not in the editorial framework or where the work of Mark himself is to be found.

The significant part of the book to this reviewer was the discussion of Mark's theology. As the gospel of Galilee (pp. 130 f.), in contrast with Luke and John which are the gospels of Judea, Mark has a son-of-man Christology (Matthew and Luke interpret Jesus as the Jewish Messiah, and John as the eternal Logos veiled in flesh). Jesus went to Jerusalem only to die (p. 130) in accordance with the necessity of God's will as related somehow to the ransoming of "the many" (pp. 132 f.). But the resurrection guarantees the completion of the work of the son of man, who will return in glory—in Galilee (p. 131). Thus Lohmeyer, and the whole discussion in Chap. VI of the significance of Galilee in early Christianity is very important and pregnant of future work in gospel criticism. Up to this point, "Mark moves upon the level of the received tradition" (p. 148). Then, identifying the originally unequivocal ideas, son of man and son of God (pp. 152, 158, 196—see Mark 8:38), the latter phrase representing a Christology current in the Roman church as Paul reveals (Rom. 1:2-4), Mark pushes Jesus' postresurrection office back into his earthly life (pp. 153 f.), giving Jesus his consciousness of rank at his baptism and adding the confirmation of it in the story of the Transfiguration. The later evangelists took the Markan hint and pressed the origin of Jesus' rôle to his virgin birth (Matthew and Luke) and still farther to his preëxistence as the eternal Word (John). But Mark is the first to apply "the idea of conscious Messiahship to Jesus' earthly life"

(p. 156 n.). This Messiahship Jesus attempts to keep secret, though the demons know it, Peter confesses it (another antedating of a resurrection experience) and the Transfiguration confirms it, all of which emphasizes the artificiality of the concept, as Wrede long ago argued (p. 161). But Mark wrests by it a solution of Jesus' death: as son of man, already conscious of his mission, Jesus accepted death as part of his rôle for the "ransom of many," confidently looking to God for the final *dénouement* (with all the histrionic meaning of that word) in glory (pp. 78, 163, 185). With this representation in Mark some critics will disagree, holding that Jesus was in reality a prophet of the kingdom and was made son of man by the Christians of Galilee, the nationalistic Messiah by those of Judea, the son of God by Gentile Christians, motivated in each case by the spiritual experience of the resurrected and exalted Christ. That motive is not to be deplored but rather to be adopted, and as sharers with those first Christians in the life of the Spirit by which we too experience the resurrected Christ, we must write a Christology suitable to our day (pp. 84 f., 164 ff.). This intriguing interpretation of Mark and the gospel tradition invites comment, but space forbids the indulgence of the reviewer's own prejudices.

The rest of the book must be disposed of in a few words. Using Werner, Dr. Grant argues quite convincingly that Mark is not Pauline, testing the case with respect to Christology in its various concepts and arriving at the conclusion that "on every point the distinctively Pauline teaching is found to be absent in Mark, while their agreements nowhere go beyond the common basis of non-Pauline Gentile Christianity." The result is a later dating of Paul's conversion and the recognition of his greater dependence on the common tradition (p. 203). The book concludes with a discussion of the question of anti-Semitism in the New Testament and Christianity, rightly pointing out the Jewishness of Jesus and his teaching; and of the problem of the social gospel, holding that as a prophet Jesus was concerned with social ethics but in a limited way, for "his ethics has no concern with the secular relations of men, but only with men as members, or potential members, of the Kingdom of God" (p. 250). All sovereignty belongs to God, but one may render to Cæsar what is his due if it does not conflict with what one owes God. Mark is the gospel of heroic living, as Grant points out repeatedly (cf. pp. 87, 147, 227, 251). It sprang from the fires of the Neronian persecution.

The final question is, Is there a distinction between the gospel of Jesus and the gospel about Jesus (p. 81)? The answer is Yes and No. Yes, if what is meant is whether Jesus became in the experience of the church something more than he was on earth. But the answer is No if this development is regarded as unfortunate and in error. On the contrary it is the, not logical, but inevitable extension of Jesus' meaning in the experience of men (p. 164) by the power of the Spirit (p. 84). Yet Grant's final word is to deplore the whole theological emphasis, in particular "the sentimental, saccharine, sickly-sweet Jesuolatry" (p. 258), and to place the emphasis on the kingdom of God.

It is a stimulating book not without inconsistency, repetitious in places, and somewhat disjointed. Like many of its kind, in settling some questions, it raises others.

CLINTON M. CHERRY

The Excavation of Tell Beit Mirsim: III, The Iron Age, by William Foxwell Albright, Vols. XXI-XXII of the *Annual of the American Schools of Oriental Research*, New Haven, 1943, pp. xxvi, 229, 73 plates, \$4.00.

Seventeen years after the beginning of excavation at Tell Beit Mirsim, the fourth and final volume describing the result of four campaigns at the site has

appeared. Thus Tell Beit Mirsim becomes one of the very few major sites in Palestine for which the results of excavation have been completely and adequately reported. This is not a spectacular site; few museum pieces have been found. The identification is not definite, although the excavator believes that probably it is the biblical Kirjath-sepher or Debir (p. 160). Yet the results of the faithful work of the American Schools here will be as widely used by archaeologists of the next generation as those of any other site in Palestine. The pottery found here in well-stratified layers is an extremely valuable index for the chronology of the second millennium and of half of the first.

This particular volume deals with the remains (with the exception of the pottery of the first three campaigns) of strata B and A. These two strata fall into the period of Palestine's Iron Age, extending from the conquest by the Israelites to the destruction of the town at the beginning of the sixth century. Professor Albright would date the destruction of the town by the Israelite invaders in the second half of the thirteenth century (p. 36). The Philistines destroyed the Israelite occupation shortly after 1050 B.C. (p. 37); Shishak, whose invasion Albright dates about 918 B.C., probably is responsible for the third destruction at the end of the Early Iron period. Again the town apparently suffered severely during Sennacherib's invasion in 701 (p. 65). For each of these occupations of the site there is a reliable picture of daily life as it was lived in this town of southern Palestine. The city walls, the gates, the architecture of public and private houses, implements, the industries of the community, the economic level of the inhabitants—all of these subjects are set forth in interesting detail in this report. Apparently Tell Beit Mirsim was a centre of the textile industry during the Iron II Age. Numerous dye plants found along with quantities of loom weights would indicate that there was a degree of specialization among the communities of southern Palestine. Albright gives a valuable discussion of the textile industry in this particular period of Palestinian history.

This work is not only a report of a particular site, but a compendium of comparative archaeology. In the discussion of the findings at Tell Beit Mirsim there is a wide drawing from an extensive knowledge of the archaeology of the Near East for comparative materials. A unique and extremely important chapter written by J. L. Kelso and J. Palin Thorley, professor of ceramics, University of Pittsburgh, on the potter's technique has been included in this volume. Here for the first time a ceramic expert has collaborated with a Palestinian archaeologist in a study of the techniques used by potters in ancient Palestine. Within the limits of a few pages is a nontechnical discussion of methods of making pottery, of clay, of firing, of the wheel, of "slips," of the kiln, and of the chemical composition of the material used for pottery. This enthusiastic evaluation of the art of the Palestinian potter is of interest:

. . . it can be frankly stated that for commercial ware the craftsmanship and the forms are better than for similarly employed wares of today. . . . On the whole, we do not produce any better shapes today. The best workmen were already close to "Greek" perfection and their work actually had more life and vitality to it than much of the more mathematically perfect Greek shapes. Indeed, these Israelite potters, if they had been employed in Greek pottery establishments at the period of the latter's best skill, could have quickly adjusted themselves to Greek refinements and their work would have been quite equal to that of the Greeks. Thus the old view that the Israelites had no artistic skill must certainly be revised in the field of ceramics (p. 100).

The publication of the Tell Beit Mirsim material in such a useful and yet economical manner is an achievement which deserves the thanks of that increasingly large group of people who are interested in a record of the life of the ancient world. It should serve as a model for the publication of much material now at hand, but as yet unavailable to students in the field.

JAMES B. PRITCHARD

Rebuilding Our World, by Willard L. Sperry, New York, Harper, 1943, pp. xi, 157, \$1.75.

Sectarians are suspicious of the preaching which is commonly heard in our college chapels, says Dean Sperry in the foreword to his volume of wartime sermons preached in the Harvard College Chapel.

In due time [he writes] some informed person should make a study of the American college chapel as we meet it in our privately endowed colleges and universities. Most of these chapels are technically nonsectarian; this merely means that in practice they are interdenominational. These chapels are, so far as I know, unique in the history of Christianity. They have no precedents in the past and no parallels in the Old World. Sectarians suspect them, and the institutions which maintain them, of being imperfectly religious. Ardent denominationalists fear that in such an atmosphere their young people may "lose their religion."

The dean is not troubled by these fears. He believes that college chapels render a special service to the Christian world and render it more effectively than does any other agency.

We are living at a time when the cause of Christian unity and church union has ceased to be the vague luxury that it once seemed and has become a spiritual and moral necessity. I venture to suggest that our American college chapels are, unconsciously rather than consciously, prophetic ventures in that direction and that many persons who will in maturity move resolutely in this direction will have had their first experience of church unity in these same chapels where all sorts and conditions of Christians worship together.

It may be, as Dean Sperry believes, that college congregations lead denominationism up the road toward something like universal agreement on matters of faith and practice. If they do that, they partly justify the kind of preaching which is being done by college preachers; partly, but not wholly, for the reconciling of sectarian differences is not the only nor the chief task of the ministry. Whether his sermon be spoken from a university rostrum or from the pulpit of a parish church, the preacher is under bonds to give spiritual assurances. Bewildered souls, of college age and beyond it, in every denomination, need to be persuaded of God as they seek the meaning of their own lives in a chaotic world. If it be true, and it probably is, that secular education widens the field of bewilderment, no one has greater need of reassurance than has the college student—unless it be the professor, who frequently does his part to befog the moral landscape.

A boy of that college generation which finished its course immediately before the outbreak of the present war had this to say about his experience with college religion: "I am sick of hearing preachers talk about me. They tell me every Sunday how wonderful I am and how much the world expects of me. They may begin with politics or world affairs, or economics, or 'pressing' social problems; but invariably they come back to me. I'd like to have college preachers tell me something about God, for a change; that is, if they know anything about him worth telling. I can't escape the feeling that almost any kind of god would be more significant for me than I can ever be for the world, great as they make me out to be."

This complaint, assuming that it speaks for many students, as the boy vowed it did, raises a suspicion of college preaching which is far more serious than any entertained by denominational statisticians. It might be worth while to study the chapel service with the purpose of determining its effect not only on denominational affiliations but also, and especially, on the spiritual life of the student. The parish minister who keeps in touch with his boys and girls through four years of undergraduate work feels misgivings about the chapels; he fears that they do not lend youth sufficient aid in its gropings after spiritual assurance. Young men and women,

confused by the offerings of the classroom, he suspects, ask for light only to have their attention called toward themselves and their darkening world.

Why is this? Is it because preachers, overawed by the academic setting, feel that they must say something about social conditions that will be profound enough to merit a nod from the presidential chair? Or is it that their own eyes see no intimations of God in the darkness of the modern world?

One does not suppose that Dean Sperry, who surely knows something about the deficiencies of college preaching, offers his sermons as models. But they might well be taken as such by men of fewer qualifications who aspire to preach before students. For, the chief characteristic of these wartime homilies is their ability to create an awareness of God. It is not that the preacher argues; there is nothing forensic about his sermons. A few years ago a brother minister named Sperry "The Interpreter." The name is well deserved, for there are few men in American pulpits who see the spiritual meaning of life with the dean's insight or speak what they see with his clarity. The particular sermons under review seem to be emanations of the spirit rather than labored productions of the conscious mind. This appearance of effortless flow is, of course, misleading. Such simplicity as Dean Sperry always achieves with either the written or the spoken word comes only by hard work. Yet, while every page bears witness that the original manuscript was stained by brain sweat, the result of each sermon is an offering of spiritual assurance and comfort.

There is much that might be said about the structure, the style, the literary qualities of these sermons; about their complete freedom from that sentimentalism and those preposterous demands which so often mar sermons addressed to young people. In reviewing the work of a new preacher one would be bound to give these features something more than bare mention; not so when the man is as widely and as favorably known as is Dean Sperry. It is enough to report that here are eighteen sermons which persuade without argument. No one of them says in so many words, "God is; and he is here with us." But many of them must have caused a goodly number of hearers to say it.

The method by which the preacher achieves this effect is not easily determined. Take the sermon entitled "Faithful in the Things That Are Another's." One is startled by the discovery that God is mentioned in it only once. How, then, does the sermon succeed in giving the reader a comfortable sense of the Divine Presence in the world; a sense of comfort, moreover, that quickens the soul with purpose to rise and act? The answer seems to be that truth held with conviction and spoken in simplicity always has a tendency to frame itself in God. Or again, even as a massive building implies the foundation on which it stands and tends to beget a sense of well-being and confidence in one who looks on its settled mass, so a sermon great with truth and reverence for life implies God and mediates an awareness of him to those who read or listen. Or, once more, asking of a figure of speech what no figure can quite do, one might say that, like Pippa's morning song, such a sermon wakes the conviction that all is right in God's world if not in the world of man.

Want of this ability to produce an unlabored awareness of God, an atmosphere of spiritual confidence in which men may feel themselves encouraged to "possess" their souls, is, perhaps, the chief defect of modern preaching. Therefore it may be only a kindness to suggest that even those ministers who cherish no expectations of preaching to college students might profit from reading these Harvard Chapel sermons. Certainly the level of American preaching would be appreciably raised could more ministers enter into the mood in which these wartime assurances were conceived and spoken.

ROBERT MUNSON GREY

American Freethought, 1860-1914, by Sidney Warren, New York, Columbia University Press, 1943, pp. 257, \$3.25.

After reading the volume on *Popular Freethought in America, 1825-1850* by Albert Post (reviewed in the CROZER QUARTERLY, January, 1944) and the present work by Dr. Warren, the reviewer is more than ever impressed with the tremendous amount of intellectual energy expended in this country during the last century. More than that, one is impressed with the terrible seriousness with which the giants of those days fought for the cause of truth as they saw it. It was a fight to the finish, and when the smoke of battle had cleared away it was evident to the impartial observer that the freethinkers had helped immeasurably in advancing the cause of scientific investigation, rigorousness of thinking, freedom of speech, and religious toleration.

In general the freethinkers were and are in agreement upon the following principles:

Firstly, they believe that the scientific method is the only acceptable one for determining the validity of reasoning. Second, they are agnostic in the sense that they believe nothing except that which is proven by science. Thirdly, they affirm the intelligibility of the universe, but do not attribute that intelligibility to immanent creation or transcendent design. . . . Finally, freethought is secular in character. Freethinkers believe that all human motivation should be inspired by the exigencies of the situation on earth, and not be conditioned by a concern with a future life.

They believe in an absolute separation of the church and state.

The appearance in 1859 of Darwin's *Origin of Species*, and the discoveries of Wallace, Tyndall, and others gave great encouragement to the cause of science and freethought. Though Darwin was repudiated at first by Christians everywhere, there finally emerged a group of writers who attempted (with partial success) to bridge the gap between the findings of the evolutionists and what was thought to be the essentials of Christian thought. John Fiske with his *Through Nature to God*, Henry Drummond in *Natural Law in the Spiritual World*, and Lyman Abbott with his many writings and sermons helped to make the theory of evolution such as to become acceptable to the intellectuals in the church, at least. Dr. Warren concludes that "the doctrine of evolution . . . tended to strengthen rather than weaken the cause of religion." Certainly the necessity of facing the findings and data of modern science made the church leaders more intellectually alert and forced them to see the folly of repudiating the finest scientific minds of their day.

While the epoch-making works of John W. Draper, *History of the Conflict between Religion and Science* (1874), and Andrew Dickson White, *A History of the Warfare of Science and Theology* (1876), made the clergy as a group boil with rage, there was no denying the amazing body of facts which these two gentlemen had put together. Whatever the interpretation, no one could successfully deny that institutionalized religion in the past had at nearly every turn tried to block the free inquiry of science, even in matters which might be regarded as purely secular. The fight for freedom of research, freedom of thought, and the right to publish the results of scientific investigation, all of these freedoms, which are today in this country generally accepted, are a priceless heritage which we owe in great measure to the untiring and almost fanatical devotion with which the freethinkers and their allies waged war on the intolerance of orthodoxy. There are a great many other factors which have brought us these liberties, of course, but in a day when freedom is a watchword (the four freedoms, *et al.*), the spiritual descendants of Tom Paine must not be forgotten.

Among the agnostics, atheists, and infidels, the outstanding personality was that of Robert G. Ingersoll. The silver-tongued orator of his generation spoke to hundreds

of thousands of people and was the devil's advocate supreme. He liked to goad the clergy and the believers, and, as a consequence, they shot their barbs at him more than at any other person, as the symbol of rank heresy. In spite of his destructive attitude toward the churches, the clergy, and most Christian thought, Ingersoll "expressed a basic faith in science. He possessed a deep veneration for its achievements and almost invariably championed it as the only factor that could alleviate men's suffering and discontent. He had an abiding faith in the progress of man and firmly believed that man was master of his own destiny. . . ."

The course of history moves on. Out of the fire and heat of debate, the crucibles of scientific investigations, and the inquiries and reflections of the philosophers, contemporary religion has gained a great deal.

RAY H. ABRAMS

A Portrait of Jesus, by Sherwood Eddy, New York, Harper, 1943, pp. xvi, 231, \$2.00.

This volume is well described by its subtitle: "A Twentieth Century Interpretation of Christ." The writer is favorably known in the religious field as a worker, traveler, and author. While he has not won his laurels in the special area of New Testament study, the able scholarship manifested in this book justifies his claim that he has been carefully studying the life of Christ "some fifty years."

The writer approaches his subject with an open mind and a liberal spirit. He justifies the addition of another to the many biographies of Jesus by the present need of relating the results of the modern study of the life of Jesus to the "assurance" which in the "realm of faith" is gained through personal experience. He succeeds well in his effort "to be both critical and constructive."

The first of the three excellent appendices to the book is entitled "The Four Gospels as Historical Documents." In it the author says:

Though Christian documents are, compared to other ancient historic records, remarkably sober and trustworthy nowhere do they make any claim to infallibility. The earliest writers ascribe no supernatural inerrancy to any of the Gospels. Luke only claims that he has the necessary qualifications for writing an accurate history. He treats Mark and all his sources with great freedom. The writer of the Fourth Gospel plainly corrects Mark and Luke. No writer of the four Gospels had any idea of literal infallibility.

The writer recognizes the fact that the later experiences of the church were read back into its record of earlier events. He agrees with the view that the exaltation of Peter in Matt. 16: 18-19, embodies a "Jewish-Christian tradition" and "cannot be regarded as a genuine utterance of Jesus." The Great Commission also is considered to be "in the language and experience of the later church." He believes that a distinction must be made between the meaning of the Lord's supper as it really appeared at its first observance and the meaning which the church discovered in it later.

The Gospel of John is presented as the "first 'modernistic' Gospel," and a discerning contrast is made between it and the Synoptic gospels. The author declares that the "writer of the Fourth Gospel . . . never equates Jesus with God," and that a true understanding of this book, which he regards as "one of the greatest books of religion ever written," is possible only through the use of "poetic imagination."

In his handling of theological problems also the writer maintains his liberal spirit. He asserts that "there never has been one agreed-upon orthodox position in Judaism or Christianity concerning the nature of God, or his coming kingdom, the Messiah, or the person and work of Christ, but many varying points of view."

Throughout the book the writer holds true to his expressed aim, which is to make the reader face the "supreme question,—Can I come into such a relation to Jesus Christ that I may find God as my Father?" In pursuing this purpose he

declares Jesus to be "the supreme prophet and teacher of all mankind," and holds that he was "truly and always man . . . yet . . . in some unique way, 'God was in Christ.'" Further, he says, "Jesus is the final revelation of the nature of God to man and also the means of winning man back to God, of restoring the lost image of God in man." In this work of redemption the crucifixion had a large place. "Whatever theory or doctrine men have held,—the *fact* of the crucifixion had, by the appeal of Christ's sacrificial love for sinners, brought men to repentance,—Christ's death had actually brought about for many a reconciliation with God."

With regard to the resurrection, Dr. Eddy frankly admits the difficulties which the doctrine presents to the modern mind, and that the narratives concerning it are "most fragmentary and conflicting." He discerns in the gospels, however, three convictions on the part of disciples: that they personally know Jesus, that he was crucified, and that he had risen. To him the "*most convincing evidence of the resurrection was the new power in life and death that the world saw in changed men.*"

In view of the emphasis the author gives to the uniqueness of Jesus Christ as the only sufficient savior of the world, and his insistence that "In Christ we have the final assurance that no evolutionary development of the future can produce any higher form of 'goodness' than the cross, any higher revelation of God, or any other world Savior," it is interesting to note his views concerning eschatology. He expresses the opinion that "God's kingdom will yet be realized in part in history, but fully and completely beyond history," whatever that may mean. The alternative to this might be "an arbitrary miracle of God without human coöperation or response." In the story quoted from Dr. F. C. Burkitt, concerning the angel who questioned the Son of God as to what he had done on earth, the Lord is represented as giving an account of his life and of his execution by his enemies. When the angel, horrified, cried, "Was there no other way?" Jesus said, "No, *there was no other way.*" If the life, teachings, death, resurrection, and living presence of the Son of God cannot bring this sinful world to repentance and faith, what other method could God have to lead men to become his loyal subjects? If eventually a more effective way must be adopted, why not use it now and bring in the hoped for golden age without delay.

Many other important matters related to its important theme are discussed in the book, but these are presented to indicate something of the writer's approach to his subject. Critical discernment, broad understanding, and evangelistic earnestness unite to make this volume one which respects the reader's integrity of mind and stirs his heart.

RITTENHOUSE NEISSER

The British Traveller in America, 1836-1860, by Max Berger, New York, Columbia University Press, 1943, pp. 239, \$3.00.

In the middle decades of the nineteenth century a flood of spies streamed into the United States from Great Britain to search out the land. America had made good. The Union, consisting originally of a fringe of thirteen states on the Atlantic seaboard, had become a bond of thirty-four sovereign states, with adjacent territories, extending to the Pacific. A miracle had been performed in the peaceful surrender of certain political rights in recognition of federal authority. Democracy had also proved itself in the extreme constitutional enactment of a free church within the bounds of the entire national domain. In spite of gloomy predictions from lands of historic state churches religion had not only survived but had grown strong and influential in the life of the new Republic.

Reports had also reached the mother country of the marvellous progress that had been made in "the wilderness" across the sea: the uncalculable extent of its natural

resources just beginning to be tapped; the extravagant wealth of its citizens; the rapid growth of its cities; the strenuous energy that drove forward in invention and the conquest of distances by steamboats upon the rivers, the building of great canals, and the thrust of the railroad ever westward.

Men and women came to see for themselves and to profit financially from their visit. Of the thousands who made the journey approximately 230 of them published accounts of their travels. They found an eager public awaiting their reports in the homeland. And as is always the case, they saw what they wanted to see, reported what to them seemed significant, and very few had the original conceptions of their imaginations changed by the experiences of their sightseeing and contacts with the people of America.

Dr. Berger has studied and analyzed hundreds of these writings, giving us a compilation of the views expressed. The customs and character of the American people, the weakness or strength of the democratic government, slavery, education, and religion were the chief topics of discussion. In general the authors were friendly, not to say commendatory, though the lack of refinement and culture in the frontier areas drew their ridicule and condemnation.

The democratic form of government granting to all male citizens of maturity the right and privilege of the franchise received favorable comment. Slavery was usually condemned, and often Americans were charged with hypocrisy in boasting of their civil freedom while thousands of their fellow men were bought and sold as chattels. The public-school system of education received universal praise and often it was contrasted with that of the homeland to the detriment of the latter. The innumerable religious sects—Millerites, Shakers, Mormons, to mention but a few—amazed the visitors and received their caustic estimates. The more historic denominations were appraised according to the religious discipline of the writer. The conservatives thought religion in America too free, receiving the good-humored tolerance and support the people gave to law and general welfare. At heart Americans were indifferent to religion. The more liberal writers refuted these charges and asserted that services of worship were exceptionally well attended, church music was uniformly superior to that in England, ministers received adequate salaries, and benevolent causes were generously supported.

The British Traveller in America is a source book of facts not alone for the student of American history but for the general reader as well. Its value lies not alone in the judgment trained observers passed upon us one hundred years ago. Rather, it enables us to see ourselves as others saw us. Much that may have escaped our attention, or otherwise would not have been recorded and preserved, is here made permanent.

R. E. E. HARKNESS

English Institute Annual, 1942, New York, Columbia University Press, 1943, pp. xv, 207, \$2.50.

The *Annual* for 1942 quite lives up to its predecessors; it is timely, informative, and provoking. The three parts, chosen from the program given in full on pp. 137 f., are "Interpretation in Biography," "Authenticity and Attribution," and "Personality and Expression in Literature."

Biography, in the sense in which we understand it today, is not so old a form of literature as one might at first suppose. Moreover, like styles in clothing, it has changed its character through the years. The title of this section suggests our own present concern, for we are now emphasizing the fact that biography is not merely recorded facts and dates, but an interpretation and a conclusion resulting from a

process of analysis and synthesis. The result must be the portrait of a real person in a real situation, derived from an insistence upon understanding the inner experience of the subject. In Edmund Gosse's fine phrase biography is "the faithful portrait of a soul in its adventure through life."

Maurois gives five rules for writing a biography and five more rules for arranging the facts. That even rules strictly followed do not eliminate interpretation is evidenced by the fact that although he and Newman White have the same materials about Shelley, yet they arrive at different conclusions. All who are concerned with the lives of people and an understanding of their fellow journeymen will find here much to sharpen their wits and soften their wisdom.

The second section is composed of three papers in which the authors deal with the principles and difficulties involved in ascribing literary productions to definite individuals. Style, subject matter, external and internal evidence, all must be used, but often the results are only suppositional and provisional. When we consider, for example, that Swift could say of certain pamphlets shown to him for identification, "... there are some I do not remember, . . . I fancy I did not write any of these" (p. 125), the ascription of authorship becomes no easy matter, but rather a procedure for intelligent and humble caution. (The parallelism between English and biblical literature in this matter is enlightening to the serious student and monitory to all others.)

The first paper of the third section is by Henry A. Murray and is based upon a procedure in the English department of Harvard University, designed to study the relation between the writing of students and their personalities. Two general divisions in the group appear: subjective egocentrics and objective sociocentrics. The kind of person each writer is conditions the kind of literature he writes. This would seem obvious enough, but the reason may not be so obvious. It lies in the fact that each man chooses according to his sensibilities, taste, and æsthetic purposes. He is attracted to certain themes, characters, and images. He writes out of what he is. Murray believes that the reverse is also true: given a man's writings, we can know his personality. (To those interested in one of the most intensive and convincing pieces of work done in this field, the reviewer would recommend a reading of "Shakespeare's Imagery and What It Tells Us," by Caroline Spurgeon.)

The concluding paper is the work of S. I. Hayakawa, who will be remembered by many for his exceedingly readable *Language in Action*, an average man's introduction to semantics. Here exception is taken to the self-styled superiority of scientists to poets and their assertions that they alone deal with "facts" through the "intellect." These were sacrosanct statements a few years ago, but Hayakawa is in the main stream of more than linguistics when he declares that the only difference we allow today is that of fruition. Man attempts to relieve the tensions of life by the use of symbolic processes, one of which is affective language, thereby extending his experience beyond the immediate conditions of his environment. Thus poetry is a means of relieving tensions for both its creator and its recipient. The conclusion is that "literature is one of the instruments of a generalized 'mental hygiene'" (p. 175) with a promised land of pedagogy that makes the teaching of literature not merely one of diagnosis, but also of prognosis and prescription.

Hayakawa has written the most challenging paper in the volume and has given encouragement to those who believe and teach that cultural and liberal education can with confidence substitute an apologia for an apology.

ROBERT E. KEIGHTON

The Fall of Christianity, by G. J. Heering, New York, Fellowship Publications, 1943, pp. x, 243, \$1.50.

This "study of Christianity, the State, and War" was first published in 1928 (two years after the anticonscription manifesto with its seventy distinguished signers) in Dutch, in an English translation in 1930 in Great Britain, and now after some of its argument is antiquated in the United States. The long note on p. 228 was evidently added in the English edition. The American translation contains a foreword by E. Stanley Jones and an editor's postscript at p. 235.

The foreword attempts to justify the republication of the volume so long after its first appearance and in a totally different world situation on the basis of Christian need to disentangle itself from imperialism and war. But its author was certainly nodding when he wrote that war represents "comradeship in danger, willingness to sacrifice, abolition of classes, mutual aid, love of country, a cause" if his purpose was to discredit war. And the editor's postscript states that up to July, 1942 "over 64,000" persons in England had registered as conscientious objectors and in the United States up to September, 1943, "more than 10,000" had been so classified. From the pacifist point of view, this is not encouraging. Moreover, the Fellowship of Reconciliation after years of propaganda can boast a world membership of only some 28,000 or about one in every 75,000 of world population. How out of date this publication is in 1943 is illustrated by a quotation from Charles Clayton Morrison reading, "the genius of war is inseparably bound up with nationalism. *War can never be an international function.*"

If pacifist postulates and a pacifist construction of early Christian history are accepted, this discussion of *The Fall of Christianity* may be regarded as logical, acute, and at times brilliant. But those postulates are not tenable historically, psychologically, and sociologically as has so often been demonstrated.

If pacifism desires to attract serious attention to its claims, it must proceed to discover the actual causes for war and especially the wars of 1914-1918 and 1939-1945. What surprises in the present study is that with such promising clues as the importance of Fichte and Hegel in cultivating racialism and the deification of the state, the scent should not have been remorselessly followed. It was the German Christian concentration on the inner life and the exclusion of social emphasis from Christianity which made possible the birth and progress of *Volksreligion* with its "the State is the divine idea as it exists on earth." If the cult of racialism as represented in Gobineau, Lagarde, Richard Wagner, Stoecker, and Houston S. Chamberlain, which became the "decisive influence on a whole generation of young Germans and the inspiration of the entire Nazi literature," had been analyzed and woven into the author's pattern of pacifism, there might be some point to continuing the debate. And the author would undoubtedly have composed a different volume in 1943 from that produced in 1928. But with Hitler on the rampage for years and the vicious Protocols undermining the integrity of Germany's *Wahrheitssinn*, our author is unaware of this menace to his ideology and program. What was actually occurring in Germany escaped his attention because historical perspective was lacking, and thus ten pages could be devoted to Fichte and none to Hitler. Contempt for Mussolini is present, but the significance of fascism to the pacifist interpretation is not appreciated. Professor Heering did understand the experiment going on in Russia much better than most of his contemporaries (see the splendid paragraph on p. 207) and once more was on the verge of a discovery which would have altered his argument.

In summary, the author holds that "military service is not right at all." He was writing more than ten years prior to the invasion of Poland. But any man in

service may not refrain from combat, since sabotage is morally without sanction and is deceitful. In any case conscience must be obeyed. Since incitement to refuse military service is a punishable offense, the author cuts his Gordian knot produced by the indirect incitement of his argument to pacifism by concluding: "We would not have young men take a step, at our incitement or moral pressure, the full meaning of which they did not grasp and the consequences of which they could not bear." Thus the physical consequences of an ethical conclusion are evaded and this in the halcyon days before war broke!

CONRAD HENRY MOEHLMAN

The Philosophy of the Christian World Mission, by Edmund D. Soper, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, 1943, pp. 314, \$2.50.

"We cannot have a Christianity which is worthy of the name without a world mission which is the agency through which it expresses most significantly its note of universality," declares Professor Soper. But a great many changes, political, philosophical, theological, have taken place since the modern missionary movement had its inception with William Carey, and the Christian churches require a fresh apologia for their missionary enterprise. It is to supply an up-to-date justification for the continuance and expansion of Christian missions that this book has been written.

The work is divided into four sections: 1. "The Biblical Background," in which it is shown that Christian missions do not depend upon certain proof texts such as the Great Commission, but on the essential universality of the Christian religion; 2. "The World Mission in History," in which a condensed survey of the history of missions is recorded; 3. "Christianity as a World Religion," in which are considered the motives of missions in the light of changes in theological outlook, in relation to a more tolerant appreciation of values in non-Christian religions, and in reference to the question as to whether the claim that Christianity is uniquely the revelation of God can be justified; 4. "The Strategy of the World Mission," in which the effect of the rising tide of nationalism, especially in Asia, on Christian propaganda by foreign missionaries and the problem of the conflict of cultures are discussed. The Ecumenical Movement which has developed out of Christian missions, beginning specifically with the World Mission Conference in Edinburgh in 1910, is given a chapter in this section. There is also an appendix on Protestant missions in Latin America.

Dr. Soper was born in a missionary home and has been active in the missionary cause as an executive and as a teacher of missions and comparative religion. His point of view is progressive and liberal. He turns away from the extreme position of Dr. H. Kraemer, the Dutch scholar, the author of the preparatory volume for the Madras Conference entitled *The Christian Message in a non-Christian World* who sees no continuity between Christianity and any of the non-Christian religions, but he also rejects the thesis of Professor A. G. Baker who considers missions primarily in terms of a cross-fertilization of cultures. However, he finds in both these extremes suggestions of value. His own position is that the Christian churches are the custodians of God's supreme self-revelation in Jesus Christ and, therefore, under perpetual obligation as trustees to make this revelation known to all men everywhere. Pastors who are looking for an interpretation of Christian missions which will take the place of the rather shopworn advocacy of a generation which has passed will find this book most useful. It is the product of classroom lectures and discussion in a theological seminary.

GORDON POTEAT

Behind the Universe, by Louis Berman, New York, Harper, 1943, pp. 306, \$2.75.

A tremendous drama is being staged behind and within the universe. Man, at first sight, seems to walk the stage alone, a wanderer seeking a light which will at once guide his steps and prove that he is not a homeless waif. However, as he collects the facts in his situation and organizes them, he finds himself to be a filament of a cosmic light, a much needed extension of its own power.

The story, told briefly from the beginning, opens with the preparation of the world for life (protoplasm), by the extraordinary fitness of hydrogen, oxygen, and carbon. So fit, indeed, are these and their compounds for the production of protoplasm that "mechanical or quasi-mechanical laws of chance or averages" will not explain their coöperative function. "The co-existence, and coöperation as an ensemble, of these chemical elements and physical conditions, moving toward the production and facilitation of life, implies that our world was prepared for it by a cosmic psycho-activity."

This mind, we are told, is itself "inextricably involved" with cosmic energy, embracing, as it were, the whole of time and space, and driving toward a far-off ineffable goal. But alas, "the fateful phenomenon of entropy arises to oppose the universal process," and the cosmic psycho-activity, aware of its own inevitable death, seeks to counteract this dissipation of energy by setting the stage for the emergence of the life-personality.

The life-personality in its protoplasm has the "most concentrated [antientropic] concatenation of energy in the universe." In its own "memory, awareness, and direction" we find the explanation of the organized evolution of species which culminates in human psycho-activity. The human individual thus becomes, through the life-personality, a particular differentiation of the cosmic mind. Within his own unconscious life, meanwhile, a man participates in what has been styled a collective unconscious and a superconscious "which incorporates the contents and associations of all individual psycho-activities of our earth."

The individual, then, who seemed to be alone is in reality bound by inextricable lines of continuity to the organism we call the universe. If anything, he has lost his way. It is only as he *consciously* practices mystic participation, which will reconcile individuation and community, that he will find himself and make his contribution to the cosmic struggle.

In comment it must be said that the logic of Dr. Berman's plot demands that it end in tragedy. Even if it were a "grander conception of personal immortality" that men endure simply as "patterns of memory within God's being and becoming"; even if it were intelligible how men, who as mere filaments depend completely upon God, can assist him in his struggle for immortality, one still would wonder how the cosmic mind, which is as inextricably involved in its energy as the human mind is with its protoplasm, can survive the entropic dissipation of energy.

It has almost become fashionable to dodge the mind-body and mind-matter problem by some sort of psychophysical *monism*. Little hyphens, however, do not cross out big problems; they join letters and words much better than they do ideas! Unless such problems are solved as they are met, they add up—as they do in Dr. Berman's universe—to insoluble mysteries. This grand array of physical, biological, and psychological facts, teleologically organized, might have marched much more forcibly against skeptical minds had other philosophical problems been given more attention along the way.

PETER A. BERTOCCI

Son of Man and Kingdom of God, by Henry Burton Sharman, New York, Harper, 1943, pp. 145 (and index), \$2.50.

This work is, in a measure, a supplement to the author's *The Teaching of Jesus about the Future* published in 1909. In that work omission was made of the "reputed teaching of Jesus about his rejection, sufferings, death, resurrection, and appearances after the resurrection." Consideration is now given to the passages which deal with these matters. In Dr. Sharman's earlier work the interesting and scholarly Synoptic theory of Dr. Ernest DeWitt Burton, with its several documents, was followed. In this study the author simplifies his procedure by a division of the material into a Marcan source and a non-Markan source. The two *foci* of the investigation are the elusive phrase "son of man" and the almost equally elusive one "kingdom of God."

With impressive care and scholarship the writer examines the relevant passages, compares the parallels, and traces the modifications of what he considers to be the original, or approximately original, tradition through the literary sources. In many of these separate studies Dr. Sharman reaches conclusions as to literary modification under theological influence which will commend themselves to most, if not to all, of his readers. The patience and care of the author are admirable. It is perhaps the caution which he feels is proper in a study of these phrases which prompts him to what seems to be, at times, a too careful statement of conclusions which merit a bolder pronouncement. On occasion the conclusion is presented in the form of a rhetorical question.

This reviewer is in accord with the writer in the opinion that Jesus did not designate himself as the "son of man," yet he cannot so divest Jesus of connection with certain contemporary messianic hopes as to deny that he might have used the phrase as designating another than himself, and that not solely in a "dreaded crisis." But the problem remains difficult. Nor can he follow the conclusion of the painstaking and scholarly investigation of "kingdom of God" that Jesus modified the concept of the kingdom so thoroughly that it was, to all intention, unrelated to the eschatological hopes of the people among whom he lived and worked. There seems to be too much on the other side that could not be entirely later in origin. Grateful as New Testament scholars will be to Dr. Sharman for his careful study, it remains a matter of doubt as to how far his conclusions will help to a clearer understanding of these difficult matters. It is possible that a fuller use of some elements in form history might have helped the investigation.

ERNEST W. PARSONS

The Problem of Ezekiel, by William A. Irwin, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1943, pp. xx, 344, \$3.00.

The book of Ezekiel was admitted to the Jewish canon only after long hesitancy, and then with the limitation that it should be read by no one under thirty years of age. It passed into the Christian church and without restrictions was accepted as the work of Ezekiel, a captive in Babylonia, who wrote between 593 and 570 B.C. But apart from a few chapters and some scattered paragraphs it was neglected by both pulpit and study. Only within the last century have critical problems been raised. The value of the dated superscriptions has been questioned; half a dozen scholars have concluded that the book was a late pseudepigraph, written in Palestine; and a growing number have been convinced that it is a compilation. Twenty years ago Hölcher disturbed the peace by using his metrical foot rule which showed that fewer than one hundred and seventy verses could have been written by the poet Ezekiel.

Professor Irwin's *Ezekiel* has profited by the gains and the mistakes of earlier scholars. It is a critical introduction, not a commentary, and is the result of long and patient laboratory research. Here we see him at work, feeling his way, becoming more and more familiar with the facts, rejecting past errors, proving the criteria that distinguish the poet from the interpreter, and thus arriving at definite, if not dogmatic, conclusions. It is the test-tube process that every student who wishes to interpret the Scriptures intelligently must practice. Naturally the volume is critical. Hebrew and Greek abound; nevertheless the accompanying translations and explanations are so clear that any one who wishes may easily follow the line of argument.

The method is inductive. Objective evidence is a first consideration. The favorite words, phrases, structure, and idiosyncrasies of an author betray him to the reader. These can be determined only by familiarity not only with the book itself, but also with the whole range of Hebrew literature. To this must be added a minute knowledge of Israelitish history and religion. Slowly, by trial and error did Irwin become aware of the distinctive criteria of Ezekiel's oracles. Beginning with chap. 15, in which is found an oracle and a commentary thereon, he discovered specific characteristics separating the two, as well as a standard introduction to the oracle (pp. 17-19, 33-41, 269-282). This put him on the highway. But the subjective element rightly plays a part in the critical process. It is the critic who knows the objective facts, and if his mind and ear are sensitive he feels a rhythm and kinship in language that lies beyond words, phrases, and syntax (pp. 17, 279). This is an essential factor in all criticism; yet herein lies the danger of subjectivity, against which Irwin is always on guard.

This critical work has left to Ezekiel, who did not belong to Northern Israel, or to Babylonia, but who lived and prophesied in Jerusalem from about 600 B.C. until after the second captivity, some 250 passages in which are the genuine oracles of the prophet (pp. 283, 284, 307-321). Though with the passing years this may not prove to be the final count, at the present it is all to the good. Quality is the measure of a prophet, not quantity. Further, the commentators (a term preferable to *editors*), probably through four centuries, mayhap in Babylonia, and also in Alexandria, contributed much, that is, about three-fourths of chaps. 1-39, that is of historical and theological value (pp. 303-305, 334-337). This volume is the threshold to a new appreciation of the book of Ezekiel.

I. G. MATTHEWS

BOOK NOTICES

The Short Story of Jesus, by Walter Lowrie, New York, Scribner, 1943, pp. xv, 238, \$2.50.

For years there has been a constant flow of books dealing with the story of Jesus. This is another in that ever-increasing stream. In the preface the author states: "This little book is perhaps such as any theological student might be able to write, and yet perhaps not every professor of theology could write it." This sentence adequately introduces the book, for it is simply and interestingly written for average people. It does not claim to be a critical work, but does, at places, reflect an interest in the discipline and results of scholarship. The Gospel of Mark is used as a basis and with confidence. In comparison with older, critical lives of Jesus, this story is conservative and rather devotional in tone. Some of his conclusions are drawn without much regard for the more recent work in the field of Formgeschichte and historical criticism. His defense is simple and straightforward: "This little book, like the four Gospels, is written by a believer for believers" (p. 6). This approach is reflected when he speaks of Jesus adopting "baptism as the initiatory rite of his Church" (p. 17). He prefers the term God's reign to God's kingdom (p. 22). He refers to great sections of Mark as "Peter's Story" told from his personal experience (p. 24). Nevertheless he writes with a frankness that is refreshing, as when he says, when speaking of the birth stories: "I am content to see nothing but myth—a very beautiful myth" (p. 7). Again his devout faith in the miracles is refreshingly associated with a reliable conclusion: "We can no longer appeal to miracles as a proof of the divinity of our Lord" (p. 28). He also associates a deep confidence in the authenticity of the parables with the recognition that their interpretation "was colored to some extent by subsequent experience of the Church" (p. 65). Many people will welcome this book as a delightful and useful book for lay people. This seems to be its purpose, and it should be evaluated on that basis.

JAMES R. BRANTON

Children Need Adults, by Ruth Davis Perry, New York, Harper, 1943, pp. xiv, 136, \$1.50.

The author is the director in the nursery school and kindergarten of the Riverside Church, New York City. Her book is chock-full of wisdom refined in the fire of experience; it is a little book so full of understanding as to incline the reviewer to counsel every teacher of little children to get a copy, capture its insights, and put them to work for herself. This teacher senses the significance of the early years as do few who, as parents or teachers, have to do with young children. Three years, so frequently passed over as unimportant, are more determinative than any other like span of years. Students for the ministry who register in my classes in Christian education rarely choose to make a special study of the young child. In this they reflect popular opinion—and very unknowing opinion! Truly the child is parent to the adult he will become, a blessed or awful truth depending on what happens to him in the nursery-kindergarten-primary age. At the moment we are concerned about democracy—so we say. If we are, we shall be sure to begin to educate even the young child for democracy. Authority and stern discipline make for autocracy; development in freedom under guidance makes for democratic living. Here is where the wise adult is needed by the child—note the title of the book. This matter of the guidance of a child through the beginning years is the most delicate task to which

an adult ever set his hand; and what blind leaders, what bunglers, most of us are! The author with good insight treats such matters as: the child's strange world, the influence of the family and the nursery school, the rule of the adult, learning self-control, the value of punishment, need for approval, codes of behavior, need for attention, courtesy, bad language, mine and thine, tall tales, a sense of humor, etc. This chapter she calls "The Beginnings of Discipline." Four other chapters are "The Beginning of Routine," "The Beginning of Science," "The Beginnings of Art," and "The Beginnings of Religion." It is a book good to the last word.

W. R. MC NUTT

Some to Be Pastors, by Peter H. Pleune, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, 1943, pp. 191, \$1.50.

This is a book about many things, and rightly so because the pastor has to do with many things. It is a very wise, human document, and I think it is largely biographical, a fact which most contributes to its interest. The author, himself a pastor of many years and teacher of pastoral theology in the Presbyterian Seminary, Louisville, Ky., writes out of wide experience and much thought on the pastoral function. In the opening chapter the author stresses that the chief element in the pastoral ministry is the man himself. How very true! In another chapter he discusses the "understanding heart." Well, that, too, is pertinent. Unless one has understanding of people and their problems, he may do more harm than good. Verily he must "understand" really and scientifically, and not merely *think* that he understands. Chapter VIII, which is entitled "Pastoral Psychiatry" (not an exact or happy terminology), provides opportunity to say that there is a growing body of new insight and knowledge for the furthering of understanding. This presentation is well done. In other chapters the author deals with weddings, funerals, books, and time-vacation-money. The chapter, "Ministering to Children," in the reviewer's judgment should be the climax of the book, but it is not. It is a catalogue of this and that which may be done by pastor and church on behalf of the children—all good enough but not sensing the crucial significance which contemporary psychology gives to the first ten years. This is the strength of another book reviewed in this issue, namely, *Children Need Adults*, by Ruth Davis Perry. Both books are praiseworthy.

W. R. MC NUTT

Frederick Bohn Fisher, World Citizen, by Welthy Honsinger Fisher, New York, Macmillan, 1944, pp. xviii, 257, \$2.50.

One naturally approaches a biography written by a man's widow with a mental question mark. Mrs. Fisher, however, has handled her devoted subject with fine good taste and has produced a really worth-while and delightful book. She knew her husband for what he was, and has told us, without very much adoration and sentimentality. It is a valuable contribution to the religious history of our half of the twentieth century. Fred Fisher (that is how he was invariably known) was in India more or less and in other parts of the world a good deal, but he was always here in America, always in the swim of contemporary Christianity. The author tells that when it was announced that they were to be married a friend said to her, "But, my dear, aren't you afraid to marry a man who lives by such leaps?" That is the kind of man that Fred Fisher was: dead at fifty-six, he had occupied almost a score of important positions in the Methodist church and interdenominational organizations: pastor of the First Methodist Church, Boston; secretary of the Laymen's Missionary Movement; director of the Industrial Relations Department, Interchurch World

Movement; resident bishop, Calcutta area (1920-1930); pastor of the First Methodist Church, Ann Arbor, Michigan (1930-1934), and of the Central Methodist Church, Detroit (1934-1938). Rabindranath Tagore and C. F. Andrews were his good friends, and he talked to Mahatma Gandhi as he would to a commercial traveler in a Pullman smoking compartment. Reading the book, one feels that if he did scatter his Christian service around the world a little too much to be reckoned among great Christian leaders, he was nonetheless a most valuable and faithful servant in the vineyard of his Lord. He is still a man worth knowing!

MITCHELL BRONK

Boys and Girls at Worship, by Marie Cole Powell, New York, Harper, 1943, pp. xxv, 198, \$2.00.

A book of story material, picture interpretations, appropriate hymns, and contemporary verse. The six services are grouped around Dreams, Creators with God, Our Friends, Jesus, Christmas, and The God of the Universe. The author is chairman of religious education, School of Religious and Social Work, Boston University. Her Introduction presents the need of "a sense of purpose" and "glimpses into possible depths of experience." The purpose is the quickening of quests in living, a sustaining belief in the values of beauty, goodness, and truth, and sincere religious experience—"spiritual and moral training to help in standing firm under the pressure of life." While the author favors "free" prayer, the reviewer regrets the failure to appreciate the educational value of the church's treasury of prayer, particularly of certain collects. The book will prove of value to leaders of worship in church school and for junior sermons.

JAMES SHACKELFORD DAUERTY

Christian Behaviour, by C. S. Lewis, New York, Macmillan, 1943, pp. 70, \$1.00.

To say that this volume is by the author of *The Screwtape Letters* is enough for the members of the C. S. Lewis cult. To add that it is by the man who wrote *Out of the Silent Planet* will include many others. That the volume is a companion to *The Case for Christianity*—also a series of talks broadcast in England—will characterize its contents. The brief chapters offer a discussion of Christian morality in language that is concise, but far from trite, made clear by illustrations that are always contemporaneous and often brilliant, without being banal. Lewis has a flair for the simplicities of Anglo-Saxon monosyllables. His sentences are deceptive; they carry a heavy burden of serious thought and the basic principles of conduct. He succeeds in making goodness an adventure in living.

ROBERT E. KEIGHTON

BOOKS RECEIVED

The Rights of Infants, by Margaret A. Ribble, New York, Columbia University Press, 1943, pp. x, 118, \$1.75.

A practicing psychiatrist, who is also a doctor of medicine, insists that babies need emotional as well as physical care. Though she appears to feel that mothers are the normal ones to exert this care, a growing number of pastors will probably find it of interest.

**Education and Health of the Partially Seeing Child*, by Winifred Hathaway, New York, Columbia University Press, 1943, pp. xiii, 216, \$2.50.

**Proceedings of the National Conference of Social Work*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1943, pp. x, 491, \$5.00.

**Contemporary Thinking about Jesus: An Anthology*, compiled by Thomas S. Kepler, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, 1944, pp. 429, \$3.50.

Points for Emphasis, by Hight C. Moore, Nashville, Broadman, 1943, pp. 200, \$0.35.

A vest-pocket commentary on the International Sunday School Lessons for 1944.

**The Vitality of the Christian Faith*, edited by George F. Thomas, New York, Harper, 1944, pp. xi, 358, \$3.00.

The March of Medicine, New York, Columbia University Press, 1943, pp. xii, 151, \$2.00.

The eighth series of the valuable New York Academy of Medicine's Lectures to the Laity. Discoveries along the frontiers are chronicled and the significance of this knowledge is pointed out.

**The Creative Delivery of Sermons*, by Robert White Kirkpatrick, New York, Macmillan, 1944, pp. xxii, 235, \$2.50.

Life's Unanswered Questions, by Harold Cooke Phillips, New York, Harper, 1944, pp. ix, 170, \$1.50.

Sixteen "timely sermons on timeless questions" by the pastor of the First Baptist Church in Cleveland.

The Altar and the World, by Bernard Iddings Bell, New York, Harper, 1944, pp. 148, \$1.25.

Fourteen chapters dealing with the Liturgy, "which is the only service of worship which Jesus commanded His followers to perform." The author has designed it to be read "by those, of any Church or none, who are interested in the relationship between Worship and Social Action." A slight acquaintance with the language of Canterbury, if not of Rome, will prove helpful.

**The Great Century: In Northern Africa and Asia*, by Kenneth Scott Latourette, New York, Harper, 1944, pp. ix, 502, \$4.00.

While America Slept, by D. F. Fleming, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, 1944, pp. 87, \$1.00 (paper).

A contemporary analysis of world events from the fall of France to Pearl Harbor.

**The Jewish Community in Russia, 1772-1844*, by Isaac Levitats, New York, Columbia University Press, 1943, pp. 300, \$3.50.

**The Thrill of Tradition*, by James Moffatt, New York, Macmillan, 1944, pp. xi, 201, \$2.00.

Pattern for Peacemakers, by R. Alfred Hassler, New York, Fellowship Publications, ©1943, pp. 44, \$0.25 (paper).

Exit Empire, by Vernon Nash, New York, Fellowship Publications, ©1943, pp. 47, \$0.25 (paper).

The Next Peace, by R. Alfred Hassler, New York, Fellowship Publications, 1944, pp. 64, \$0.25 (paper).

**Church and State in Education*, by William Clayton Bower, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, ©1944, pp. v, 103, \$1.00.

**The Challenge of Israel's Faith*, by G. Ernest Wright, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, ©1944, pp. ix, 108, \$1.50.

**A Preface to Prayer*, by Gerald Heard, New York, Harper, ©1944, pp. xvi, 250, \$2.00.

**From Science to God*, by Karl Schmidt, New York, Harper, ©1944, pp. x, 169, \$2.00.

* To be reviewed.